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Preface 
The majority of the work for this thesis was completed as a series of stand alone articles published 
(or in one case, accepted for publication) in journals with a double blind peer review system. There is 
also one case note that has been published unrefereed.  The fact that much of the thesis has already 
been published has certain ramifications for the thesis, relating to both content and style. Of 
necessity each published article introduces the topic, and the workings of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) (TPA), afresh.  Similarly, each article explores, to varying degrees, the possibility of 
reform in that particular area. Although each is tailored to the particular subtopic in question, a 
degree of overlap and repetition is unavoidable. 
 
I have decided to set out the published articles in the format in which they have been published.  This 
lends authenticity to the work, and makes it clear where the published work begins and ends.  
However, it does mean that each section which is a published work will be presented in the house 
style of the particular journal in which it has appeared, complete with its own footnoting. 
 
Aside from the introduction, each article forms the main bulk of one chapter. All chapters will 
conclude with an outline of any significant developments which may have arisen since the publication 
of the article, so as to bring the article ‘up to date’.  The abbreviations adopted in each article are 
continued throughout the balance of that chapter. 
 
The interest in the topic of TPA and maritime law, along with the growing body of cases, makes it 
clear that the impact of the TPA on maritime law is a real and significant issue to the maritime 
industry and maritime law community in Australia. Outside the author’s work, there has been little 
analysis published in Australia or elsewhere.     iv 
Abstract 
 
The trade of shipping is necessarily international in nature.  Courts and international bodies often 
express the need to ensure international consistency in matters of maritime law.  However, it has 
been an extremely difficult goal to achieve.  Many countries have refused to be party to international 
conventions that seek to ensure comity.  Some have enacted laws that reflect part but not all of those 
conventions, or seek to improve the protection offered by the conventions.  The domestic law of each 
country also adds its own flavour to shipping law as recognised and applied by the courts in that 
jurisdiction. 
 
In 1974 Australia enacted the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), heralding a new era in 
corporate and commercial law.  However, its impact on maritime law on Australia has only been felt 
over the last 10 – 15 years.  It is potentially relevant to many areas of maritime law, including 
carriage of goods by sea, cruise ships, and towage.  This thesis explores the encroachment of the 
TPA on a number of different areas of shipping law, using the few case examples on offer and 
extrapolating the impact that the TPA may have.  It also considers the extent to which the TPA is 
stymied by simple contractual agreements to litigate or arbitrate in a non Australian forum, despite 
the TPA’s status as a mandatory statute within Australia.  
 
Raised at various points in the thesis is the possibility of law reform, which is a complex compendium 
of issues overlaid with a moral dimension – does shipping, as an industry, deserve to be exempted 
from the operation of the Act which sets a high standard of corporate behaviour?  If so, how could 
that reform be shaped?  In the meantime, what steps can the shipping industry take to work within 
the legal framework of the TPA?   v 
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Chapter One 
 
The Trade Practices Act and Shipping Law in Australia – 
An Introduction 
 
 
 
 
  1It is no surprise that the Australian economy is heavily dependent on international shipping. Australia 
is an island nation. It produces and exports minerals and primary produce, which by their nature 
require transportation by sea.
1  Australia also has a significant demand for imports.
2 The vast 
majority of our exports and imports are carried by sea.
3 Their transportation is the result of private 
contracts between those who own or manage the vessels, and those with an interest
4 in the cargo.  
While the act of taking a finite shipment of goods and delivering it elsewhere in the world may appear 
to be a simple physical act, the process is rendered complex by the number of different parties 
involved, the various responsibilities they assume and the terms and conditions on which they are 
prepared to accept those responsibilities.  As between the various parties, tasks are assigned, risks 
are adjudged and insurances arranged accordingly.  When a ship is carrying many consignments for 
different parties, that complexity is multiplied accordingly. 
 
Those parties involved in the transportation of goods (and related maritime arrangements) would 
undoubtedly regard them as commercial arrangements first and foremost, rather than legal ones.  
But the legal framework is critically important. The wheels of international commerce work best when 
‘greased’ by a receptive legal framework. Those regularly involved in maritime commerce will attempt 
to frame their own practices around laws in a manner that ensures the outcome of any particular 
dispute is as certain as possible, leading to the lowest overheads or transaction costs.
5 This striving 
                                                      
1 For example, in 2004–05, the maritime transport sector’s share of Australia’s international trade was 680.5 million 
tonnes valued at $215.2 billion. In Australia’s total trade this represented 75.4 per cent by value, and 99.9 per cent by 
weight and tonne kilometres: Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, 
Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics [BITRE] 2007 ‘Australian Maritime Trade: 2000–01 to 2004–
05’ (Working Paper 69, BITRE, Canberra, ACT), ix. 
2 Between 2004–05 and 2005–06 Australian imports increased by 12.5 per cent: ibid 9. 
3 Above n 1. 
4 Either as buyer or seller. 
5Something that is usually achieved by choosing the law applicable to the contract and the forum for any disputes: 
Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws (2001) (Whincop & Keyes) 29.  Chapter 5 
of this thesis deals with the extent to which such selections can override the operation of the TPA. 
  2for certainty of outcome is all the more challenging when the legal frameworks of various countries 
are relevant to performance. 
 
As a result, it is to be expected that the laws relating to maritime and trade have developed with an 
international focus. This can be traced back through history to ancient times,
6 and in more modern 
times has come about through various measures aiming to standardise international maritime and 
trade law.  Manifestations of this include the many international Conventions concerning the 
commercial aspects of shipping, such as carriage of goods
7 and passengers,
8 limitation 
conventions,
9 and those in related fields such as arbitration.
10  International bodies such as 
UNIDROIT,
11 UNCITRAL
12 and CMI
13 have developed model laws and principles that different 
countries - or even parties - can adopt, leading to enhanced uniformity.
14 In the face of ambiguity, 
                                                      
6 Justice James Allsop ‘International Commercial Law, Maritime Law and Dispute Resolution: The Place of Australia, 
New Zealand and the Asia Pacific Region in The Coming Years’ (2007) 21 Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law 
Journal 1, 2. 
7 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading 1924 done at the Hague (Hague 
Rules); Visby Protocol to the Brussels Convention (1968) (together with the Hague Rules, known as the Hague-Visby 
Rules); SDR protocol amending the Brussels Convention as amended by the Visby Protocol (1979) (SDR Protocol); 
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea done at Hamburg 31 March 1978 (Hamburg Rules).   
8 Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 (Athens Convention) 1976 
Protocol to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974, done in 
London 1976 (1976 Protocol); 2002 Protocol to the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their 
Luggage by Sea 1974 (2002 Protocol). 
9 International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships 1957 (1957 Limitation 
Convention); Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims done at London 1976 (1976 Limitation Convention); 
1996 Protocol to amend Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims of 19 November 1976 (1996 Protocol) 
10 Eg United Nations Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards entered into in New York 1958 (New 
York Convention). For more see above n 6 at 6, 7. 
11 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Institut International Pour L’unification du Droit Prive). 
12 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
13 Comite Maritime International. 
14 Justice Allsop (above n 6, 7) refers to UNCITRAL Model Laws on Electronic Signatures  2001; EC Directives on 
Electronic Commerce 2000; EC Directives on Electronic Signatures 1999; UNCITRAL Model Laws on Electronic 
Commerce, 1996; CMI Rules for Electronic Bills of Lading 1990; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 1985 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 11 April 1980: 
 
  3courts will seek a solution that promotes uniformity rather than detracts from it.
15  As such, it is clear 
that individual countries recognise the importance of a degree of ‘commonality’
16 between the laws 
of different countries in matters of international trade – and that significant deviation from 
commonality of laws is undesirable.  
International commercial law is a species of private law that is supranational or transnational. 
17
 
It is, of course, impossible to create total uniformity in the laws of different countries. Nevertheless, 
through a combination of the standardisation of contractual terms agreed by the parties, and 
legislative and judicial attempts to align legal regimes between countries, a ‘fuzzy’ alignment of 
applicable principles can be achieved. This gives transnational operators a degree of comfort that 
basic familiar concepts, and even those more complex concepts, are likely to be recognised in 
different legal jurisdictions.
18
 
However, unavoidably, the application of commercial maritime law in any particular instance
19 
involves the application of municipal (domestic) law to the dispute in question.
20  The particular court 
or panel seized of any dispute must apply the municipal law of that country, including any 
                                                      
15 As regards admiralty matters, see The Tolten [1946] P 135,142; (1946) L L Rep 349, 352 as cited in Sarah Derrington 
& James Turner The Law and Practice of Admiralty Matters (2007) [1.17]; and as regards interpretation of international 
carriage Conventions see Shipping Corp. of India Ltd v. Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Ltd(1980) 147 CLR 142, 159 
(Mason & Wilson JJ).
16 Justice Allsop, above n 6, 2.
17 Ibid. 
18 Of course, the plethora of different international conventions (such as the Hague, Hague Visby and Hamburg Rules) is 
also in and of itself, a challenge to the aim of international uniformity – but in this thesis, the emphasis is on the effect of 
municipal laws on international uniformity.
19 At least in the context of commercial law. 
20 The ‘Tojo Maru’ [1972] AC 242 at 290 – 291; adopted in Australia by Blunden v Commonwealth (2003) 218 CLR 330 
as cited in Allsop, above n 6, 5. 
  4International Conventions which that country has ratified.
21 The need to maintain comity with other 
nations is recognised by courts,
22 but must always give way to the will of municipal Parliament, 
which grants the courts their jurisdiction and to which the courts are bound.
23 A particular municipal 
law may be of great significance to that country, and it may not be willing to compromise on its 
application.
24 This thesis is concerned with one such municipal law and its effects on commercial 
maritime law in Australia. 
 
In Australia, one of the most powerful municipal laws relating to commerce is the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) (TPA).  It has many important parts, but for this thesis, the critical parts are those 
containing Sections 52 and 74. Those sections were primarily designed to protect consumers but 
their scope was not so limited.
25 Section 52,
26 in particular, is an extremely powerful provision which 
seeks to impose a standard of conduct on those participating in trade and commerce in Australia:  
 
(The TPA) is a statute of the highest importance in connection with commercial activity and 
behaviour in Australia and in the promotion of the welfare of Australians. The norms of 
conduct laid down in Pt V, including in particular s 52 dealing with misleading or deceptive 
conduct, and the ample and flexible relief made available in Pt VI, in particular the powers in 
s 87, illustrate the central importance of the Trade Practices Act to the regulation of 
commercial life and commerce in Australia.
27
 
                                                      
21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 1155 UNTS 331 Article 26, Article 27 (entered into force on 27 
January 1980). 
22 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia)Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 142; Federal Commerce 
and Navigation Co Ltd v Tradax Export SA (the Maratha Envoy) [1978] AC 1 at 8 (Lord Diplock). 
23 Above n 20.  
24This is explored further in Chapter 5 below. 
25 In the second reading speech for the Trade Practices Bill 1973 the Attorney General, the Honourable Senator Murphy 
said “The consumer protection provisions are to be found for the most part in Part V. Some of these provisions are 
expressly limited to transactions involving consumers.” Commonwealth Hansard, Senate Vol  57 p.1012. Second 
Reading 27 September 1973.(emphasis added). 
26 Which is discussed at length and quoted in the introductory sections to each chapter of this thesis. 
27 Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 238 ALR 457 at 504, [195] (Allsop J). 
  5The TPA has now been part of the municipal law of Australia for more than 30 years.  It has taken 
some time for the courts to explore and exploit the scope of the provisions, particularly s52. Through 
this development, it has gradually become apparent that the sphere of influence of the TPA can and 
does extend to disputes involving matters of maritime law.
28 It is probably fair to say that the 
expanding influence of the TPA has caught some in the maritime industry by surprise. To the extent 
that it constitutes a significant deviation from international comity, it is viewed as undesirable – 
particularly because it has the potential to cut across usual and accepted forms of liability in maritime 
law.  The reality is, however, that the TPA is the cornerstone of Australian commercial law;
29 as 
such, parties operating in this region ignore it at their peril. 
 
This thesis explores the uneasy relationship between the TPA and maritime law in Australia.  
 Despite its origins in consumer protection, it is now clear that the all-pervasive nature of the TPA 
means it can and will apply to maritime disputes caught within its purview.  This thesis argues that its 
application is appropriate for certain aspects of maritime law - such as cruise ship passengers and 
services provided wholly within Australia.  However, in relation to certain other international 
commercial maritime contracts, the application of the TPA can create discord; it results in Australia’s 
laws being out of step with that of our trading partners thus threatening international comity.  
Furthermore, it gives false hope to Plaintiffs based in Australia who might relish adding the TPA 
cause of action to their weaponry
30 but find themselves grasping for shadows should they be forced 
to litigate or arbitrate elsewhere.  The thesis explains why, as a result, Plaintiffs must engage in an 
                                                      
28 The first reported cases in which  s52 was alleged in a maritime matter were Comalco Aluminium Ltd  v Mogal Freight 
Services Pty Ltd (Oceanic Trader) (1993) 113 ALR 677 and Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd 
(1993) 117 ALR 507, both judgements of the Federal Court of Australia.    
29 Above n 27. 
30 Based on my view that the TPA cause of action can lead to liability that might otherwise not exist, I believe that there 
are substantive reasons why a plaintiff might seek to rely on the TPA; this does not entirely accord with the suggestion of 
Mary Keyes that ‘the use of TPA claims in foreign jurisdiction cases may be for strategic purposes.’ Mary Keyes 
Jurisdiction in International Litigation Federation Press (2005) 154. 
  6expensive and uncertain battle over jurisdiction in order to determine whether the TPA cause of 
action may be brought at all.  This thesis outlines where the law lacks clarity as to the application of 
the TPA, questions whether the TPA ought to apply to all commercial maritime matters and gives 
some suggestions for reform. 
 
This thesis unfolds as follows. The second chapter examines the effect of the TPA on contracts for 
the carriage of goods by sea. It outlines s52 and its related provisions and charts their evolution from 
consumer protection to a weapon wielded within private commercial transactions.  It then considers 
the territorial and extraterritorial reach of the TPA and why (and in what circumstances) overseas 
carriers might find themselves exposed to a TPA cause of action. It examines a number of maritime 
cases that have already been decided in Australia based on the TPA, and discusses the interface 
between TPA claims and the cargo liability regimes. In particular it highlights the uncertainty about 
the carriers’ ability to limit liability for claims in the manner in which shipowners have become 
accustomed. It points out that s52 is a weapon for both parties; a theme which is further developed in 
chapter 4. It concludes by posing the (partly) rhetorical question – whether s52 ought to have a place 
in maritime contracts enforced in Australia. 
 
Chapter 3 considers the TPA in the context of the law relating to carriage of passengers by sea. It 
explains that cruise ship operators operating from Australia or advertising in Australia are uniquely 
exposed to claims for breach of the TPA because they carry, in essence, an entire cargo of 
‘consumers’.  Such claims could relate to simple misrepresentations in advertising about what the 
cruise might be like; or the claims might be for personal injury or death sustained on board.  As 
regards the latter form of claim, the chapter notes that, ironically,
31 recent amendments to the TPA 
                                                      
31 Given the origins of the TPA as a consumer protection statute. 
  7as a result of the so called ‘public liability crisis’ have watered down and in some cases excised the 
ability of individuals to rely on the TPA in seeking damages.  Those amendments, and what they 
might mean for cruise ship operators, are discussed and critiqued; before concluding that there 
remains plenty of scope for a passenger to use the TPA to bring a claim against a cruise ship 
operator.  The article also examines the interplay between the TPA, contractual attempts to exclude 
liability, and international conventions limiting passengers’ claims and examines the current 
passenger liability regime in Australia in that regard. It concludes that cruise ship operators must 
navigate a murky seascape of liability under the TPA and would be well advised to carefully consider 
their obligations under the TPA. 
 
It is important to remember that shipowners are not only the provider of services but also the 
consumer of services.  Every vessel visiting port requires certain services at each port; such as 
pilotage, towage, stevedoring, shiprepairs and providoring. Chapter 4 deals with the application of 
the TPA where a maritime service is undertaken in Australia, using the example of towage contracts.  
In this context the emphasis is on s74 (3) TPA, which imposes an obligation to exercise due care and 
skill in a contract for the provision of services.  This chapter shows that the TPA can also be used by 
shipowners – not just against them. (Australian parties, while usually happy to rely on the TPA to 
support any claims of their own, might find that the boot is on the other foot in this regard.) This 
chapter anticipates then develops recent case law which has given guidance on the meaning of the 
s74(3) exception.  The chapter argues that the providers of maritime services in Australia ought to 
make relatively modest changes to their terms and conditions to allow them to legitimately limit their 
overall liability.
32 However, it may be that until the High Court rules on the matter,
33 the industries 
will maintain their ostrich-like stance.  
                                                      
32 Using s68A.  
  8 
Legal disputes arising in Australia involving the TPA and maritime law create headaches for parties, 
lawyers and courts alike; particularly where the parties had agreed to resolve their disputes 
somewhere other than Australia.  Almost invariably, resolving these disputes involves teams of 
lawyers; and increasingly (and regrettably) will also involve pre-emptive strikes by one or both parties 
to secure a ‘beneficial’ jurisdiction to hear the claim.    Chapter 5 looks at the theoretical issues and 
very practical problems resulting from a party wishing to rely on the TPA when there has been an 
agreement to litigate or arbitrate elsewhere than Australia.  The attitude of the English courts is 
critical to this chapter, given the dominance of England as a centre for resolution of maritime law 
matters, with either its courts, or its law, applying in many cases as a result of contractual agreement.  
Chapter 5 outlines how the English legal system stoically defends the principle of party autonomy. It 
explores how the English and Australian courts are on a collision course as regards the status of the 
TPA. This is particularly problematic for maritime law disputes as the underlying contracts often 
contain a contractual provision which, if allowed to operate, would render the application of the TPA 
unlikely. It explains why Australian parties might be ‘shell shocked’ by the lack of recognition given to 
foreign ‘mandatory’ statutes in England, but points out that it is a result of the primacy of the principle 
of autonomy of contract – a principle which the English are not prepared to compromise.  The 
chapter compares the experience of some other foreign ‘mandatory’ statutes before the English 
courts, as well as considering the fate of international attempts to allow recognition of such statutes, 
before drawing some lessons from that for Australia. It notes that there are signs that the judiciary, 
both in Australia and abroad, are taking creative approaches to the problem. It concludes, 
nonetheless, that currently the application of TPA to maritime law in Australia, and the English 
dismissal of the importance of the TPA once the parties have chosen an English forum, means that 
                                                                                                                                                                 
33 As at 13 May 2008, PNSL Berhad v Dalrymple Marine Services Pty Ltd; PNSL Berhad v The Owners of the Ship 
‘Koumala’ awaiting a hearing date for an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court.  
  9an Australian plaintiff wishing to rely upon TPA in those circumstances must undertake an 
undignified scramble for the courthouse in the hope of securing their preferred forum. Ultimately, the 
high stakes mean that the scramble must take place without sufficient time for due consideration of 
the strength of the TPA cause of action. 
 
This thesis argues that it is clear that the TPA does apply to maritime law in Australia, but the knitting 
together of maritime and TPA law in Australia is far from seamless. Bearing in mind the uppermost 
importance of certainty of legal outcomes in international maritime commerce, the best way to 
achieve clarity in the law is not to allow it to continue to develop in an ad hoc manner, tinkering with 
amendments or waiting for caselaw to develop incrementally.  Rather it is time for policymakers and 
legislators to take a considered and principled approach to the application of the TPA to maritime 
law.   
  10 
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  12Corporate Morality and Commercial Maritime
Contracts:
Considering the impact of the Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Australia), s 52 on carriage of
goods by sea
Kate Lewins*
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Australia), s 52 prohibits a corporation from
engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct. Its reach has extended beyond
consumer transactions, to commercial and even, in some circumstances, inter-
national transactions. After providing an outline of s 52, this article looks at the
circumstances in which the Trade Practices Act can apply to a contract of
carriage that has a nexus with Australia, even if one or both parties are not based
in Australia. The article reviews the potential impact of the Trade Practices Act
on carriage contracts generally and the Hague/Hague-Visby limitations in
particular.
1. INTRODUCTION
Certainty is of great importance in carriage of goods by sea and other commercial
maritime contracts. A complex web of interlinking contracts, Conventions and legal
ﬁctions underpin the relationships and liabilities of the various parties involved. It is a
stated aim of the courts to interpret and enforce contracts and international Conventions
1
in a manner that provides certainty in commercial circles.
2 So it may come as a surprise
that commercial contracts such as these, built on principles of lassez faire and interpreted
by courts seeking to deliver commercial certainty, may be neutralized by an Australian
statute whose aim is (in part) to encourage fair trade and develop corporate morality.
Corporate morality and commercial maritime contracts are two expressions which are
not often uttered in the same breath. And yet there is, or should be, a growing realization
that s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘‘TPA’’) does have an impact on
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Murdoch University, Perth, Australia.
1. Eg, ‘‘It has been recognised that a national court, in the interests of uniformity, should construe rules
formulated by an international convention, especially rules formulated for the purpose of governing international
transactions such as carriage of goods by sea in a normal manner, appropriate for the interpretation of an
international convention, unconstrained by technical rules of English law or by English legal precedent, but on
broad principles of general acceptation’’: Shipping Corp. of India Ltd v. Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Ltd
(1980) 147 CLR 142, 159 (Mason & Wilson JJ).
2. See eg Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v. Tradax Export SA (The Maratha Envoy) [1978] AC
1, 8, per Lord Diplock.
197
13commercial maritime law in Australia.
3 Its involvement may well be controversial, but
there is no doubt now that, in determining the liabilities of parties in a maritime dispute
that has some nexus with Australia, this statute, about controlling corporate behaviour
towards others, needs to be considered alongside cargo liability regimes, terms of sea
carriage documents or charterparties and the common law of contract.
The potential application of s 52 in a maritime context is evident from the following
example. A time-chartered vessel is due to discharge an Australian consignee’s cargo in
Australia pursuant to a contract of affreightment with the consignor. The consignee
enquires as to the likely arrival of the vessel so as to make arrangements for stevedoring
services. Misleading information about the ETA of the vessel is faxed to the consignee in
Australia by the charterer. The consignee books stevedores accordingly and is out of
pocket when the vessel does not arrive as planned. The expenses caused by the reliance
on the misleading information would be recoverable by the consignee from the charterer
under the TPA. The time charterer would be liable regardless of the fact that the bill of
lading seeks to exclude any claim of that nature, and that the applicable cargo carriage
regime is silent on its recovery
4—even if it was not the contractual carrier and despite any
circular indemnity clauses or other attempts to channel legal action towards one agreed
defendant.
The primary provision of the TPA, for the purposes of this article, is s 52. Section 52(1)
states:  ‘‘A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is
misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.’’ The application of s 52 is
broad and it has transformed Australian civil litigation. But, like all other causes of action,
the TPA has advantages and pitfalls. The aim of this article is to outline both of these,
concentrating on the implications for those corporations involved in maritime contracts
and relationships with Australian corporations.
While a broad exposition of s 52 is best left to dedicated texts,
5 this article seeks to
outline the elements and importance of s 52 in the Australian maritime commercial
landscape, and focuses on the particular ramiﬁcations for carriage contracts.
2. AN OUTLINE OF TPA, s 52
Section 52 is a revolutionary provision that has cut across all other forms of relief for civil
disputes in Australia. It is: ‘‘a comprehensive provision of wide impact, which does not
adopt the language of any common law cause of action. It does not purport to create a
3. Other sections of the TPA may also be relevant: see s 53, which deals with representations in speciﬁc
instances; s 51AA–AC, on corporate unconscionability; and s 74, which imposes warranties of due skill in the
provision of services. The latter does not apply to contracts for the carriage of goods for business purposes (s
74(3)) but could apply to maritime contracts that are not carriage per se—such as towage or salvage. However,
this paper is limited in scope to s 52. For a copy of the TPA see: http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/
0/115/top.htm.
4. Art 4A of the Australian Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1991 (Cth) (‘‘COGSA 1991’’) does allow claims
for delay in certain circumstances, but the remedy is conﬁned to shippers. It is also subject to limitation. For a
copy of COGSA 1991, see: http://scaletext.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/2/1046/top.htm.
5. For further and more detailed outline of the section see R.V. Miller, Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act
1974, 24th edn (Law Book Co, 2003) (hereafter Miller); C. Lockhart, The Law of Misleading or Deceptive
Conduct (Butterworths, 1998).
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14liability at all; rather it establishes a norm of conduct . . . ’’
6 It has been referred to by some
as the ‘‘new corporate morality’’. Initially, the Australian courts were conservative in its
application. But over time its reach has extended from the realm of consumer protection
into that of private contracts; even a breach of contractual warranties may constitute
misleading or deceptive conduct.
7 It has virtually replaced the law relating to mis-
representation in Australia. However, it is by no means limited to situations where the
parties are in a contractual relationship. In Australia, it has been applied to areas as diverse
as advertising, newspaper articles, property transactions, sale of goods, the professions,
holidays and takeover bids, to name but a few.
Section 52 prohibits a corporation from ‘‘engaging in conduct’’ that is misleading or
deceptive or likely to mislead and deceive.
8 The Act deﬁnes  ‘‘engaging in conduct’’
broadly, as:
doing or refusing to do any act, including the making of or the giving effect to a provision of, a
contract or arrangement, the arriving at, or the giving effect to a provision of, an understanding or
the requiring of the giving of, or the giving of, a covenant.
9
As for the words ‘‘mislead or deceive’’, the courts have tended to stick closely to the
dictionary deﬁnitions such as:
deceive: . . .    ‘‘to cause to believe what is false, to mislead as to a matter of fact, to lead into error,
to impose upon, delude, take in.’’
mislead: . . .    ‘‘to lead astray in action or in conduct, to lead into error, to cause to err.’’
10
Section 52 can be breached unwittingly, without either intent
11 or negligence, and may
even be breached by silence, where there is a duty to reveal relevant facts.
12 The section
can be breached if no person has actually been misled (although any person alleging a
breach of s 52 needs to show reliance on the conduct and damage resulting from that
reliance in order to receive relief
13). It can also be breached by statements that are literally
true but, once assessed in the light of the overall effect and context, are found to contain
a false representation.
14
Section 52 is designed to ensure that ‘‘trading must not only be honest but must not even
unintentionally be unfair’’.
15 This gives the section a far wider ambit than most common
6. Brown v. Jam Factory Pty Ltd (1981) 35 ALR 79 (Fed Ct), 86 (Fox J).
7. Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v. CCH Australia Limited (1993) 114 ALR 355 (Full Fed
Ct). This decision has fuelled controversy amongst academics: see D. Skapinker & J.W. Carter ‘‘Breach of
Contract and Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Australia’’ (1997) 113 LQR 294 and J. Cornwall-Jones
‘‘Breach of Contract and Misleading Conduct: A storm in a teacup?’’ (2000) 24 MULR 248.
8. The threshold requirement for a corporation acting in trade or commerce will not be discussed here, as in
a commercial maritime context they will usually be satisﬁed easily.
9. TPA, s 4(2).
10. Franki J in Weitmann v. Katies (1977) 29 FLR 339 (Fed Ct), 343, quoting the Oxford Dictionary.
11. Though intent can be relevant, because if there were intent then conduct would be deceptive rather than
merely misleading.
12. The question is whether, in all of the circumstances there has been conduct likely to mislead or deceive:
Demagogue Pty Ltd v. Ramensky (1992) 110 ALR 608 (Full Fed Ct).
13. TPA, ss 82, 87. A requirement of reliance also curtails claims where the plaintiff knew the representation
was not true or had ceased to regard that representation as inﬂuential. However, the Australian Consumer and
Competition Commission (ACCC) (being the body charged with enforcement of the TPA) may bring an action
for breach of s 52 without the need to show that anyone has been misled.
14. Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v. Sydney Building Information Centre Pty Ltd (1978) 140
CLR 216, 228, per Stephen J, relying on passing off actions by way of analogy.
15. Ibid., per Stephen J.
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15law causes of action that generally require some degree of fault, intent, or failure to take
reasonable care. As such, it is an attractive cause of action for a litigant and a threatening
one for defendants.
The power of s 52 is not only due to the simplicity of the section itself, but also those
facilitative sections elsewhere in the TPA that reinforce it. Brieﬂy:
(i) The remedies section allows the recovery of damages for those who have sustained
loss as a result of the conduct.
16 There is no requirement equivalent to duty of care
or privity of contract; rather, the notion is reliance on the conduct in question
leading to loss. The pool of potential plaintiffs is increased as a result.
(ii) As well as an award of damages, the TPA allows the court to make any orders it
thinks  ﬁt including selecting from an extensive suite of remedies in order to
compensate the plaintiff in whole or in part for the loss or damage, or to prevent
or reduce the loss or damage.
17
(iii) Those liable for the breach of s 52 include not only the main perpetrator but also
any party ‘‘involved’’ in the contravention.
18
(iv) The statutory deﬁnition of agency adopted in the TPA (s. 84) is broader than at
common law.
19
(v) S 52 also applies to representations about a future matter by virtue of s 51A. The
TPA deems representations as to future conduct as having been misleading or
deceptive unless the representor can show that there were reasonable grounds for
making the representation.
20
The ﬁnal contributor to the considerable scope of s 52 is the attitude of Australian courts
in interpreting it. Courts have been strident in their development of s 52 and the protection
of the principles of fair trading that it exempliﬁes. For instance (and particularly relevant
in a maritime context), the courts virtually ignore contractual clauses seeking to exclude
or somehow ofﬂoad liability that may accrue under s 52. Such clauses are generally
regarded as attempting to undo the effect of the provision and will not be applied.
21
16. S 82 states: ‘‘(1) A person who suffers loss or damage by conduct of another person that was done in
contravention of  . . . [amongst others, s 52]...   may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against
that other person or against any person involved in the contravention.’’
17. See ss 80, 87. Some remedies include an injunction (s 80), declaration, rendering an agreement void,
varying the contract, refusing to enforce the contract, requiring the refund of money or property, varying the
contract or covenant in such a manner as the court considers just and equitable (s 87).
18. S 75B (1) reads: ‘‘A reference in this Part to a person involved in a contravention of a provision of
[amongst others, s 52] shall be read as a reference to a person who:
(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention;
(b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention;
(c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention;
or
(d) has conspired with others to effect the contravention.’’
However, the extraterritorial application of Act set out in s 5 does not apply to s 75B: see s 5(1).
19. For instance, a person with apparent authority can give authority to another person: TPA, s 84(2).
20. S 51A(1)&(2). See discussion of this section in articles referred to at fn 7.
21. A disclaimer clause can only be effective if it has the effect of actually erasing that which is misleading
in the conduct because it then modiﬁes the conduct: Benlist Pty Ltd v. Olivetti Australia Pty Ltd (1990) ATPR
41–043, cited in Miller, § 1.52.75, p 431. This is unlikely to apply in a maritime contract, though see the text
accompanying fn 76 infra for one possible application. For a maritime example of ignoring of exclusion clauses
once s 52 has been held to apply, see the Mogal case, infra fn 52.
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22 there seems to be no concept akin to contributory
negligence leading to a reduction of the measure of damages. Once the violator’s conduct
is found to breach s 52, they will be liable for the whole of the loss (even if the
complainant itself made decisions or omissions
23 that led to the loss).
All these features mean that s 52 is a formidable opponent of the complex principles of
liability that have been developed for breach of maritime contracts, particularly carriage
contracts. The ability to cut across well-established rules of privity, its relative immunity
to exclusion and limitation clauses, and the six-year time limit for a claim for damages
24
are particularly signiﬁcant. That signiﬁcance will be discussed further in Part 4 of this
paper.
3. THE ORDINARY AND EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
One would be forgiven for assuming that the impact of the TPA is limited to Australian
territory and those corporations registered in Australia. However, the Trade Practices Act
seeks to impose its provisions on those doing business within Australia (even if they are
not registered in Australia) and also extends its reach to conduct outside Australia in
certain circumstances. Signiﬁcantly for the maritime industry, the application of the Act
cannot be thwarted by choice of law clauses.
25 Nor can an arbitration clause exclude the
application of the TPA, or deprive the parties of remedies that a court may grant under the
Act.
26
a. Conduct within Australia
Much of the TPA
27 seeks to moderate a corporation’s conduct within Australia. The TPA
has been framed on the assumption that it catches conduct within Australia.
28 Therefore,
it can catch the conduct of
(i) Australian corporations, or foreign corporations registered in Australia; and
(ii) foreign corporations not registered in Australia but who have ‘‘engaged in
conduct’’ in Australia.
22. As a result of Henville v.  Walker [2001] HCA 52. This decision has the dubious distinction of being
named by a leading Australian commentator, Professor W. Pengilley in ‘‘The Ten Most Disastrous Decisions
made Relating to the Trade Practices Act’’ (2002) 30 ABLR 331. The writer understands that the Australian
Government (Department of Treasury) is considering proposing amendments to allow for contribution to the loss
to be taken into account in the assessment of damages.
23. Argy v. Blunts and Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 719 (Fed Ct), 744–745.
24. S 82(2).
25. Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160 (NSW SC).
26. Emmett J in Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v. Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] 1485 FCA 21 (Fed Ct) as cited
by B. McCabe, ‘‘Compulsory Arbitration Clauses and Claims under the Trade Practices Act’’ (1999) 7 TPLJ 41,
43. It is still possible for both parties to agree to arbitration of a dispute that arises under the TPA but parties
cannot be held to that agreement if the effect is to thwart the TPA: see Emmett J, at 26. See also M. Davies ‘‘A
chink (or two) in the Bill of Lading Plaintiff’s Jurisdictional Armour? Good news for Australian Maritime
Arbitration?’’ (1998) 26 ABLR 70, 74.
27. For example, unconscionable conduct (Div IVA); misleading or deceptive conduct (s 52).
28. Bray v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd [2002] FCA 243 (Fed Ct)
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17What does ‘‘engaging in conduct within Australia’’ mean?
29 First, it is important to note
that the term ‘‘conduct’’ relates to the speciﬁc conduct that allegedly breaches the
TPA—for instance, the misleading representation. Therefore, the mere fact that a foreign
corporation has some sort of trade relationship with Australia is not sufﬁcient. It is the
speciﬁc conduct complained of by the plaintiff that must have occurred in Australia. In a
maritime context, this means that a corporation will not necessarily be caught by the TPA
just because vessels owned by it visit Australian ports.
In the recent case of Bray v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd
30 it was held that ‘‘engaging in
conduct’’ included conduct initiated by an overseas corporation outside Australia but
expected to be received in Australia (such as the content of emails, facsimiles, telexes and
telephone conversations to and with parties in Australia).
31 Therefore, those engaged in
the maritime industry who are based out of Australia, not carrying on business in Australia
but dealing with trading partners in Australia by way of faxes, phone calls, letters and
emails, will ﬁnd those aspects of their business caught by the provisions of the TPA.
The interpretation of the phrase ‘‘engaging in conduct within Australia’’ seems,
therefore, to represent a physical or territorial aspect to the operation of the Act.
Therefore, the issuing of bills of lading in Australian ports will render the conduct of the
carrier (for instance, regarding representations made in that bill) subject to the TPA.
Similarly, the negotiation of a carriage contract between an Australian corporation and a
foreign corporation for delivery of goods to Australia will bring the conduct of both
negotiating parties within the TPA.
32 On the other hand, it would seem that conduct
between a foreign corporation and an overseas agent of an Australian company that did
not take place in Australia would not be deemed as ‘‘engaging in conduct within
Australia’’.
33
What about bills issued outside of Australia for cargoes to be delivered in Australia?
Are representations in those bills taken to be ‘‘engaging in conduct’’ in Australia? In
Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v.  Hyundai Merchant Marine Co,
34 Sheppard J. concluded that
Hyundai as contractual carrier had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct by issuing
a clean bill instead of a claused bill to an American consignor. However, the action by the
indorsee based on s 52 failed, as Hyundai was not incorporated nor carrying on business
in Australia,
35 and the conduct in question—the issuing of the bill—had not occurred in
29. For the deﬁnition of ‘‘conduct’’, see text accompanying fn 9.
30. Bray v. F. Hoffman La Roche [2002] FCA 243, para 147, following No. 1 Raberem Pty Ltd v. Monroe
Schneider Associates Inc (8 February 1991) Unreported (FCA: van Doussa J).
31. Decided in the context of s 45 (anti competitive conduct).
32. The Australian corporation will be caught by virtue of being registered in Australia and because the
conduct occurred in Australia. The foreign corporation’s conduct will only be governed by the TPA to the extent
that there was ‘‘conduct’’ in Australia, as envisaged by Bray v. Hoffman La Roche [2002] FCA 243, where the
conduct complained of was contained in negotiations and communications by the foreign corporation or its agent
directed to and received in Australia.
33. Though the conduct of the Australian agent might be caught by the extraterritorial operation of the Act
(see infra text accompanying fn 42) the conduct of the foreign corporation will not be caught and will not be
subject to the TPA.
34. (1993) 117 ALR 507 (Fed Ct).
35. Ibid., 520. This would have been relevant to the extraterritorial provisions to be discussed in the next
section.
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36 The ﬁnding that Hyundai had not ‘‘engaged in conduct’’ in Australia was
made despite the fact that there was an appreciation by those parties that the bill was to
be negotiated and the goods delivered to a consignee or indorsee in Australia. Nor could
the claim against Hyundai be sustained under the extraterritorial provisions of the TPA
discussed under the next heading.
However, the recent case of Bray v. Hoffman-LaRoche
37 provides cargo interests with
a useful springboard to argue that this aspect of the Hyundai decision should not be
followed.
38 Now that the Bray case has accepted that conduct can originate overseas so
long as it is received and intended to be received in Australia, the Hyundai case then could
be seen as taking an unnecessarily narrow view of what constitutes ‘‘engaging in conduct’’
in Australia. After all, the very nature of bills of lading and sea carriage documents is that
not only the consignor is interested in what the bill says. The consignee/indorsee of the
document will rely on representations on its face; and that those representations will
commonly be received, and be relied upon, in the country where the cargo is to be
discharged. In that sense, the issuing of a bill of lading is less like a personal
representation made by the carrier only to the consignor (as it seemed to be viewed in
Hyundai) and more like a public representation made to class of persons interested in the
cargo and, as a result, the veracity of the bill.
39
If the Hyundai case survives a challenge on those grounds, then Australian importers
who wish to improve their chances of their carriage arrangement being caught by the TPA
could buy goods FOB and arrange their own carriage contracts; or choose carriers who are
Australian-registered foreign corporations.
b. Conduct outside Australia—extraterritorial operation
The reach of the TPA extends beyond conduct in Australia to conduct outside Australia
in certain limited circumstances.
40 Speciﬁcally, TPA, s 5 provides that s 52
41 also applies
to the engaging of conduct outside of Australia by: Australian corporations or those
carrying on business in Australia; or by Australian residents or persons ordinarily resident
36. However Hyundai were found liable in fraud. See ibid., 524.
37. [2002] FCA 243 (Fed Ct)
38. Although Bray v.  Hoffman concerned the anticompetitive provisions of the TPA, it is clear that the
comments made about the reach of the TPA can apply to s 52. For instance, in its decision (at paras 145–146)
the court relied upon a High Court relating to the tort of negligent misstatement (Voth v. Manildra Flour Mills
Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538) which had been applied to conduct found to contravene TPA, Pt V in No. 1
Raberem Pty Ltd v. Monroe Schneider Associates Inc (8 February 1991). Unreported (FCA: van Doussa J).
39. The notion of representations being made to and affecting a class of persons is one that is common in TPA
actions, applying as it often does in an advertising context.
40. Satisfaction of s 5 is not a condition precedent to jurisdiction of a duly authorized court to proceed to hear
a matter under TPA, s 86—though it will be a critical element of the cause of action against foreign respondents:
see Bray v. Hoffman La Roche, para 191. The procedural requirements for service outside the jurisdiction means
that the issue of applicability of the TPA/extraterritoriality of the TPA are brought forward and argued
immediately after issuing (in Federal Court) or even before issuing (in Supreme Courts). This falls outside the
ambit of this paper but, for more, see P. Nygh & M. Davies, Conﬂict of laws in Australia, 7th edn (Butterworths,
2002) (hereafter, Nygh & Davies), chs 4 and 22.
41. S 52 is contained within TPA, Part V.
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42 As a result, offending conduct outside of Australia will be caught if it is by
a corporation incorporated in Australia or that ‘‘carries on business’’ in Australia.
A corporation that is incorporated in Australia will be a clear-cut case. However, what
of a corporation ‘‘carrying on business’’? This phrase has been a vexed one in the conﬂict
of laws. Recently, the Federal Court rejected a narrow interpretation of the phrase that
would have limited it to situations where a foreign corporation had a place of business in
Australia.
43 In an earlier case, Mason J (as he then was) of the High Court said that:
‘‘ ‘business’ denotes activities undertaken as a commercial enterprise in the nature of a
going concern; that is activities engaged in for the purpose of proﬁt on a continuous and
repetitive basis.’’
44 If the foreign corporation has an ofﬁce or an agent in Australia
undertaking its business
45 then it will quite likely be carrying on business here, and
thereby caught by the TPA provisions. The liner trade, with regular visits to Australia and
agents in each port, would seem to be caught by that deﬁnition of the ‘‘carrying on
business’’. However, those who are not in the liner trade but merely own or control vessels
and charter them to load or discharge cargo in Australia from time to time (for example,
bulk carriers) would, without more, be unlikely to be caught by that deﬁnition.
A case in point is Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co
46 discussed
already in the context of the ordinary jurisdiction of the TPA. Sheppard J held that, not
only was Hyundai not caught by that ordinary jurisdiction, nor was it caught by the
extraterritorial application of the Act, because it was not ‘‘carrying on business’’ in
Australia. Perhaps the judge saw the beneﬁt of circumscribing the impact of s 52 on
maritime cases, but again there seems to be room for an argument to be mounted that
carriers making regular visits to Australia are indeed ‘‘carrying on business’’ here. In any
event, it is not hard to imagine how a slight change in facts might have led to a different
result. For instance, had the vessel been on voyage charter to an Australian company, or
the consignor been Australian, then the court may well have found that the representation
had been intended to be received in Australia and thereby qualifying under the ordinary
operation of the Act.
For now at least, the Hyundai case is persuasive authority for the proposition that
carriers who are chartered by overseas interests to deliver goods in Australia do not fall
42. A plaintiff who seeks to use TPA, s 5 to rely on conduct outside of Australia to show a breach of the Act
entitling it to damages or seeking an injunction must seek ministerial consent to do so: s 5(3)–(5). S 5(5) provides
that consent shall be granted unless, in the opinion of the minister, the law of the country in which the conduct
occurred required or speciﬁcally authorized that conduct and it is not in the national interest for consent to be
given. There has been at least one case where the failure to seek ministerial consent is noted, although it was not
decisive of the case, as the judge held that the defendant was not ‘‘carrying on business in Australia’’ within the
terms of TPA, s 5(1): Hyundai (1993) 117 ALR 507, 518, 520. Nygh & Davies (supra, fn 40) note (para 22.13)
that for a claim of damages, consent need not be obtained before issuing proceedings (Natureland Parks Pty Ltd
v My-life Corp Pty Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 237 (Fed Ct), though it does need to be obtained before a hearing. On
the other hand, leave needs to be obtained before instituting in the event of a claim under s 87—see s 5(4) and
Yamaji v. Westpac Banking Corp (No. 2) (1993) 42 FCR 436 (Fed Ct). In any event, it is wise to seek ministerial
consent as early as possible.
43. See Bray v. Hoffman La Roche [2002] FCA 243, para 63. While this case concerned the anti-competition
provisions of the TPA, the courts would be likely to apply the same deﬁnition in a fair trading context.
44. Hope v. Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1, 8–9. Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ concurred.
45. This will require an analysis of the relationship between the principal and agent, and in particular whether
the agent is in truth carrying out the principal’s business: see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. White [1999]
2 VR 681 at 691; Bray v. Hoffman La Roche, supra, fn 37 at para 63–64.
46. (1993) 117 ALR 507.
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agents in Australian ports and issue bills that are ultimately intended to fall into the hands
of Australian indorsees. Their conduct will only be caught, under the ordinary application
of the TPA, if it can be said that they have engaged in conduct that takes place in Australia
(including that sent from overseas but received in Australia).
Finally, in many parts of the TPA there is an overall requirement that the conduct in
question be ‘‘in trade or commerce’’. In fact, the deﬁnition within the TPA circumscribes
the extraterritorial application of the TPA even further, requiring the underlying
transaction to have some nexus with Australia. ‘‘Trade and commerce’’ is deﬁned as
‘‘trade or commerce within Australia or between Australia and places outside Aus-
tralia’’.
47 Therefore, dealings by an ofﬁcer of a foreign company who is negotiating deals
between two foreign states with no Australian link will not be in trade and commerce and
will not be caught by the TPA even if part of the deal is settled in Australian territory.
By way of summary, the provisions of the TPA discussed in this paper are likely to
apply to corporations that:
(i) are registered in Australia and dealing with foreign corporations regarding
maritime matters—such as an Australian corporation that charters vessels to ship
consignments to or from Australia;
(ii) are foreign corporations not registered in Australia but entering into contracts
within Australia (their conduct by sending emails/faxes and the like to be received
in Australia, will be subject to the TPA
48); eg, a foreign corporation that enters into
a contract by fax with an Australian company to provide shipping services under
a contract of affreightment;
(iii) are foreign corporations who are ‘‘carrying on business’’ in Australia; a clear cut
example is having an ofﬁce/agent here with regular visits by vessels, such as
corporations in the liner trade; perhaps even those overseas carriers committed to
a long term contract of affreightment to or from Australia might qualify; but
simply controlling various vessels that may or may not call in Australia from time
to time is unlikely to be sufﬁcient.
Finally, relying on the Bray case, it is at least arguable that the issuing of bills by foreign
corporations, in foreign ports for delivery of goods to Australia and to Australian
consignees or indorsees may well be ‘‘engaging in conduct’’ within Australia. This is
because, as the carrier has to expect that the bill will be sent to Australia, so would the
representations made in the bill be received and relied upon in Australia.
The reach of the TPA is therefore quite signiﬁcant. In no circumstances should the TPA
be dismissed as a potential cause of action simply because one party is registered
elsewhere than Australia. However, the nature of maritime business as it is, usually
involving overseas companies, means that the extraterritoriality of the TPA needs to be
given close consideration given the particular facts of the case. Importantly, the territory
in which the particular ‘‘conduct’’ took place will be signiﬁcant. Arbitration clauses in
47. TPA, s 4.
48. Pursuant to Bray v. Hoffman-La Roche [2002] FCA 243.
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21charterparties can be effective but only if worded widely enough to incorporate a statutory,
non-contractual cause of action.
49
4. IMPACT OF THE TPA ON CARRIAGE CONTRACTS
Once the jurisdictional issues are satisﬁed, there is no question that TPA, s 52 applies to
carriage contracts as it does to every commercial contract in Australia. Representations as
to a certain state of affairs and promises as to performance of the contract are an integral
part of the law of international carriage of goods by sea and indeed the law of international
sale. This is because invariably most of the relevant parties are physically remote from the
performance of the transaction and must rely on the truthfulness and completeness of
those statements in order to conduct business. Some examples are representations as to the
qualities of a ship being chartered or a cargo to be loaded, how a cargo will be cared for,
when a ship is to arrive and, in particular, the representations contained on the face of a
bill of lading concerning the quantity and condition of the cargo on loading. Both the law
relating to carriage and the TPA envisage that these representations can be acted upon by
a person other than the consignor, and that that person, when sustaining loss, should be
entitled to recover.
50
In many situations an action under s 52 will provide relief that would be available at
common law in any event. However, the s 52 action can be more effective than the
common law; it is almost impervious to contractual exclusion clauses, has a six-year time
bar, an extensive list of remedies and those not strictly parties to the contract of carriage
can still receive relief.
51 So, this begs the question: to what extent can the TPA affect, even
upset, the carefully developed allocation of liability and contractual responsibilities that
exist in shipping?
To date, there have been only a handful of Australian maritime cases citing s 52 but they
give an indication of its potential. Cases have concerned the following.
(i) Representations by freight forwarder in Australia as to past experience and
competency in packing containers with aluminium coils, when in fact there was no
suitable system of care and no general competency. The freight forwarder was liable under
s 52 for misleading or deceptive conduct, despite an exclusion clause in the bill of lading
that excluded liability for damage occurring before shipment.
52
49. See Hi Fert Pty Ltd v. Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] FCA 1485 (Full Fed Ct). However, under
COGSA, an arbitration clause in a sea carriage document cannot exclude the jurisdiction of Australian courts in
any event: COGSA 1992 (Aus), s 11(2). See also Davies (1998) 26 ABLR 70.
50. In carriage law, the legislation relating to bills of lading is the primary recognition of this: see in Australia
the Sea Carriage Documents Acts in each State, eg, Sea Carriage Documents Act 1997 (WA).
51. In some cases, a s 52 claim may be a simpler route to relief: eg, The owners of the cargo lately laden on
board the ship David Agmashenebeli v. The owners of the ship David Agmashenebeli [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 92,
analysed by B. Parker, ‘‘Liability for incorrectly claused bills of lading’’ [2003] LMCLQ 200. In that case the
master incorrectly claused a bill which, it was claimed, ought to have been clean. If the TPA applied to this
scenario, then it would seem to be a relatively straightforward claim that the master, and therefore the carrier,
engaged in misleading conduct.
52. Comalco v. Mogal Freight Services (Oceania Trader) (1993) 113 ALR 677 (Fed Ct). The carrier’s appeal
to the Full Federal Court was dismissed.
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22(ii) Representations made to Australian charterer/importer under a contract of affreight-
ment. The carrier had made representations and contractual promises to the charterer that
hold cleanliness survey to ‘‘grain cleanliness standard’’ would be carried out before each
of the cargoes the subject of the contract of affreightment were loaded. When a
consignment was loaded pursuant to the contract of affreightment several years later, that
particular standard of survey was not carried out, strict standards of inspection and
cleaning had not been performed and the consignment was contaminated with a disease
causing the consignment to be rejected on its arrival in Australia.
53
(iii) Representations on the bill that cargo was clean on board when in fact the bill ought
to have been claused to reﬂect the fact that part of the cargo had been contaminated upon
loading.
54
(iv) A letter of indemnity issued by a charterer to the vessel against which the cargo was
delivered without production of the bills of lading. Pursuant to a letter of credit, a bank
held the bills and by virtue of that delivery the bills were valueless as security in the
bank’s hands. It was alleged that the letter of indemnity provided by the charterer to the
ship constituted a misleading representation concerning the charterer’s right to the cargo
or to deal with the goods.
55
(v) Representations contained in a notice of impending arrival of goods that a carrier
was required by Australian Customs to issue to the importer of the goods. The notice was
required to give relevant details identifying the contents of the container. The carrier gave
that notice, but mistakenly misdescribed the cargo as general purpose, not reefer. The
importer did have other means to check the description, but relied wholly on the carrier’s
notice. The importer collected the cargo from the stevedore and, in reliance on the notice,
failed to realize that the container required power. As a result, the contents spoiled.
56
Only the ﬁrst and ﬁnal of these cases succeeded on the TPA point. In the second, whilst
the court found there had been misleading or deceptive conduct, the plaintiff was unable
to recover damages, as it failed to show there was continued reliance on the conduct in
question. It had known that a less strict survey was being performed than contractually
required. The third case—the  Hyundai case discussed earlier
57—failed because the
conduct in question occurred overseas and was conduct by a foreign corporation, with the
result that the TPA did not apply. In the fourth case, the court held that the letter of
indemnity in question was properly characterized as a mere promise to indemnify. It did
53. Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v.  Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [2000] FCA 660 (Fed Ct). Although the
representations were found to be misleading, ultimately the action failed as the plaintiff was unable to prove it
had relied upon the representations. It had known that a lesser standard of survey had been used by the
defendants for at least six months prior to the shipment in question. See ibid., paras 87–96.
54. Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 507 (Fed Ct). Ultimately the
action against Hyundai based on s 52 failed because the representation had been made outside Australia and
Hyundai was not a corporation carrying on business in Australia. Hyundai was found liable in fraud. See supra,
text accompanying fn 34.
55. Westpac Banking Corp v. Stone Gemini [1999] FCA 434 (Fed Ct).
56. Woolworths Ltd v. APL Co Pte Ltd [2001] NSWSC 662 (NSW SC). The court held that the importer knew
that this container was a reefer and required refrigeration (at para 52); not the least because it was a consignment
which the importer had shipped but then recalled. The claim in tort was reduced by 30%, but the plaintiff
recovered full damages under s 52.
57. (1993) 117 ALR 507 (supra, fn 54).
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23not assert a right to deal with the cargo and therefore there was no misleading or deceptive
conduct.
58
Representations and other misleading conduct can occur in all manner of scenarios in
the carriage of goods. For the purposes of this article, we will divide up the types of
carriage contract into two broad types: those subject to a cargo liability regime,
59 being sea
carriage document contracts; and those subject entirely to free market forces and common
law principles, being charterparties. In the context of cargo liability regimes, this article
looks primarily to the Australian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth) (COGSA), an
Act that enacted the Hague-Visby Rules,
60 since amended
61 to include some modiﬁca-
tions. Although the TPA can affect a transaction where a different cargo regime is at
work,
62 examining the impact of TPA, s 52 upon the Australian COGSA gives an
opportunity to see how the Australian legislature contemplated that the TPA will interact
with cargo liability regimes.
a. TPA, s 52 and carriage under sea carriage documents covered by a cargo
liability regime such as Australian COGSA
The interface between a cargo claim based on a cargo liability regime and a related claim
based on TPA is a curious one. On the one hand, there are various cargo regimes, all born
of negotiation between cargo and carrier for the apportionment of responsibility for loss
or damage to cargo whilst on board a ship. The regimes contain a web of exceptions and
counter exceptions, and limitations on who can claim,
63 on the time to claim and a cap on
the ultimate recovery amount. On the other hand, there is the TPA, with the lofty ideals
of enforcing a corporate morality, which eschews exclusions of liability and was designed
to show little respect for the inherent restrictions of traditional grounds of liability. So,
which of the two will prevail?
i. Does s 52 or the cargo liability regime have precedence?
The drafters of COGSA did foresee a clash with the TPA and introduced s 18:
18 Act prevails over certain provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974
The provisions of this Act prevail over the provisions of Division 2 of Part V of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 to the extent of any inconsistency.
58. Ibid., para 74.
59. Such as the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules.
60. The International Convention for the Uniﬁcation of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading 1924 (Hague
Rules) as modiﬁed by the Visby Protocol to the Brussels Convention (1968) and the SDR Protocol amending the
Brussels Convention as amended by the Visby Protocol (1979).
61. Though none that speciﬁcally affects the monetary or time limitations discussed in this section. For the
text of the Act see: http://scaletext.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/2/1046/top.htm
62. Because the port of loading usually determines the cargo regime applicable, and damage is often litigated
in the port of discharge, so carriage cases that ﬁnd themselves before Australian courts are more likely than not
to be governed by the cargo liability regime of a different country. Those regimes are more likely to have a
narrower application that the Australian COGSA—which means that the opportunity for a clash with s 52 is less
likely, and the sphere of inﬂuence of s 52 is expanded.
63. Though these are also the subject of the Sea Carriage Document Acts in each State of Australia.
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24This gets around some parts of the TPA;
64 but s 52 is in Division 1 of Part V.
65 One cannot
therefore assume that COGSA prevails over s 52.
66 Instead, the effect of s 52 and COGSA
has been described as ‘‘overlapping’’.
67
As has already been stated, in many cases s 52 would simply render a plaintiff entitled
to claim against a carrier
68 to a similar result by a different route, in much the same way
as alternate claims in contract, tort and bailment are already pleaded in carriage contacts.
Indeed, not every breach of contract or breach of duty will support an action for damages
arising from misleading or deceptive conduct.
69 The Hi-fert case
70 is a good example of
this. The s 52 action failed, but the carrier was found to be liable under the cargo liability
regime in any event for breaching Art 3, r 1(a) and (c). The carrier had failed properly to
clean the holds of the ship. Had the plaintiff been able to complete the s 52 claim, it would
have been an additional ground of recovery only.
71
The fact that the TPA usually offers much the same cause of action as that in contract
or tort under COGSA may lead one to question why TPA claims are even pursued. Quite
simply, the main (though not only) drawcard for cargo interests is the possibility that a
s 52 claim will not be subject to the monetary limitations imposed by the cargo regimes.
72
As Professor Martin Davies points out,
73 if s 52 is not subject to the monetary limitation
in COGSA, then there is an obvious advantage in suing under s 52—unlimited
liability.
Many standard cargo claims to which a cargo liability regime applies and which involve
wrongdoing by the carrier will see no signiﬁcant beneﬁt in adding a s 52 claim,
particularly if the claim is under or near the limitation amount.
74 Cases of fraud, also, are
severely punished at common law, and a claim under s 52, whilst viable and easier to
prove, would most likely add little.
75 Even carriers’ representations on the bill of lading,
if inserted because of a genuine inability to determine or check the veracity of statements
64. In particular s 74, which implies a warranty of due diligence in the provision of services to a consumer,
but by its terms does not apply to contracts of carriage of goods for business purposes.
65. See M. Davies, ‘‘The Exocet ﬁnds a new target, or fear and loathing for Freight Forwarders and other
Carriers By Sea’’ (1993) 21 ABLR 377, 382.
66. Or indeed the speciﬁc prohibited false or misleading representations set out in s 53. The new
unconscionable conduct provisions are also not mentioned in COGSA.
67. N. Gaskell, R. Asariotis & Y. Baatz, Bills of lading, law and contracts (LLP, 2000), § 8.46.
68. By virtue of the applicable Bills of Lading or Sea Carriage Documents Act, combined with the applicable
cargo liability regime.
69. See, eg, discussion in Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v. Ghazis [1992] 2 VR 217 (Vic SC: Ormiston
J), 238.
70. Hi Fert Pty Ltd v. Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [2000] FCA 660 (Fed Ct).
71. This result was ironic, as the plaintiff had fought long and hard to have the dispute heard in Australia,
relying inter alia on the TPA claim to dispute the defendants’ argument that it was governed by the arbitration
clause and ought to be heard in England.
72. Although the question of monetary limitation was not canvassed in Hi Fert v. Kiukiang (supra, fn 70);
one presumes the claim was less than the limitation amount.
73. Davies, (1993) 21 ABLR 377, 382
74. Even if the claim sought damages in excess of the limitation amount, commercial considerations would
dictate that it would be better to accept the limitation amount rather than litigate over a small amount outside of
limitation.
75. As occurred in the Hyundai case, where the s 52 action failed but the plaintiff succeeded on the basis of
fraud: supra, text accompanying fn 54.
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25on the bill, might still provide protection if the representation is later established to be
false.
76
However, assuming that the facts ﬁt within a TPA claim,
77 there are at least ﬁve
situations
78 where a plaintiff who has suffered loss as a result of misleading or deceptive
conduct should consider seeking a remedy under s 52:
(i) where the plaintiff would ordinarily be barred from a claim because of a lack of
privity or other lack of standing, or because the Sea Carriage Documents Act does
not apply in its speciﬁc situation;
(ii) where the plaintiff’s claim is against a party who is not the contractual
carrier;
79
(iii) where cargo liability regime is not decisive of the claim and the carrier seeks to
rely on an exclusion or limitation clause in the bill of lading (particularly an
unusual one or one that the plaintiff did not know about);
(iv) where the defendant asserts contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff;
(v) if the amount claimed is more than the limitation amount and it seeks to allege that
the dollar limit does not apply to a TPA claim;
(vi) where the plaintiff is outside the one-year time bar and wishes to take advantage
of the six-year time bar
80 in the TPA.
In the ﬁrst three situations, there seems little doubt that the remedy offered by s 52 will
be superior to that offered by the relevant cargo liability regime. In the latter two, the
remedy may be superior—it depends on whether a claim under s 52 is subject to the time
and monetary limitations imposed by the cargo regimes; an issue to which we now
turn.
ii. Does the limitation period and monetary limitation stipulated in COGSA apply to
the TPA aspect of the claim?
The provision of Art 4bis of Australian COGSA (not relevantly different from the Hague-
Visby Rules) reads:
81
Article 4bis
1. The defences and limits of liability provided for in these Rules shall apply in any action against
the carrier in respect of loss or damage to goods covered by a contract of carriage whether the action
be founded in contract or in tort.
76. By analogy with the occasional successful use of disclaimers in TPA cases, where the carrier might argue
that the clausing on the bill effectively undoes the mischief of the misrepresentation by showing that the
representation cannot be relied upon. This highlights the continuing importance of shippers exercising their
rights under Art 3 to obtain a bill with unclaused representations to the extent possible. If, however, the carrier
has used the clause merely to disguise its own failure, eg, accurately to describe the goods (particularly the
condition of the goods), then the court could regard it as an attempt to limit its liability for misleading or
deceptive conduct. The particular facts of the case will be crucial.
77. Misleading or deceptive conduct, reliance by party in question, caught by territorial law of Australia.
78. Undoubtedly there are more. Another might be due to a purely evidentiary advantage, for instance where
the plaintiff might be better served by the deeming provisions of s 51A.
79. And often, therefore protected by operation of circular indemnity clauses or similar contractual devices
aimed at channelling liability to a single entity which then seeks to limit its liability.
80. The limitation period for claims for damages under the TPA was recently increased from three years to
six years, effective 8 January 2003—see s 82 and Trade Practices Amendment Act (No. 1) 2002 (No. 128 of
2002)
81. Emphasis added.
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262. If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier (such servant or agent not
being an independent contractor), such servant or agent shall be entitled to avail himself of the
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under these Rules.
3. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, and such servants and agents, shall
in no case exceed the limit provided for in these Rules.
4. Nevertheless, a servant or agent of the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this Article, if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the
servant or agent done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage
would probably result.
Article 4bis, r 1 is fairly straightforward. It mentions contract and tort. The same limits
also seem to apply to actions in bailment, although it is not mentioned in Art 4bis, r 1.
Perhaps that means other types of action, such as s 52, can be ‘‘shoehorned’’ in as
well?
It is certainly arguable that Art 4bis, r 1 should not be read to include a purely statutory
cause of action such as s 52. The Australian regime was updated in 1998
82 and at that time
several cases had dealt with the possibility of s 52 applying in a carriage setting. It would
have been possible to mention other potential causes of action in Art 4bis, r 1, or to make
the words inclusive of all potential causes of action. Furthermore, COGSA, s 18 expressly
takes precedence over some aspects of the TPA, but remains silent about the division
containing s 52. As a matter of construction, there is at least a reasonably good argument
that the defences and limits in COGSA ought not to apply to a TPA claim.
However, the arguments against that hypothesis are also strong. The wording of the
section seems to mean to catch all grounds of action—‘‘shall apply in any action against
the carrier in respect of loss or damage to goods covered by a contract of carriage’’—but
then goes on to mention only contract and tort. Should the second phrase limit the breadth
of the ﬁrst? There are good commercial grounds to say that it should—the need for clear
and certain limits of liability and upsetting the delicate balance of liability and
compensation established by COGSA and its predecessors; and the need for Australia’s
laws to remain in step with the international maritime community. It would only take a
small change to Art 4bis, r 1 to include all causes of action howsoever based. This would,
however, be giving COGSA precedence over s 52—something which the legislators
seemed content not to do.
We turn now to the exact wordings of each limitation:
The monetary limit
Australian COGSA, Art 4, r 5 states
83:
(a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment
and inserted in the sea carriage document, neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or
become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the goods in an amount exceeding
82. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth), which had introduced the Hague-Visby Rules together with
the SDR Protocol, was amended by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Amendment Act 1997, and then by two sets
of regulations—the Carriage of Goods by Sea Regulations 1998 (SR 1998 No. 174) and the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Regulations 1998 (No. 2) (SR 1998 No. 324).
83. Emphasis added.
211 CORPORATE MORALITY AND COMMERCIAL MARITIME CONTRACTS
27666.67 units of account per package or unit or 2 units of account per kilogramme of gross weight
of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher. . . 
...  
(e) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the beneﬁt of the limitation of liability
provided for in this paragraph if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the
carrier done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would
probably result.
Professor Davies has eloquently argued that loss sustained by a plaintiff who sued under
s 52 could be regarded as ‘‘loss . . .  in connection with the goods’’ within the scope of Art
4, r 5 such that the limitation amount could be applicable to s 52 actions.
84 However,
perhaps there is an opposite argument. First, is the loss ‘‘in connection with’’ the goods or
better characterized as loss ‘‘in connection with’’ the misleading or deceptive conduct of
the defendant? Secondly, TPA, s 82 states that: ‘‘A person who suffers loss or damage by
conduct of another person that was done in contravention of . . . (amongst others, s 52)
may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against that other person . . . ’’
This section gives a statutory right to damages for loss or damage resulting from a breach
of s 52. It seems unlikely that a court will allow this to be read down, particularly when
this section is not one over which COGSA expressly takes precedence pursuant to
COGSA, s 18.
85
Thirdly, the carrier’s right to limit damages in accordance with the COGSA formula has
never been intended to be iron clad. It could be argued that misleading or deceptive
conduct is akin to the power to ‘‘break’’ limitation provided by COGSA, Art 4bis, r 4 and
therefore represents an additional, Australian, ground to obtain full damages from a carrier
who has breached s 52. Carriers would be on notice that, were they to act in a manner that
was either: intended to cause damage;
86 reckless and with knowledge that damage would
probably result;
87 or misleading or deceptive in a manner caught by the TPA, then the
limitation amount might be broken or (in the case of liability under the TPA)
inapplicable.
The time limit
The Hague-Visby Rules, Art III, r 6 contains the one-year time limit: ‘‘ . . . the carrier and
the ship shall in any event be discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the
goods, unless suit is brought within one year of their delivery or of the date when they
should have been delivered. This period may, however, be extended if the parties so agree
after the cause of action has arisen.’’
88 Similar issues are raised here as are discussed in
the context of the monetary limit. The fact that COGSA, s 18 failed to mention TPA, s 52
weakens any argument that the time limit should apply to TPA claims, despite the
seemingly clear language ‘‘all liability whatsoever’’. Furthermore, would a TPA claim be
loss  ‘‘in respect of the goods’’, or ‘‘loss in respect of’’ the misleading or deceptive
conduct?
84. Davies (1993) 21 ABLR 377, 382.
85. See supra, text accompanying fn 66.
86. Art 4bis, r 4.
87. Ibid.
88. Emphasis added.
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28Monetary and time limitations—conclusion
At the outset, it was noted that the burden of the TPA on maritime law is somewhat
incongruous. Perhaps, though, the cargo liability regimes and the TPA are not so
incongruous after all. They actually have quite a lot in common. They were both a reaction
to the behaviour of big business; they sought to regulate liability and prevent the more
powerful players from excluding all possible liability. They are two different ways of
levelling the playing ﬁeld.
It is at ﬁrst ironic but on closer analysis it is understandable that the TPA arguably has
the lesser role to play in claims that involve wrongdoing on the part of the carrier, and
therefore fall directly into a cargo liability regime such as COGSA. There will be
occasions, when the facts support it, where it might be useful, even critical to plead s 52;
89
but in the main it will be yet another cause of action to bolster those framed in contract,
tort and bailment. The interesting point yet to be clariﬁed in these ‘‘garden variety’’ claims
is whether the COGSA limitations (both time and monetary) will cross-pollinate into
TPA-based claims for damage to goods carried by sea. The writer believes that there is a
real argument that the limits will not apply to the TPA.
If this is not what the legislature intended or wants, it would be necessary to amend both
TPA and COGSA in order to make it clear that the limitations in COGSA apply to all
claims, even those arising under the TPA. Unless and until that is done, there is likely to
be a great deal of time and money spent by the various proponents seeking to establish a
judicial precedent one way or another. In the process there is likely to be a ‘‘shoehorning’’
of facts into an ill-ﬁtting s 52 in the hope of a result that, in these types of contracts, would
represent a relative windfall by receiving uncapped compensation.
b. Carriage that falls outside COGSA
The TPA is particularly useful for those situations where the facts of the case have not
covered the relevant cargo regime. One scenario is where the loss or damage occurred
outside the period of responsibility dictated by the regime. The Hague and Hague-Visby
Rules both incorporate a ‘‘tackle to tackle’’ period of responsibility. The Australian
COGSA has modiﬁed the Hague-Visby period of responsibility to something similar to the
Hamburg Rules
90 so as to extend it to the period while the carrier is in charge of the goods
within the limits of the port.
91 In any event, it is not uncommon for the carrier still to be
in charge of the goods outside the period of responsibility under the applicable cargo
regime.
There are also instances when no cargo liability regime may be applicable compulsorily,
depending on the law applicable at the port of shipment
92 or the nature of the cargo.
93
Finally, there may be aspects of the carriage upon which the cargo regime applicable is
silent—such as the route to be taken between loading and discharge, or responsibility for
the condition of containers.
89. See supra, text accompanying fn 78.
90. See Hamburg Rules, Art 4.
91. COGSA, Art 1.3.
92. Art 10 of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules.
93. Under the Hague and Hague-Visby, the regimes do not apply automatically to certain cargo such as
carriage of livestock, deck cargo in certain circumstances. See the deﬁnition of goods in Art 1(c)
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29In these situations the carrier will often seek to outline the liabilities of the parties
through a series of clauses on the bill of lading. Such clauses commonly include, for
instance, a prohibition on claims for consequential loss, clauses placing the responsibility
for inspecting containers at the foot of cargo interests, and a clause granting the carrier the
liberty of proceeding on the voyage to designated ports in whatever order it sees ﬁt. The
less scrupulous carriers include a monetary limitation far less than that to which a cargo
regime would entitle cargo, and an imposition of a time bar shorter than 12 months.
Again, this is an example of the types of clauses that the courts enforcing the TPA treat
with suspicion. The courts will not enforce clauses that appear to be attempts to avoid
liability that would otherwise arise under the TPA.
94 Contractual attempts to limit liability
in a monetary sense can expect to suffer the same fate. Thus, if a consignee had sought
and received an assurance by the carrier that it had a system to ensure that the refrigerated
goods would be put on power on arrival into the carrier’s care at the port of loading, then
a contractual condition excluding liability for loss arising in the breach of such an
undertaking will not be valid.
In the parts of the carriage contract to which the compulsory regimes do not apply and
where the facts otherwise ﬁt within s 52, that section is potentially of great beneﬁt to cargo
interests. If there has been conduct that offends s 52, then these contractual devices will
more than likely have no effect, and the carrier will be liable.
c. Charterparties
Charterparties with Australian companies involved in the export or import of goods are
commonplace. Given the extent of Australia’s bulk commodity exports, that is no surprise.
Charterparties negotiated between overseas carriers and Australian companies will more
than likely fall within the scope of the TPA, as will the representations surrounding the
negotiations.
95
Charterparties are the epitome of a free market. There is virtually no external regulation
and the parties are free to contract on whatever basis they choose. Many charterparties are
concluded on standard forms, which often limit the circumstances and extent to which the
carrier can be held liable for loss or damage; for instance, to circumstances where the loss
was caused by the personal want of due diligence on the part of the owner or manager.
96
Such clauses set a very high bar for the cargo interests to leap, effectively transferring the
risk of damage during transit onto cargo interests and their insurers in all but the most
unusual of circumstances.
In negotiating a charterparty, there is plenty of scope for the parties to engage in
conduct that is misleading or deceptive. Examples of representations and contractual
94. See supra, text accompanying fn 21.
95. Though it does depend on the facts. For instance, if an Australian representative overseas negotiated the
charterparty with a foreign corporation, then the TPA would not govern the conduct of that foreign
corporation.
96. Eg, Gencon Charter (1994, BIMCO) cl 2 reads: ‘‘the owners are to be responsible for loss of or damage
to the goods or for delay in delivery of the goods only in case the loss damage or delay has been caused by
personal want of due diligence on the part of the owners or their Manager to make the vessel in all respects
seaworthy and to secure that she is properly manned, equipped and supplied, or by the personal act or default
of the Owners or their Manager. And the Owners are not responsible for loss damage or delay arising from any
other cause whatsoever, even from the neglect or default of the master or crew. . .  or from unseaworthiness of
the vessel on loading or commencement of the voyage or at any time whatsoever.’’
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30promises are those concerning matters such as vessel capacity and speed, cleanliness of
holds, previous cargoes, suitability of ship and crew, likely arrival dates, methods of
unloading or stowing. Should such a representation be wrong, or misleading in any way,
then a party who has relied on it and suffered loss or damage may well
97 be able to
recover, regardless of privity (or lack of it) or any contractual attempt to limit or ofﬂoad
liability. Again, the common law may well give a similar result in some cases, but it is the
fact that exclusion clauses and privity count for little in the TPA claim that make the TPA
action so powerful. Carriers should be aware of the particular danger involved in engaging
in misleading or deceptive conduct towards or intended to be received in Australia by, for
instance, an Australian charterer or another interested party.
d. Strangers to the contract—suing and being sued
It is trite to say that in shipping there are many different entities that have some contact
with a particular cargo. Apart from the contractual carrier, there may be other companies
involved in the actual transportation—such as charterers or owners of vessels, or the land
based transport companies who are subcontracted to complete a combined carriage
contract. There are also companies such as stevedores handling the cargo, and parties not
actually involved in the handling of the goods but somehow concerned with the wellbeing
and cargoworthiness of the ship—such as surveyors and classiﬁcation societies.
There are so many potential defendants should a cargo be damaged. As a result much
effort has been devoted to ensuring that one known party sues one known defendant. Often
a cargo claimant will sue more than one defendant, attempting recovery in tort or bailment
against those not the contractual carrier. However, such actions are themselves ordinarily
subject to the terms and conditions of the contract, via agency, circular indemnity and
Himalaya clauses. In a recovery action relying on traditional causes of action, the cargo
claimant may ﬁnd themselves battling another defendant other than the carrier but, at best,
subject to all the same restrictions of remedy as against the carrier.
On the cargo side, there are also, commonly, several different potential plaintiffs who
may have suffered a loss—the consignor, consignee or indorsee, and holder of the bill or
the ultimate purchaser of the goods at their destination. Again, the standard sea carriage
document seeks to bind all these parties to its terms and limitations.
There is no sign, however, that the TPA will respect this pragmatic commercial
construct. If a party has sustained damage from reliance on the misleading or deceptive
conduct of another, then a remedy follows. Contractual attempts to protect the wrongdoer
will be given limited, if any, effect. Therefore parties outside of the contract are also
exposed if they engaged in, or were involved in,
98 conduct that was misleading or
deceptive. And a potential plaintiff who is outside the contract of carriage may still have
a right to claim under the TPA, ignoring the limitations in the contract.
97. If it is a representation as to a future matter, the carrier may be able to prove it had reasonable grounds
for making the representation (TPA, s 51A) or, in the case of representations about competence, that it was
generally competent and merely negligent on this one occasion, in which case its representations would not have
been misleading: see discussion in Mogal (1993) 113 ALR 677, 693.
98. Parties ‘‘involved in’’ a contravention cannot be made subject to the TPA by extraterritorial applications:
supra, fn 18.
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31e. Section 52—a double edged sword
Thus far, the discussion has been based on the premise that cargo interests will be the ones
most likely to allege a breach of s 52. Of course, s 52 is not limited only to the conduct
of the carriers. It is just as applicable to the conduct of cargo interests (though the
opportunities for the breach of it are less common). Again, in many instances it will only
replicate a cause of action which the carrier has against the cargo interests at common law
or under a cargo regime—for instance, where a shipper represents a dangerous cargo as
safe; or a voyage charterer represents that it has a certain volume of cargo to load. But in
certain instances the facilitative sections may be useful, as may the breadth of remedies
available. As such, in the event of a dispute, carriers should also consider the conduct of
their Australian trading partners in the light of s 52.
5. APPLICATION OUTSIDE CARRIAGE CONTRACTS
Whilst this article has concentrated on the application of the TPA to carriage contracts, the
broader maritime industry is also subject to s 52; for example, those who have dealings
with Australian shipbuilders.
99 Shipbuilders in Australia are bound to ensure that their
conduct complies with s 52, and the conduct of the overseas customers contained in
communications received in Australia will also be subject to s 52. The same applies for
Australian shiprepairers, providores, stevedores, tug and salvage operators; and the
conduct contained in communications sent to Australia by those who are based overseas.
Shipowners who seek concessions from port operators from standard pilot or tug
arrangements based on the experience of the master or the particular attributes of the
vessel could also be liable should those representations be misleading or deceptive.
6. RIGHTS IN ADMIRALTY AND S 52
It appears that the prospect of a TPA claim being brought in Admiralty was not raised
before the Australian Law Reform Commission when it rewrote Australian admiralty
jurisdiction in the 1980s.
100 Nevertheless, it seems clear that a s 52 claim could ground an
action in Admiralty in Australia so long as the essence of the dispute ﬁts within the
deﬁnitions of the various maritime claims,
101 which are framed in a generic way. So,
depending on the facts, a claim for misleading or deceptive conduct concerning
ownership, possession or mortgage of a ship could be a proprietary maritime claim.
102
Claims for misleading or deceptive conduct concerning an act or omission in the
navigation or management of the ship in connection with loading or unloading of goods,
99. Australia has a burgeoning industry in the construction of aluminium ferry, military and leisure craft.
100. There is no mention of the TPA as a cause of action in an admiralty matter in the Australian Law Reform
Commission’s report Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction: Report No. 33. Given that the TPA was relatively new, and
in particular, s 52 was in its infancy at that time, it is not surprising.
101. See Admiralty Act 1988, s 4.
102. Ibid., s 4(2).
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103 So too could a claim based
on s 52 in respect of the construction, repair, equipping or provisioning of a ship.
104
Like any claim where the plaintiff seeks to arrest the vessel in Australia, the defendant
must be
105 the owner or demise charterer of the vessel.
7. SHOULD s 52 BE INVOLVED IN MARITIME CONTRACTS?
There is much to be said for the view that maritime contracts are complex arrangements
that have been developed over centuries to create a liability regime which, even if always
complex and not always fair, is at least certain. The courts of all countries have always
held consistency of decisions led to commercial certainty, and this was, and is, of great
importance. The importance of certainty is not just to the parties, but also to the various
industries that are intertwined with the maritime one, such as ﬁnance and insurance. The
judges may minimize the conﬂict between international maritime law and s 52 by
narrowly construing the territorial requirement. However, the threat of s 52 will still loom
for many overseas corporations seen to have ‘‘engaged’’ in conduct by communicating
with Australia.
On the other hand, great store has been placed in the TPA by Australia. Section 52 is
the single most important legislative constraint on commercial practice. No other
commercial area has been exempt from its reach. It would seem impertinent to suggest
that conduct otherwise unacceptable in Australia should be acceptable in a maritime
context—that those in maritime trade should be ‘‘allowed’’ to mislead and deceive.
Indeed, it could be said that the Australian COGSA recognizes as much when it does not
speciﬁcally make COGSA overrule s 52, but only other parts of COGSA. As we have
seen, in many cases s 52 replicates a right to recover that already exists; it is the fact that
limitations, exemptions and the defendants’ liability are not so readily controlled that
make it so powerful. Whilst there could be complaints that s 52 unfairly unravels the
commercial arrangements set up by carriers to manage risk allocation when a loss has
occurred, the TPA requires something more—a management of behaviour preceding the
loss. Though it is idealistic to seek to uphold the ideal of corporate morality, if it does
make parties reﬂective about how they conduct business, perhaps it is no bad thing.
Finally, while s 52 is by far the most signiﬁcant of the fair trading provisions in the
TPA, there are others that also have the ability to impact on maritime contracts. Section
74, whilst expressly inapplicable to carriage contracts for business, will apply to impose
a duty to exercise due skill in other related contracts. It has been cited in cases concerning
aircraft handling agreements
106 and in towage contract disputes. Another signiﬁcant
aspect of the TPA is the provisions in Part IVA,
107 which seek to limit unconscionable
conduct between trading partners. In a decision with signiﬁcant implications for letters of
103. Ibid., s 4(3)(d).
104. Ibid., s 4(3)(m)–(o).
105. And have been at the time: see ibid., ss 17–19.
106. Qantas Airways Ltd v. Aravco Ltd (1996) 185 CLR 43.
107. Ss 51AA, 51AB and 51AC.
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33credit and performance bonds, those provisions have already been applied to prevent the
beneﬁciary of unconditional performance guarantees from calling on those guarantees
when to do so was deemed unconscionable by the court.
108 However, consideration of the
implications of these sections of the TPA for international trade will need to wait for
another day.
108. In the somewhat startling case of Olex Focas Pty Ltd v. Skodaexport Co Ltd [1998] 3 VR 380 (Vic SC)
this Part of the TPA has been used to prevent a head contractor drawing upon unconditional bank guarantees,
which had been designed to secure mobilization and procurement advances it had made to a subcontractor. At
the time of the demand upon the guarantee, the advances had been almost repaid. The judge held that the head
contractor had acted unconscionably and in contravention of TPA s 51AA by making a demand under the
guarantees, because it had insisted on strict legal rights in circumstances which made that harsh or oppressive
or caused hardship. Of the TPA cause of action, Batt J said: ‘‘The effect of the statute, applying as it does to
international trade and commerce, is to work a substantial inroad into the well established common law
autonomy of letters of credit and performance bonds and other bank guarantees’’ (at p 404).
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2.2 Significant  Developments 
2.2.1  Amendments to the TPA 
Some relevant changes to the TPA have taken place since the publication of this article in 2004.  
Changes to allow proportionality and contribution of damage awards in relation to claims under s52, 
as foreshadowed in the article,34 have been enacted.35  Part VIA now allows the Court to give 
judgment against the defendant for not more than the amount reflecting the proportion of the damage 
that the Court considers just given the defendant’s responsibility for the damage or loss.36  The court 
                                                      
34 At text accompanying fn 22 of the article in 2.1. 
35 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) No 103 of 2004 
36 87CD (1) In any proceedings involving an apportionable claim: 
(a) the liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to that claim is limited to an amount 
reflecting that proportion of the damage or loss claimed that the court considers just having regard to the extent 
of the defendant’s responsibility for the damage or loss; and 
(b) the court may give judgment against the defendant for not more than that amount…’ 
See also s82 (1B): 
82 (1B)  Despite subsection (1), if: 
                     (a)  a person (the claimant) makes a claim under subsection (1) in relation to: 
                              (i)  economic loss; or 
                             (ii)  damage to property; 
                            caused by conduct of another person (the defendant) that was done in contravention of section 52; and 
                     (b)  the claimant suffered the loss or damage: 
                              (i)  as a result partly of the claimant’s failure to take reasonable care; and 
                             (ii)  as a result partly of the conduct referred to in paragraph (a); and 
                     (c)  the defendant: 
                              (i)  did not intend to cause the loss or damage; and 
                             (ii)  did not fraudulently cause the loss or damage; 
the damages that the claimant may recover in relation to the loss or damage are to be reduced to the extent to which the 
court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the loss or damage. 
  35may take into account wrongdoers not party to the proceedings, as well as the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff under any relevant law.37  
 
The court may only apply apportionment in the case of what is termed an ‘apportionable claim’ which 
is defined as a claim for economic loss or damage to property.  The vast majority of maritime claims 
under s52 would constitute apportionable claims.  As such: 
•  if a defendant can prove that the plaintiff did itself contribute to its own loss, and that the 
defendant did not intend to cause the loss nor do so fraudulently,38 or 
•  if another concurrent wrongdoer exists, whether or not a party to the proceedings,39 
-then the defendant can seek to reduce the amount of damages it pays based on the proportion of 
damage or loss that the court considers just.40  However, the Part is not to affect normal rules of 
vicarious liability, or several liability imposed by statute.41
 
While the precise workings of s82(1B) are beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting the 
criticism that the section introduces common law notions into the remedies for s52, which has 
erstwhile been a provision sitting entirely separate from common law.42   
 
                                                      
37 Section 87CD (2). This model was criticised by Nicholas Bender in ‘Multiple Wrongdoers: One for the Money – Or 
Something Different?’ (2004) 12 Trade Practices Law Journal 66 at 75 – 77.  In particular, he criticises the move from 
joint and several liability to proportionate liability, which was a recommendation of the Final Report of the Review of the 
Law of Negligence (Ipp Report). Bender claims that it leaves the prospect that the plaintiff may be undercompensated if 
one of the persons liable to it is impecunious or cannot be found.   
38 Section 82(1B). 
39 Section 87CD. 
40 Section 87CD. 
41 Section 87CI. 
42 Danielle Gatehouse ‘The Baffling Intruder: section 82(1B) of the Trade Practices Act’ Part I (2007) 15 Trade Practices 
Law Journal 74, Part II (2007) 15 Trade Practices Law Journal 163. 
  36It will be some time before a sufficient body of caselaw develops in relation to this new provision.  
Nonetheless, for all Australian plaintiffs including those in maritime law cases, it represents a 
watering down of the impact of s52.  No longer will a plaintiff be entitled to claim the full amount of 
their loss from the party who has engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct where other parties 
were also involved in the contravention.  This is of particular significance in carriage of goods by sea, 
where the cause of any particular loss of or damage to cargo may be a result of errors by various 
parties involved with that cargo.  For instance, in the Woolworths Ltd v APL Co Pte Ltd43 the 
plaintiff’s claim in tort was reduced by 30% for contributory negligence, but recovered damages in full 
for the breach of s52.  Such a discrepancy will no longer occur with the new s82(1B). 
 
Other legislative changes to the TPA, dealing specifically with personal injury and death claims, are 
more relevant to the next chapter and will be covered there.44   
 
2.2.2   New Cases 
Of the many cases reported on TPA since the article was published, there are several cases worth 
noting.   The 2004 decision of Butcher & Anor v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd45 (Butcher) is relevant 
to the point made in the article about disclaimers46 as well as the attitude of the highest court in 
Australia to s52 generally.  The High Court held in Butcher that a disclaimer was effective to negate 
the misleading nature of a representation made by an agent on behalf of its principal.  In fact the 
misleading information had been obtained from the principal and passed on by the agent – with a 
                                                      
43 [2001] NSWSC 662. 
44  See 3.2.2 below. 
45 (2004) 218 CLR 592, (2004) 212 ALR 357. 
46 See fn 21 of the article in 2.1. 
  37disclaimer that the agent could not ‘guarantee its accuracy’ and urging interested parties to make 
their own enquiries.  This has been termed the ‘conduit’ defence.47  
 
In one sense, the case did not develop any new principles. As McHugh J noted,48 the law already 
recognised three scenarios where a corporation would not infringe s 52 by passing on erroneous 
information: 
•  Where the circumstances make it apparent that the corporation is not the source of 
the information and that it expressly or impliedly disclaims any belief in its truth or 
falsity and is merely passing on the information for what it is worth;49 
•  Where the corporation, while believing the information, expressly or impliedly 
disclaims personal responsibility for what it conveys, for example, by disclaiming 
personal knowledge;50 
•  Where the corporation, while believing the information, ensures that its name is not 
used in association with the information.51 
What is notable about the Butcher decision is that the majority and minority ‘applied the same 
principles but showed a fundamentally different philosophical approach’.52  The majority, comprising 
Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ, found that the disclaimer was readable and effective. The 
majority considered as a matter of principle that a real estate agent was not an expert in matters of 
                                                      
47 Peter Gillies ‘Misleading and Deceptive Conduct: Immunising the Intermediary – the Conduit Defence’ (2006) 14 
Trade Practices Law Journal 209. 
48 (2004) 212 ALR 357, 387. 
49 Citing Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661. 
50 Citing Saints Gallery Pty Ltd v Plummer (1988) 80 ALR 525. 
51 Citing Amadio Pty Ltd v Henderson (1988) 81 FCR 149. 
52 See Warren Pengilley ‘Misleading or Deceptive Conduct Considered by the High Court: Does Butcher’s case Indicate 
New Judicial Conservatism?’ (2005) 12 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 314, 314. 
  38land title53 and it would be too radical a proposition to find that a real estate agent producing a 
brochure offering land for sale is representing that the vendor has good title.54  On the other hand, 
McHugh J and Kirby J each considered its print to be small55 and that the agent had adopted the 
representation; it had incorporated the incorrect information in its brochure56 and conducted itself as 
if the information was correct. Both the Judges in the minority considered that the agent had 
engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct and that the disclaimer did not obliterate the effect of 
the conduct of the agent.57  
 
What does this case mean for an allegation based on s52 in a maritime context?  As in the Butcher 
case itself, much will depend on the context of the contravening ‘conduct’, and the circumstances 
surrounding the disclaimer. As such, sweeping generalisations are unhelpful.58 Nevertheless, for 
instance, Butcher will be helpful for a carrier defending its failure to clause a bill of lading because it 
was unaware of its damaged or incomplete status.
59 More broadly, what the case does exhibit is a 
willingness, at least by the majority of the High Court,60 to read the provisions of the TPA in a less 
                                                      
53 (2004) 212 ALR 357, 368. 
54  Ibid, 371. Kirby J rebuked the majority in his reasons (at 404) saying that the question was whether there was 
misleading and deceptive conduct in the brochure as concerned the location of the relevant boundary line.  The question 
was not whether real estate agent pamphlets would be considered to be making representations as to vendor’s good title 
over land.  ‘This court’s function is to resolve questions before it.  We are deflected when we needlessly resort to 
hypotheticals not relevant to the question in issue.’ 
55 Ibid. McHugh J at 379, 390. Kirby J at 399; 405. 
56Ibid. McHugh J at 391. 
57 Ibid. McHugh J at 397; Kirby J at 406 – 407. 
58 Russell Miller claims that the ‘more dogmatic’ judgements of the past relating to the effect of exclusion clauses must 
now be considered to be overruled or as turning on their own facts: Russell Miller Miller ‘s Annotated Trade Practices Act  
(29th ed,2008) (Miller) [1.52.77]  However, the author’s view is that the Butcher decision is better confined to third party 
agents acting to pass on information, and that exclusion clauses by those who make a representation and who are in a 
position to know otherwise will be viewed sceptically by the courts. 
59 Which would mean that the result is the same under the TPA as it is under the Hague Visby Rules – that the carrier 
will not be liable for goods shipped damaged if it had no means of ascertaining the state of the goods and had made no 
unqualified representations that the goods were in sound condition (Article 3 r 3). 
60 As then constituted.   
  39expansive fashion than perhaps has been the case in recent times.61 Sam Appleton and Bernard 
McCabe have commented that the Butcher decision may be:  
…a subtle but important shift in the attitudes of the courts towards the liability of agents and 
other third parties in claims for misleading and deceptive conduct.62
 
In any event, we have yet to see what effect is wrought to this attitude by recent changes to the 
constitution of the High Court bench. 
 
A second case of relevance is the case of Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v 
Anor (Braverus).63  This case is discussed in chapter 4,64 insofar as it deals with the interpretation of 
s74(3)of the TPA.  However, it also had something important to say about s52.  
 
In Braverus, a pilot appointed by the Port Kembla Port Corporation was qualified but, due to an 
administrative error, unlicensed.  The pilot was negligent in berthing Braverus’ vessel, causing 
damage to the berth and the vessel. The effect of s410B of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) is to render 
the shipowner liable for the negligence of the pilot. Much of the case is concerned with the 
consequences of the pilot’s unlicensed status. However, Braverus also alleged that the pilot had 
breached s52: 
 
Braverus contended that… by his navigational commands, inaction and failure properly to 
inform and interact with the master in the conduct of the vessel, he [the pilot] engaged in 
conduct likely to mislead the master.65
                                                      
61 This is raised in Part 2 of the article in 2.1 above at p200. 
62 Sam Appleton & Bernard McCabe ‘In the wake of Butcher: decisions affecting the liability of agents and third parties in 
proceedings for misleading or deceptive conduct’ (2006) 14 Trade Practices Law Journal 46 at 52. 
63 (2005) 148 FCR 68. 
64 See Chapter 4.3 below. 
  40 
The Full Court of Appeal, overruling the trial judge, found that a Port Authority exercising its statutory 
responsibilities is nonetheless acting ‘in trade and commerce’ when it provides pilotage services.66  
This is significant, because such a finding clears one of the thresholds for the operation of s52 
against Port Authorities, which could now be said to be subject to the provisions of s52, even if 
exercising statutory responsibilities. 
 
The second significant outcome of this case was the question of whether s52 liability could be 
sheeted to the shipowner pursuant to the operation of Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) s410B. On the facts 
of the case the courts were not obliged to rule on the point. That is because both the trial judge and 
the Full Court of Appeal found that the Master’s delay in overriding the pilot’s order was not due to 
reliance on the conduct of the pilot at the critical point, but rather the Master’s own negligence in 
failing to countermand the pilot’s orders at the point when he had exercised his own judgment about 
the possibility of a collision.67 The Full Court agreed with the trial judge that the requisite causal 
nexus between the conduct and the loss had not been established on the facts.  However, the Full 
Court also commented that the effect of s410B was to render the ship vicariously liable for the pilot. 
As such, any misleading and deceptive conduct is sheeted back to the ship, not the Defendant.68    
 
Although only dictum, this must be considered highly persuasive, being an appellate judgment 
delivered by an experienced maritime judge. Nevertheless, the interplay between s52 of the TPA and 
s410B of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) will require either another case, or legislation, to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
65 (2005) 148 FCR 68, [136].
66 (2005) 148 FCR 68, [145] – [146], following NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 
ALR 312 (High Court) which had been decided since the trial judge had handed down judgment in Braverus. 
67 (2005) 148 FCR 68, [171]. 
68 As to the possible impact of s74 see ibid [174] – [192] as discussed further below at 4.3. 
  41unequivocally confirm the views of the Full Court. Again, this exemplifies the need for reform to better 
knit together the fabric of Australian maritime legislation with that of the TPA. 
 
2.2.3  A New Carriage Convention? Draft Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 
In its 21st session, UNCITRAL’s working group approved the text of the Draft Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Draft Convention).69 The 
Draft Convention will be considered by the UNCITRAL Commission in June 2008 where it is 
anticipated that the Commission will adopt the text and transmit it to the General Assembly for formal 
approval.70 It will then be open for signature.  It requires the ratification of 20 States before it will 
come into effect.71
 
A general discussion of the scope of the Draft Convention is beyond the parameters of this paper. 
However, assuming the Draft Convention does one day come into force and is accepted by Australia, 
there are several matters worth noting. First, the Draft Convention would negate several of the 
advantages of a TPA action mentioned at p210 of the article.  The Draft Convention seeks to deal 
with standing to sue,72 and gives a right to sue performing carriers, as well as contracting carriers.73 
It also extends the period of responsibility of the carrier beyond ‘tackle to tackle’;74 the Draft 
                                                      
69 UNICTRAL website <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V08/507/44/PDF/V0850744.pdf?OpenElement> at 1 
April 2008. 
70 Letter from Susan Downing Senior Legal Officer Office of International Law Attorney-General's Department, to 
members of the Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand, titled ‘Summary of Draft Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea for Australian Industry’ by email dated 12 
March 2008.  A copy is held by the author. 
71 One year after the deposit of the 20th ratification – Draft Convention, Article 96(1). 
72 Ibid, Articles 59 and 60. 
73 Ibid, Article 20. 
74 Which was the period of responsibility in the Hague and Hague Visby Rules: see Article 1(e). 
  42Convention will apply from the time the goods are received to the time they are delivered.75 In 
addition, Article 4 states: 
4.1 Any provision of this Convention that may provide a defence for, or limit the liability of, 
the carrier applies in any judicial or arbitral proceeding, whether founded in tort, contract or 
otherwise, that is instituted in respect of loss of, damage to, or delay in delivery of goods 
covered by a contract of carriage or for the breach of any other obligation under this 
convention… (emphasis added) 
 
The addition of the words ‘or otherwise’ represents a recognition that other causes of action might be 
used, and that the Draft Convention will regulate the liability of the parties regardless.76  
 
Should Australia decide to ratify and enact the Draft Convention into domestic law, it would be wise 
to take that opportunity to clarify the position as regards the TPA.  The enacting statute could 
expressly state that the TPA does not apply to matters governed by the Draft Convention. 
Alternatively, it could allow TPA claims to be brought but make them subject to the same limitations 
as contained in the Draft Convention.  The latter approach would see the time and monetary limits for 
the TPA and the more traditional causes of action become consistent. In that case, one would think 
that there would be less incentive to rely on the TPA in carriage of goods matters governed by the 
Draft Convention unless the TPA truly did offer an enhanced prospect of recovery. Either way, if 
Australia enacts the Draft Convention, and the Draft Convention is accepted by our trading partners, 
some of the advantages of alleging the TPA should fall away for Plaintiffs seeking to sue on 
contracts of carriage caught by its provisions.77 However, as we shall see in Chapter 5, the Draft 
                                                      
75Draft Convention, Article 12(1). 
76 Contrast the words in Hague-Visby Rules Article 4bis: ‘whether the action be founded in contract or in tort’.  See 
discussion of those words at page 210 of the article in Chapter 2.1. 
77 Particularly when taken in concert with the introduction of proportionality and contributory negligence provisions as 
raised in 2.2.1 above. 
  43Convention does not do much to assist an Australian plaintiff seeking to litigate in Australia but facing 
an exclusive jurisdiction clause nominating courts elsewhere. 
 
The Draft Convention does not cover charterparties. As such, unless substantial amendments excise 
maritime contracts of carriage from the TPA,78 the TPA will remain relevant in that context.79
 
The next chapter deals with the applicability of the TPA to contracts for the carriage of passengers by 
sea; and the unique exposure of the cruise ship operator to the TPA provisions. 
                                                      
78 See recommendations in Chapter 5.1 below, Part III. 
79 See p 213 of the article in Chapter 2.1 above, but subject to the limitations noted in Chapter 5. 
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The Cruise Ship Industry – Liabilities to Passengers for 
Breach of s52 and s74 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
Kate Lewins 
*
       Senior  Lecturer  in  Law,  Murdoch  University 
Cruise ship operators that are subject to Australian laws find that their passengers have 
important rights under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("TPA"), particularly 
sections 52 and 74.  However recent changes to the law have reduced the scope of these 
claims and given some ground back to the cruise ship operators.  Additional proposed 
amendments, still before parliament, will alter the scenario again.  The overall result is 
a further muddying of the waters for passenger claims where Australian law applies. 
This paper considers the circumstances in which a cruise ship operator will be bound 
by the provisions of the TPA, explores the impact of the TPA on cruise ship passenger 
liability, reflects on the recent and proposed changes to the TPA as regards liability for 
personal injury and looks at the consequences for the cruise ship operator who wishes 
to invoke a Convention limiting passenger liability. 
Introduction 
Maritime law contracts are intensely commercial in nature.  A complex web of 
interlinking contracts, conventions and legal fictions underpin the relationships and 
liabilities of the various parties involved. It is a stated aim of the courts to interpret and 
enforce contracts and relevant international conventions
1 in a manner that provides 
certainty in commercial circles.
2  However, the Australian Trade Practices Act (TPA) 
can apply to maritime law contracts - and when it does, the TPA can cut through 
traditional contractual arrangements.  Particularly vulnerable to the TPA are contracts 
entered into by cruise ship operators with passengers for a cruise.    
This paper will focus on two sections of the TPA - section 52, which prohibits a 
corporation engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct and section 74 which imposes 
a statutory term in a contract for services supplied to a consumer, that those services 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Murdoch University.  This article had its genesis in a presentation given to the 
Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Annual Conference in October 2003 in Brisbane, 
Australia.  It reflects the author’s understanding of the law as at 20 November 2003 save that it has been 
updated to take into account the Senate’s rejection of the Trade Practices Act (Personal Injury and Death) Bill 
2003  in February 2004 together with the coming into force (in May 2004) of the 1996 Protocol to the 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976.
1Eg ‘It has been recognised that a national court, in the interests of uniformity, should construe rules 
formulated by an international convention, especially rules formulated for the purpose of governing 
international transactions such as carriage of goods by sea ‘in a normal manner, appropriate for the 
interpretation of an international convention, unconstrained by technical rules of English law or by English 
legal precedent, but on broad principles of general acceptation.’ Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen 
Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 142, 159 (Mason & Wilson JJ) 
2 See, eg Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v Tradax Export S.A. (The Maratha Envoy) [1978] AC 1, 
8 (Lord Diplock). 
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will be rendered with due care and skill. Section 74 operates in a more traditional 
fashion because it attaches to contracts rather than conduct.   
The vulnerability of passenger cruise ship contracts to the TPA arises because one of 
the aims of the TPA is to control the conduct of corporations towards consumers.
3  The 
nature of cruising as a holiday taken by individuals means that all passengers aboard a 
cruise ship will be consumers under the TPA.  All of those passengers will have, at 
some earlier point, received representations about the type of experience they can 
expect.  All those passengers are captive in an environment created and maintained by 
the cruise ship operator for the passengers’ safe enjoyment and pleasure, for periods 
varying from a day or two, to weeks or even months.  If the representations prove to 
have been less than accurate, the passenger is injured or (for some other reason 
attributable to the operator) does not enjoy their cruise experience; the passenger may 
look to recover from the cruise ship operator.  Assuming the necessary jurisdictional 
nexus can be satisfied,
4 it is likely that an injured
5 or disgruntled passenger will have a 
remedy under the TPA.  Therefore, this Australian Act needs to be considered as part of 
the legislative landscape that can affect a cruise ship operator who conducts business or 
advertises for business in Australia. 
Of course, cruise ship operators, like all those in the maritime field, are used to the 
intrusion of local law on their business arrangements, at least to some degree.  Most 
operators, if not all, would manage that intrusion by seeking to control and limit their 
potential liability.  Usually an operator would rely on specific International Conventions 
limiting liability for the carriage of passengers (specifically, the Athens Convention 
Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea and its various 
amending protocols)
 6 along with the judicious use of contractual terms and conditions.  
Many countries have adopted these Conventions.  However, Australia, like the United 
States of America, has not ratified the Athens Convention or any of its protocols. 
Therefore, for reasons the paper will explore, it is feasible in many instances for 
passengers in Australia to rely on their statutory rights under the TPA in an action 
against the cruise ship operators.  Significantly, the TPA has traditionally been hostile to 
attempts to exclude liability that would otherwise accrue as a result of a breach of its 
provisions.
7
However, recent amendments and proposed amendments to the TPA have the 
potential to dramatically alter – and arguably, skew – the remedies available to a 
                                                          
3 Passengers are taken to have acquired particular services as a consumer if the price of the services did not 
exceed the prescribed amount – currently $40,000- or were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal domestic 
or household use:  Section 4B (1) (b) TPA.  Passengers can also be consumers if the cost of the services was 
greater than $40,000 so long as the services were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal domestic or 
household use or consumption.  One would expect a cruise ship holiday would so qualify, even in the less 
likely event that it was a business function, because a cruise ship is ‘ordinarily acquired for personal use’ as 
required by section 4B (1) (b).  Nor does the consumer need to be an Australian or based in Australia – see 
Wells v John R Lewis (Int) P/L (1975) 25 FLR 194, 208.
4 As described in the next section. 
5 Although the recent reforms and those proposed will make personal injury claims under the TPA less likely.  
See discussion accompanying fn 66 (s52) and 93 (s74) below. 
6 Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974 (known as the 
Athens Convention).  There have been protocols to the Athens Convention made in 1976, 1990 and 2002.  
Thus far only the 1976 Protocol has come into force. See text accompanying fn 127 below. 
7 See below at text accompanying fns 44 and 78. 
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passenger under the TPA.
8  The result of these amendments will be that cruise ship 
operators will need to navigate through a more complicated legal landscape to 
determine their potential liability to passengers under the TPA.  In order to do so, the 
jurisdictional reach of the TPA will need to be considered, as well as the type of damage 
and the manner in which it was sustained.   
With the increase in popularity of cruising, both in Australian waters and overseas,
9
it is important for cruise ship operators and their advisers to be aware of obligations 
imposed upon them by the TPA.  This paper explores the likely application and effect of 
the  TPA on contracts between cruise ship operators and their passengers.  First it 
outlines the nexus to Australia that is required before the Act can apply. It considers the 
two most likely sections that a disgruntled or injured passenger would be likely to use 
and outlines recent and proposed changes.   Finally, it looks at the implications of a TPA
action on the cruise ship operator’s right to limit liability under the Athens Convention 
and the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth).   
In what circumstances will a cruise ship operator be caught by the provisions of 
the TPA?  
One would be forgiven for assuming that the impact of the TPA is limited to Australian 
territory and those corporations registered in Australia.  However the TPA seeks to 
impose its provisions on those doing business within Australia (even if they have no 
corporate presence in Australia) and also extends its reach to conduct outside Australia 
in certain circumstances. Significantly for cruise ship operators, the application of the 
Act cannot be thwarted by choice of law clauses.
10  Nor will an arbitration clause be 
allowed to operate in a manner that excludes the application of the TPA, or deprive the 
parties of remedies that a court may grant under the Act.
11
As we shall see, different considerations seem to apply in determining when s52 or 
s74 will apply to a given set of facts with an overseas element.   
Territorial and Extraterritorial application of s52. 
Territorial application: Where conduct takes place in (or is received in) Australia it 
will be caught by the TPA 
For a claim based on s52, the misleading or deceptive conduct relied upon must have 
either occurred within Australia or, if it originated overseas, the corporation in question 
                                                          
8 Amendments are part of the suite of reforms that have occurred or are occurring in the area of personal 
injury and negligence, for instance, those suggested by the Ipp report: see below at text accompanying fns 66 
(s52) and 94 (s74). 
9 Paper given by Richard Hein (Chairman, P&O Cruises) to MLAANZ National Conference held in Brisbane 
on 2 October 2003 where it was revealed that there had been an average 9% compound growth in cruising 
over the decade to 2002. The slides that accompanied Mr Hein’s paper are available on the MLAANZ website 
<http://www.mlaanz.org/2003%20Conference/Richard%20Hein.ppt> at 29 June 2004. 
10 Francis Travel Marketing Pty Limited v Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited (1996) 39 NSWLR 160 (NSW 
Supreme Court). See also s67, which is relevant to s74 and is discussed below at text accompanying fns 25 
and 26. 
11 Emmett J in Hi-Fert Pty Ltd & Anor v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc & Anor (1998) 90 FCR 1 as cited by 
B McCabe in ‘Compulsory Arbitration Clauses and Claims under the Trade Practices Act’ (1999) 7 TPLJ 41 
at 43.   It is still possible for both parties to agree to arbitration of a dispute that arises under the TPA but 
parties cannot be held to that agreement if the effect is to thwart the TPA: see Emmett J, at 26.  See also M. 
Davies ‘A chink (or two) in the Bill of Lading Plaintiff’s Jurisdictional Armour? Good news for Australian 
Maritime Arbitration?’ (1998) 26 ABLR 70, 74. 
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must have expected it to be received in Australia.
12 For instance, the development or 
circulation of brochures for overseas cruises sent to Australians from overseas would 
bring representations made within those brochures into the net of the TPA. Another 
example is where representations are made during contractual negotiations with an 
interested customer who is based in Australia.   To the extent they were received and 
intended to be received in Australia, these representations will be caught by the TPA 
and subject to s52. 
Extraterritorial application: Conduct by an Australian registered corporation or one 
carrying on business in Australia will be caught, regardless of where conduct took 
place. 
If the conduct in question occurred entirely overseas, section 5 provides that the TPA
will apply to that conduct only if it were by a company registered or carrying on 
business in Australia.
13  This is the only means by which the TPA, and therefore s52, 
can extend to conduct that occurs overseas.
14  The TPA will apply to the conduct, here 
or overseas, of an Australian cruise ship operator – that is, where the corporation (not 
necessarily the ship) is registered in Australia or is carrying on business in Australia.  It 
is easy to establish if a corporation is registered in Australia.  What is more difficult is 
to establish whether a corporation not registered in Australia is nevertheless ‘carrying 
on business’ in Australia.   The interpretation of the phrase ‘carrying on business’ has 
been a vexed issue in conflict of laws.  Recently, the Federal Court rejected a narrow 
interpretation of the phrase that would have limited it to situations where a foreign 
corporation had a place of business in Australia.
15  In an earlier case, Justice Mason (as 
he then was) of the High Court said that  
‘business’ denotes activities undertaken as a commercial enterprise in the nature of a 
going concern; that is activities engaged in for the purpose of profit on a continuous and 
repetitive basis.
16
If the foreign corporation has an office or agents in Australia undertaking its 
business
17 then it will quite likely be carrying on business here.  If it is, then both its 
conduct in Australia and its conduct outside Australia will be caught by the TPA
provisions.
18
                                                          
12 Communications initiated outside Australia but directed to, and expected to be received by, persons in 
Australia was held to amount to conduct taking place in Australia by Merkel J in Bray v Hoffman La Roche 
Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1, [147]. The same approach was adopted by Drummond J in a fair trading context in 
Howard & Ors v National Bank of New Zealand & Ors (2002) 121 FCR 366, [42].  
13 Note the requirement that written ministerial consent is required before a party is entitled to seek a remedy 
under s82 or s87: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s5(3). 
14 The TPA relies primarily upon the corporations power for its constitutional validity, but does also rely, in 
the alternative, upon the trade and commerce power – see s6.  The High Court has recently had cause to 
consider the trade and commerce power: Re the Maritime Union of Australia & Ors; ex parte CSL Pacific 
Shipping Inc (2003) 200 ALR 39 in which the court said at [36] that ‘it is well settled that, in the exercise of 
the trade and commerce power, the Parliament can validly regulate the conduct of persons employed in those 
activities which form part of trade and commerce with other countries and among the States.  A ship 
journeying for reward is in commerce…’. 
15 See Bray v Hoffman La Roche (2002) 118 FCR 1, [63]. 
16 Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1, 8–9.  Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ concurred. 
17 This will require an analysis of the relationship between the principal and agent, and in particular whether 
the agent is in truth carrying out the principal’s business: see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v White 
[1999] 2 VR 681, 691; Bray v Hoffman La Roche (2002) 118 FCR 1, [63-64]. 
18 Subject to the need for a nexus with Australian trade and commerce. See text accompanying fn 19. 
5034                                                                                                       Kate Lewins 
(2004) 18 MLAANZ Journal 
There also needs to be some connection with trade or commerce with or in Australia 
for the TPA to apply.
19 For instance, representations made by an Australian company to 
overseas consumers while promoting its Australian cruises at an overseas travel fair will 
be caught by s52.
20 The requirement for the representation to be made in the context of 
trade or commerce with Australia means s52 would probably not apply to a company 
carrying on business in Australia promoting only its overseas cruises at the same travel 
fair.
21
Can the TPA apply where there is: 
Conduct whilst on the high seas – ‘yes madam, the gym exercise equipment is 
checked every day’.  
Or in a foreign port – ‘our onshore tours are conducted with your safety and pleasure 
in mind’. 
Most representations that would be caught by the TPA would happen before or at the 
time of contracting, or perhaps as the passenger settles themselves in the cabin whilst 
still in an Australian port.  But what about those representations which occur outside 
Australia – perhaps during the cruise, outside Australian waters or in the waters of 
another country?  If the representation is made on behalf of an Australian company or 
one carrying on business in Australia, then the TPA will apply by virtue of its 
extraterritorial provisions.
22  The representation will be subject to s52.  However if the 
representation is made on behalf of a cruise ship operator who does not carry on 
business in Australia then the TPA will not apply once the ship is out of Australia or if 
the cruise is wholly outside Australia.  So, for example, the TPA will not apply to 
representations made to an Australian whilst on a Mediterranean cruise booked from 
Australia and operated by a company who is neither registered nor carrying on business 
in Australia.
23
In summary, in each instance it is a case of establishing whether the TPA applies to a 
given fact scenario.  If the conduct occurred in Australia or was intentionally directed to 
Australia it does not matter if the cruise ship operator is not registered or carrying on 
business here.  The TPA will apply.  If the conduct was misleading or deceptive then the 
cruise ship operator will be liable.  The issuing of brochures in Australia, or even 
posting them to an interested customer in Australia, will render the representations in 
the brochure subject to s52.  This will be the case, even if Australia is not the port of 
embarkation.  The TPA will catch conduct occurring overseas, if the perpetrator is 
registered or carrying on business in Australia.  The exact interpretation of ‘carrying on 
business’ remains a hot topic for litigation. 
                                                          
19 Due to the constitutional limitations of the TPA.  That requirement would be satisfied by, for instance, an 
Australian cruise company or one trading here, who was operating cruises outside Australia.  It would not be 
satisfied if for instance, an Australian consumer in the UK booked an English Channel ferry crossing with a 
company neither registered nor carrying on business in Australia.  
20 Wells v John R Lewis (Int) P/L (1975) 25 FLR 194 established that the TPA was not solely concerned with 
Australian consumers. 
21 It is at least arguable that here there is an insufficient connection with trade or commerce in Australia. 
22 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s5. 
23 But if those representations had been made to the Australian whilst he or she was still in Australia – for 
example, in a confirming fax or letter, then the representations would be caught as conduct taking place in 
Australia.
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Extraterritorial application of s74 
What about the application of s74?  When does that implied warranty apply to 
transactions partly based, or performed, overseas?  Section 5 outlined above
24 purports 
to grant extraterritorial jurisdiction over all of Part 5 of the TPA, including Division 2 
which contains s74.  However the language contained in s5, of corporations ‘engaging 
in conduct’, does not make much sense in the context of statutory warranties imposed in 
contracts.  Of greater assistance is s67 coupled with general conflict of law principles.  
Section 67 states that so long as the proper law of the contract is that of Australia
25 then 
any attempt to substitute the law of another country for the consumer protection 
provisions of the TPA will be ineffective.
26  The determining factor is therefore whether 
the law of the contract is Australian.  If it is, then s74 applies, regardless of whether it is 
breached overseas, because it is still a breach of the contract to which Australian law 
applies.  If an Australian enters a contract in Australia for a Mediterranean cruise with 
an overseas cruise ship operator, and if the facts were such that the proper law of the 
contract was Australian law,
27 it is submitted that failure to exercise due diligence in the 
provision of the services on that Mediterranean cruise would result in TPA liability.
28
Relevant provisions of the TPA – an outline 
The main provisions that are most likely to be used in a claim against a cruise ship 
operator are s52 and s74. For brevity’s sake this paper will mainly confine itself to these 
two sections, but other sections that are potentially relevant will be mentioned at the end 
of this section. 
Section 52 – prohibition against misleading or deceptive conduct 
Section 52 reads: 
(1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
(2) … 
Section 52 is a revolutionary provision that has cut across all other forms of relief 
for civil disputes in Australia.  It is:  
a comprehensive provision of wide impact, which does not adopt the language of any 
common law cause of action.  It does not purport to create a liability at all; rather it 
establishes a norm of conduct…. 
29
                                                          
24 At text accompanying fn 13. 
25 Or some State or Territory of Australia.  
26 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s67. 
27 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc. v. Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 provides a useful fact 
scenario, although the case itself concerned a challenge to Australian jurisdiction and the place of contract, 
rather than a decision of the law applicable to the contract.  In that case the plaintiff arranged a Mediterranean 
cruise via a travel agent in Sydney.  The plaintiff was given an exchange voucher by the travel agent to 
exchange for the passage tickets in Greece just prior to boarding the ship.  The plaintiff was injured in a trap 
shooting activity on board.  The court found that the contract was entered in Australia rather than when the 
voucher was exchanged in Greece.  If such a scenario had occurred after 1986 (see fn s 84 and 85) and a court 
found that the proper law was that of Australia, then it would certainly be arguable that s74 would have 
applied to the cruise contract. 
28 There are complicated issues involved in determining the governing law of the contract, particularly as 
regards contracts made on the Internet.  Such matters are outside the bounds of this paper. For a discussion of 
the relevant principles, see texts on conflicts of laws such as Peter Nygh and Martin Davies Conflict of Laws 
in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002, 7
th edition), in particular chapter 19. 
29Brown v Jam Factory Pty Ltd (1981) 35 ALR 79, 86 (Fox J). 
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It has been referred to by some as the ‘new corporate morality’. Initially, the 
Australian courts’ interpretation of s52 was conservative.  But, over time, its reach has 
extended from the realm of consumer protection into that of commercial contracts; even 
a breach of contractual warranties may constitute misleading or deceptive conduct.
30 It 
has virtually replaced the law relating to misrepresentation in Australia and in so doing 
has simplified it.  Although in this context we are largely interested in its effect on 
contracts, it is by no means limited to situations where the parties are in a contractual 
relationship.  In Australia, it has been applied to areas as diverse as advertising, 
newspaper articles, property transactions, sale of goods, the professions, takeover bids 
and, relevantly, holidays - to name but a few.
31
Section 52 prohibits a corporation from ‘engaging in conduct’ that is misleading or 
deceptive or likely to mislead and deceive.
32  The Act defines ‘engaging in conduct’ 
broadly, as: 
doing or refusing to do any act, including the making of or the giving effect to a provision 
of, a contract or arrangement, the arriving at, or the giving effect to a provision of, an 
understanding or the requiring of the giving of, or the giving of, a covenant.
33
As for the words ‘mislead or deceive’, the courts have tended to avoid the mere 
substitution of alternate words, adhering closely to the dictionary definitions such as: 
deceive : …’to cause to believe what is false, to mislead as to a matter of fact, to lead into 
error, to impose upon, delude, take in 
mislead: to lead astray in action or in conduct, to lead into error, to cause to err.
34
Section 52 can be breached unwittingly, without either intent
35 or negligence, and 
may even be breached by silence where there is a duty to reveal relevant facts.
36  The 
section can be breached if no person has actually been misled (although any person 
alleging a breach of s52 needs to show reliance on the conduct and damage resulting 
from that reliance in order to receive relief.
37)  It can also be breached by statements that 
are literally true but, once assessed in the light of the overall effect and context, are 
found to contain a false representation.
38
                                                          
30 Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Limited (1993) 42 FCR 470.  This 
decision has fuelled controversy amongst academics – see Skapinker & Carter ‘Breach of Contract and 
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Australia’ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 294 and Cornwall-Jones 
‘Breach of Contract and Misleading Conduct: A storm in a teacup?’ [2000] Melbourne University Law Review 
10. 
31 See Russell V Miller, Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act (LBC, 2003, 24
th edition) (‘Miller’) 
paragraphs 1.52.170 – 1.52.280 for examples of the various situations in which s52 has been held to apply. 
32 The threshold requirement for a corporation acting in trade or commerce will not be discussed here as in the 
context of a cruise ship operator offering its services, this will be easily satisfied.    
33 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s4(2). 
34 Weitmann v Katies (1977) 29 FLR 339, 343 (Franki J) quoting the Oxford Dictionary.  
35 Though intent is not necessary it can be relevant, because if there were intent then conduct would be 
deceptive rather than merely misleading. 
36 An example of this may be the failure to withdraw outdated brochures containing incorrect information.  
The question is whether, in all of the circumstances there has been conduct likely to mislead or deceive: 
Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31.  
37 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s82 and s87. A requirement of reliance also curtails claims where the 
Plaintiff knew the representation was not true or had ceased to regard that representation as influential.   
However, the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC) (being the body charged with 
enforcement of the TPA) may bring an action for breach of s52 without the need to show that anyone has been 
misled.    
38 See Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Pty Ltd (1978) 140 
CLR 216, 228 where Stephen J relied on passing off actions by way of analogy. 
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Section 52 is designed to ensure that ‘trading must not only be honest but must not 
even, unintentionally, be unfair.’
39  This gives the section a far wider ambit than most 
common law causes of action that generally require some degree of fault, intent, or 
failure to take reasonable care.  As such, it is an attractive cause of action for a litigant 
and a threatening one for defendants. There is no requirement equivalent to duty of care 
or privity of contract; rather, the notion is reliance on the conduct in question leading to 
loss.  The pool of potential plaintiffs – and defendants - is increased as a result. 
The power of s52 is not only due to the simplicity of the section itself, but also those 
facilitative sections elsewhere in the TPA that reinforce it. For instance, the remedies' 
section allows the recovery of damages for those who have sustained loss as a result of 
the conduct.
40  As well as an award of damages, the TPA allows the court to make any 
orders it thinks fit including selecting from an extensive suite of remedies in order to 
compensate the plaintiff in whole or in part for the loss or damage, or to prevent or 
reduce the loss or damage.
41
Other examples of facilitative sections include 
x S75B – which provides that those liable for the breach of s52 include not only 
the main perpetrator but also any party ‘involved’ in the contravention.
42
x S84 - which sets out a statutory definition of agency that is broader than common 
law.
43
x S51A  -which provides that the onus or proving that a prediction about the future 
was reasonably made lies on the maker of the statement.  
x S82 – a six year time limit for claiming loss or damage by conduct in 
contravention of the TPA.
The final contributor to the considerable scope of s52 is the attitude of Australian 
courts in interpreting it.  Courts have been strident in their development of s52 and the 
protection of the principles of fair trading that it exemplifies.  For instance (and 
particularly relevant in the context of liability for cruise ship passengers) the courts 
virtually ignore contractual clauses seeking to exclude or limit liability that may accrue 
under s52.  Such clauses are generally regarded as attempting to undo the effect of s52 
and will not be applied.
44  Another example is that currently
45 there seems to be no 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s82. The section reads:  ‘(1) A person who suffers loss or damage by 
conduct of another person that was done in contravention of …[amongst others, s52]…may recover the 
amount of the loss or damage by action against that other person or against any person involved in the 
contravention.’ 
41 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s80 and s87.  Some remedies include an injunction (s80) declaration, 
rendering an agreement void, varying the contract, refusing to enforce the contract, requiring the refund of 
money or property, varying the contract or covenant in such a manner as the court considers just and equitable 
(s87).  
42 The section reads: 
“A reference in this part to a person involved in a contravention of a provision of [amongst others, s52] 
shall be read as a reference to a person who: 
  (a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; 
  (b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; 
(c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or 
  (d) has conspired with other to effect the contravention” 
However, the extraterritorial application of Act set out in s5 does not apply to s75B: see s5(1). 
43For instance, a person with apparent authority can give authority to another person: Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), s84(2). 
44 For a maritime example of the ignoring of exclusion clauses once s52 has been held to apply, see Comalco v 
Mogal Freight Services (Oceania Trader) (1993) 113 ALR 677.  A disclaimer clause can only be effective if 
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concept akin to contributory negligence leading to a reduction of the measure of 
damages.  Once the violator’s conduct is found to breach s 52 then it will be liable for 
the whole of the loss (even if the complainant itself made decisions or omissions
46 that 
led to the loss.) Finally, in deciding whether conduct was misleading, deceptive or 
likely to mislead or deceive, the test is not what a reasonable person would think.   
Courts will look at the class of people likely to be affected by the conduct – including 
the gullible, not so intelligent and poorly educated.
47
All these features mean that section 52 is a formidable opponent of the complex 
principles of liability that have been developed for common law causes of action and 
particularly those that have been traditionally well protected from claims through the 
use of contractual terms limiting or excluding liability. The ability to cut across well-
established rules of privity, its relative immunity to exclusion and limitation clauses, 
and the six-year time limit for a claim for damages
48 are particularly significant.   
Why might cruise passengers be interested in a s52 action?
49
Where a cruise ship operator or its agent
50 gives a prospective passenger the wrong 
impression about some aspect of the holiday, then this will most likely constitute 
misleading or deceptive conduct.
51  Cases from the USA provide useful fact examples.
52
For example, a brochure that represents cabins to be ‘special, luxurious and beautiful’ 
when the reality turns out to be anything but
53 will constitute misleading or deceptive 
conduct under s52. Other examples might be a deceptive explanation of port or other 
charges,
54 or the order of ports or length of time to be spent at each,
55 or the 
                                                                                                                               
it has the effect of actually erasing that which is misleading in the conduct because it then modifies the 
conduct: Benlist Pty Ltd v Olivetti Australia Pty Ltd (1990) ATPR 41-043, as cited in Miller, at 1.52.75.   
45 As a result of Henville v Walker (2001] 206 CLR 459. This decision has the dubious distinction of being 
named by a leading Australian commentator, Professor Warren Pengilly in his article: ‘The Ten Most 
Disastrous Decisions made Relating to the Trade Practices Act’ (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review
331. Nevertheless, it has been followed in several judgments already (see for example I & L Securities Pty Ltd 
v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd  (2002) 210 CLR 109.) The writer understands that the Australian 
Government (Department of Treasury) is considering proposing amendments to allow for contribution to the 
loss to be taken into account in the assessment of damages.   
46 Argy v Blunts and Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 112; 94 ALR 719, 744 –745. See also the 
recent case of Woolworths Ltd v APL Co Pte Ltd [2001] NSWSC 662. (Supreme Court of New South Wales) 
In the Woolworths case, representations were contained in a notice of impending arrival of goods given to 
customs but also provided to the importer.  The carrier mistakenly misdescribed the cargo as general purpose, 
not reefer (refrigerated) cargo.  The importer did have other means to check the description, but relied wholly 
on the carrier’s notice.  The importer collected the cargo from the stevedore and in reliance on the notice, 
failed to realise that the container required power.  As a result, the contents spoiled.  The court held that the 
importer knew this container was a reefer and required refrigeration (at [52]); not the least because it was a 
consignment the importer had shipped but then recalled.  The claim in tort was reduced by 30%, but the 
plaintiff recovered full damages under the alternative claim based on s52. 
47 Puxu Pty Ltd v Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd (1980) 31 ALR 73, 93 (Lockhart J.) However, the 
courts have adopted the notion of puffery, where representations could not be intended to be taken literally: 
see Stuart Alexander & Co (Interstate) Pty Ltd v Blenders Pty Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 307, 311 (Lockhart J.). 
48 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s82(2). 
49 At this stage we are assuming that the TPA applies to the conduct in question. 
50 ‘Agent’ is broadly defined for the purposes of the TPA – see s84. 
51 ACCC Travel and Tourism – and the TPA (ACCC Publishing Unit) Nov. 1999, 9. 
52 See site by Judge Thomas A Dickerson <http://www.classactionlitigation.com> at 29 June 2004. 
53 See Vallery v Bermuda Star Line 141 Misc 2d 395, 532 NYS 2d 965 (NY Sup 1988) as cited by Judge 
Thomas A Dickerson ‘The Cruise Passenger’s rights and remedies’ 
<http://www.classactionlitigation.com/library/cruiserights.htm> at 29 June 2004.  
54 Ibid, at text accompanying fn 138.  
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recommendation of the quality of shore based excursions operated by third parties but 
sanctioned and promoted by the cruise ship operator.  Representations that turn out to be 
misleading,
56 and have been relied upon by a passenger who has sustained loss or 
damage as a result, will sound in damages.
 57  Even conduct post performance can be 
caught by s52, such as in the course of negotiating a settlement of a claim by a 
passenger against a cruise ship operator.
58
Using s52 to pursue a personal injury claim is, at present, possible
59 but not 
common
60.  An example of such a claim might be if a querulous elderly passenger was 
coaxed up a gangway after being told it was perfectly safe and had just been checked by 
engineers.  In fact there was no proof that any checks had taken place and during her 
embarkation the gangway gave way injuring her.   Another example would be a 
representation in a brochure assuring passengers that the vessel had every last safety 
feature and that all crew were trained in responding to calamities; when the reality 
revealed only rudimentary training and only basic safety features.  Indeed, had the TPA
been applicable, White Star Line could well have been held liable for personal injuries 
caused by a reliance on the representation that the “Titanic” was unsinkable. 
Of course, many of these types of claims could be brought equally well in 
negligence or breach of contract.
61  However, framed in tort or contract they would be 
susceptible to properly incorporated exclusion clauses and contractual limits of liability, 
including monetary and time limits.   From a passenger’s point of view, the beauty of 
the s52 action is that such exclusion and limitation clauses are virtually ignored.  Only if 
a disclaimer can be said to have erased the misleading effect of the conduct will the 
exclusion clause be valid.
62  If the passenger has relied on the misleading or deceptive 
conduct, and sustained a loss or injury, then the exclusion clause will rarely be effective 
to block recovery.  Neither will the fact that the passenger contributed to the accident or 
the injury alter the liability of the cruise operator, which would remain 100%.
63 Overall, 
                                                                                                                               
55 By analogy to Dawson v World Travel Headquarters Pty Ltd [1980] FLR 455, where the change in a tour 
itinerary meant that there was the loss of a ‘day’ in Singapore when compared with the representations made 
in the tour itinerary.
56 Insofar as representations as to future matters are concerned, the representor will be deemed to have been 
misleading if the representor did not have reasonable grounds for making the representation : Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth), s51A(1).  The representor is deemed not to have had reasonable grounds for making the 
representation as to the future matter unless it proves otherwise: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s51A(2).   
57 As stipulated in s82, the section that gives a right to claim damages for loss or damage suffered by conduct 
of another person that was done in contravention of a provisions including s52. 
58 See Dillon v Baltic Shipping Company (Mikhail Lermontov)  (1989) 21 NSWLR 614 where the trial judge 
held that the conduct of the defendant in the settlement of the plaintiff’s claim had been misleading: see at 
page 650.The Court of Appeal doubted the finding by the trial judge that the defendant had engaged in 
misleading and deceptive conduct in the settlement of the claim but upheld the plaintiff’s claim on this ground 
based on the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW): see Baltic Shipping Company (Mikhail Lermontov) v Dillon
(1991) 22 NSWLR 1 per Gleeson CJ at 9, Kirby P at 22 and Mahoney JA at 51.  The Dillon case is discussed 
further in relation to s74 in the text accompanying fn 81.  
59 Loss or damage is defined to include injury, thus making it possible to sue for damages: Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), s4K. 
60 Law of Negligence Review September 2002 paragraph 5.11 
61For instance, in Dillon v Baltic Shipping Company (Mikhail Lermontov) (1989) 21 NSWLR 614 the plaintiff 
recovered damages for breach of contract for disappointment and distress at the loss of the balance of her 
holiday, following the UK case of Jarvis v Swan Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233.  That aspect of the decision was 
upheld on appeal to the High Court (1993) 176 CLR 344.  
62 An example of this would be a disclaimer about the quality or skills of third party operators.  If such a 
disclaimer was contained on any brochure recommending a certain operator, and it was sufficiently obvious, 
then this may well be effective. 
63 Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459. 
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the cause of action under s52 is easier to establish than a common law cause of action.
64
For these reasons, the TPA has traditionally been a potentially powerful weapon against 
cruise ship operators. 
65
Proposed amendments to TPA affecting claims under s52 for personal injury or 
death. 
The ramparts of s52 are under attack, at least as regards claims for personal injury.  In 
the insurance and legal landscape that occurred post September 11 2001, the Federal 
Government commissioned the Review of the Law of Negligence (known as the Ipp 
Report).
66 Relevantly, the terms of reference required the development of:  
amendments to the TPA to prevent individuals commencing actions in reliance on the 
TPA, including misleading and deceptive conduct, to recover compensation for personal 
injury and death.
67
The panel was concerned that changes wrought to the law of negligence by its 
recommendations might be undermined if the TPA continued to provide a ‘back door 
route’ to claims for personal injury.
68  Amongst other reforms,
69 the Ipp Report 
recommended that the TPA be amended to prohibit the award of damages for injury or 
death as a result of a breach of s52 or the related provisions in Division 5 Part 1 TPA.
70
The Bill giving effect to that recommendation, the Trade Practices Amendment 
(Personal Injuries and Death) Bill 2003 (the Bill) would extinguish personal injury 
claims based on s52.  However the Bill has reached an impasse because the Senate 
insisted on amendments unacceptable to the Government.
71   
The ACCC is vehemently opposed to the excising of personal injury and death 
claims from s52 and related provisions of the TPA: 
                                                          
64 For the reasons discussed above, at text accompanying fns 35 to 47. 
65 Although the number of cases brought against cruise ship operators in Australia is relatively low, there have 
been only a handful of cases that have alleged a breach of s52, and at least one that could have but didn’t; 
namely Gill v Charter Travel Co Unreported, Qld Sup Ct (De Jersey J), 16 February 1996, Butterworths 
Unreported Judgements BC 9600812. Further discussion of this case is contained in the text accompanying fn 
92. 
66 Final report released 2 October 2002 and available at: http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/review2.asp 
(visited 29 June 2004). 
67 Ibid, Terms of Reference no 4 at page x. 
68 Ibid, paragraph 5.12. 
69 The Report suggests a wide range of reforms over personal injury negligence law.  In particular, it has 
suggested that the Commonwealth and the States enact an Act giving effect to the recommendations, to apply 
to any claim for personal injury or death arising out of negligence whether framed in contract, tort or for 
breach of statute: Recommendation 2. The report recommends sweeping changes to, amongst other things, 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, limitation of actions, the tests for foreseeability, standard of care 
causation and remoteness of damage, proportionate liability and damages payable, as well as specifically 
considering the liability of public authorities, recreational service providers and not for profit organisations.  
Some States have already enacted these reforms.  However the detail of these suggested changes is beyond the 
ambit of this paper. 
70 The recommendation was hardly surprising, given that the terms of reference directed the Review to find 
some mode of preventing such claims.  However this proposed prohibition on damages for personal injury 
claims brought under Division 5 Part 1 TPA does not apply to s74, which is found in Division 5 part 2.  The 
operation of s74 is also a focus of the Ipp Report in a different context.  See below at text accompanying fn 
98. 
71 Bill No. 72 of 2003
. The Senate passed the Bill with amendments on 1 December 2003; the Bill returned to 
the House of Representatives on 2 December 2003 where the amendments were rejected and the Bill returned 
to the Senate in its original form; the Senate again insisted on its amendments on 11 December 2004. 
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There is a real risk that some of the far reaching changes to the law now being considered 
may be rushed through as quick fix re-active measures with inadequate attention being 
paid to their long term effects. …The Commission can conceive of no circumstances in 
which it is or should be acceptable for a supplier to mislead or deceive a consumer…
72
If the Bill were to pass, cruise ship operators would then only face the prospect of 
s52 claims if the claim does not involve injury or death.  It seems ironic that damages 
under s52 will flow for a misleading representation about a brochure, a cabin, or 
facilities on a cruise or on shore activities, but will not apply if the misleading 
representation happens to have a more serious outcome - personal injury or death.   
Those same reservations are held by the ACCC.
73  It is also ironic that whilst one hand 
of Australian government appears reluctant to sign off on any of the Athens 
Conventions, the other hand of government is, through domestic legislation, creating a 
regime for personal injury compensation that makes the Athens Convention look 
generous.
74  Also, it cannot be lost on those in power that the Bill effectively undercuts 
the ‘consumer protection’ aspect of the TPA for those it was intended to protect, while 
the use of s52 in litigation by big business is flourishing. 
Whilst the complications created for the cruise ship industry by the Bill and other 
TPA reforms are discussed later,
75 cruise ship operators would undoubtedly welcome it 
or any other significant change to the reach of s52.    On the other hand, consumer 
groups, academics and plaintiff lawyers have joined the ACCC in criticising the 
outcome.
76  In any event, at this time, s52 is still important to cruise ship operators.  
Unless and until the Bill can be made attractive to the Senate by some further 
amendment, s52 can still support a personal injury claim.   Even if the Bill, or one like 
it, were to be passed, s52 will remain relevant to non-personal injury claims. 
Section 74 – statutory warranty that corporation will exercise due diligence in the 
provision of services 
The other main provision of the TPA that has the potential to cause angst to cruise ship 
operators is s74.  It is contained in Part 5, Division 2 of the TPA, amongst various 
statutory warranties concerning the provision of goods.  S74 states: 
(1) In every contract for the supply by a corporation in the course of a business of services 
to a consumer there is an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with due care 
and skill and that any materials supplied in connexion with those services will be 
reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are supplied.  
(2)…
77
                                                          
72 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ‘Second Submission to the Principles based Review of 
the Law of Negligence’ August 2002. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Discussion of the Ipp Report’s proposed general negligence reform is best left to dedicated papers, but the 
reforms in some Australian States involve thresholds on claimable damages (so that a small claim may be 
barred) and caps on awards for general damages.  See the summary 
<http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/publications/2002/20021115_2.asp> at 29 June 2004.  
75 See discussion accompanying fn 112. 
76 eg see ACCC press release 2 September 2002 “Consumers To Lose From Negligence Review Proposals: 
ACCC” <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/88163/fromItemId/378014> at 29 June 2004; 
Australian Consumers’ Association press release 3 September 2002 “Proposed Reforms to Law of Negligence 
“Over the Top” says ACA”; Australian Plaintiff Lawyers Association press release 2 October 2002  “Coonan 
lacks compassion and understanding” <http://www.apla.com/links_med_sub/releases/021002.htm> at 29 June 
2004.  
77 The remainder of the section reads: 
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‘Services’ is defined in s4 as:  
…a contract for or in relation to…(ii) the provision of, or the use or enjoyment of 
facilities for, amusement, entertainment, recreation or instruction… 
The warranties in the TPA, including s74, differ from the other consumer protection 
provisions in the TPA because the remedies for breach are not to be found in the TPA.
Instead, the remedies are those at common law - primarily breach of contract.  The 
implied statutory warranties are designed to complement and expand pre-existing law.   
As such, the TPA is not providing a complete scheme, but rather imposes on the 
common law a statutory warranty.  
Section 68 ensures compliance with the statutory warranty.  It provides: 
(1) Any term of a contract (including a term that is not set out in the contract but is 
incorporated in the contract by another term of the contract) that purports to exclude, 
restrict or modify or has the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying:  
(a) the application of all or any of the provisions of this Division; 
(b) the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision; 
(c) any liability of the corporation for breach of a condition or warranty implied by 
such a provision; or 
(d) the application of section 75A; 
is void.
78
It is possible to limit liability under s74 as set out in s68A, but this will not apply to 
leisure passengers.
79  Indeed, it is important that, (where Australian law governs the 
passage contract), passage conditions do not claim a right to limit liability that does not 
exist. That in itself would constitute misleading or deceptive conduct as well as breach 
other specific provisions of the TPA.
80
Does s74 apply to a cruise passenger contract for services? 
In the famous Australian case of Dillon v Baltic Shipping Company
81 (Mikhail 
Lermontov) the trial judge held that s74 applied to impose a requirement to exercise due 
                                                                                                                               
(2)…   Where a corporation supplies services … to a consumer in the course of a business and the consumer, 
expressly or by implication, makes known to the corporation any particular purpose for which the services are 
required or the result that he or she desires the services to achieve, there is an implied warranty that the 
services supplied under the contract for the supply of the services and any materials supplied in connexion 
with those services will be reasonably fit for that purpose or are of such a nature and quality that they might 
reasonably be expected to achieve that result, except where the circumstances show that the consumer does 
not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him or her to rely, on the corporation's skill or judgment.  
(3)  A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that are, or are to be, 
provided, granted or conferred under:  
a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the purposes of a business, trade, 
profession or occupation carried on or engaged in by the person for whom the goods are transported or stored; 
or (b) a contract of insurance. 
78 The section allows limitation of liability in certain circumstances, but not when the services are of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption.  Clearly a contract for cruising 
would fall within that exception.  Therefore limitations of liability are not permitted.  An interesting argument 
would be whether a limitation on the time available to sue for loss under a passage contract would breach s68 
as having the effect of restricting the remedy in s74. 
79 Though it is arguable that it could apply to business travellers, for instance those attending an onboard 
conference.  However such travellers would probably be entitled to protection because they are services of a 
kind ‘ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use’ within the definition of ‘Consumers’ in 
s4B.
80 For example, s53g.  Provisions in part 5, apart from s52, can be the subject of prosecution by the ACCC.  
81 (1989) 21 NSWLR 614. 
59The Cruise Ship Industry – Liabilities to Passengers for Breach of s52 and 
s74 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)                                                                43 
(2004) 18 MLAANZ Journal 
care and skill in the navigation of a vessel carrying the plaintiff’s personal luggage,
82
although not to the carriage of the plaintiff herself.  At the time of the Mikhail
Lermontov sinking, s74 contained its own definition of services, which included only 
the transportation of goods, not passengers.  As a result, limitations in the carriage 
contract seeking to limit or exclude liability in respect of luggage lost or damaged in 
breach of s74 were inoperative, though they were operative as regards the claim for 
personal injury.   
The Court of Appeal seemed to doubt the Trial Judge’s finding that s74 applied to 
the baggage component of the contract.  The Court of Appeal took the view that the 
contract was properly characterised as one for the carriage of a person and obiter 
comments indicate that the court took a dim view of the Trial judge’s device of cleaving 
the contract into two, one falling inside and the other outside s74.
83  The doubts of the 
Court of Appeal in the Dillon case have been assuaged by amendments to section 74 in 
1986.
84  The definition of services applicable since 1986 includes:   
the provision of, or the use or enjoyment of facilities for, amusement, entertainment, 
recreation or instruction…
85
On its face, it seems clear that this definition includes cruise ship contracts, and 
there is academic support for this conclusion.
86  Therefore, if the sinking had occurred 
after that amendment, Mrs Dillon would have been able to recover under s74 for 
personal injury caused by the defendant’s admitted failure to exercise due care and skill 
in the navigation of the vessel.  
Importantly, the appellate courts in the Dillon case were not required to address 
directly the parameters or content of the duty imposed by s74 on a cruise ship operator – 
namely, to exercise due care and skill in navigating a vessel. Nor was that in issue 
before the High Court.
87  Therefore, the first instance judgment of Justice Carruthers is 
the current authority for the existence of such a duty within s74.   The imposition of 
such a duty in Dillon, and the fact that s68 does not allow its exclusion or limitation, is 
of great significance, particularly when one considers that shipowners have traditionally 
been able to claim protection against the consequent costs of negligence in the 
navigation of a vessel.
88 There is no doubt that the imposition of such a duty will be 
challenged the next time it arises.  If the imposition of s74 to navigational services is 
upheld, it means that all cruise contracts to which Australian law applies will contain an 
obligation to use due care and skill in navigation – and, (because the contracts are with 
consumers
89) no exclusion or limitation clause can undercut or effect that.
90
                                                          
82 Ibid at 641-642. 
83 Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon (Mikhail Lermontov) (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 (Court of Appeal); see Kirby 
P at 22, Mahoney J. concurring. 
84 The definition of services in s74 was removed and the general definition of services found in s4 then 
applied to s74.  
85 The amendment to s74 came into effect in June 1986.  The definition of services is now found in s4 as set 
out in the text following fn 77.   
86 Warren Pingelly, ‘The Law of Travel and Tourism’ (Blackstone Press 1990), 71, fn 22; Atherton & 
Atherton ‘Tourism, Travel and Hospitality Law’ LBC (1998), [12.12 –12.16].   
87 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (Mikhail Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344. 
88 Be it contractual, or more commonly due to the operation of an international convention such as those in 
operation over cargo claims, passenger claims or general liability claims.  For a further discussion of 
limitation conventions see text accompanying fn 123 onwards. 
89 So that s68A does not apply. 
90 Although in certain circumstances, the shipowner may be able to limit liability under an international 
convention – see text accompanying fn 146.   
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Subject to the caveat under the next heading, it is not only injuries sustained for 
navigational error that would be covered by the statutory warranty - any injury sustained 
as a result of the so called ‘hotel functions’ of a cruise ship, or as a result of organised 
off shore activities, would also be subject to this statutory warranty.  For instance, injury 
sustained in a beauty or hairdressing salon or whilst taking a shore tour will sound in 
liability if the cruise ship operator or its agents have failed to exercise due care and skill.  
As noted by Atherton,
91 there seems to have been a lost opportunity to establish the 
application of s74 to the hotel functions of cruise ships.  In the case of Gill v Charter 
Travel Co
92 a passenger injured himself jumping into a pool that had been half emptied 
during the course of the day.  The pool had not been covered with a net, as was usual 
when a pool was not available for swimming.  Much of the case concerned the 
application of limitation clauses and a monetary cap on liability imposed by the 
contract. Ultimately the plaintiff recovered but his damages were capped.  Had s74 been 
pleaded by the plaintiff and held to apply, the limitation of liability clauses relied upon 
by the cruise ship operator would have been in breach of s68, and the contractually 
imposed cap on the claim would have been of no effect.  
Recent amendments to reach of s74 - Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for 
Recreational Services) Act 2002 
Section 74 has also had its wings clipped by recent statutory intervention limiting the 
reach of s74.  The amendment, which became effective on 19 December 2002, arose out 
of the desire of Federal Parliament to ensure that ‘individuals who choose to participate 
in inherently risky activities’
93 can be permitted to take responsibility for their own 
safety – to voluntarily assume the risk of injury.  By virtue of the Trade Practices 
Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Act 2002
94 (the Amending Act), a new 
s68B allows corporations to exclude restrict or modify its liability for death or injury as 
a result of a breach of the duty to exercise due care and skill imposed by s74.    
Some important points to note about the Amending Act: 
x This amendment does not of itself exclude liability – an effective exclusion 
clause or disclaimer must be properly incorporated in the contract.  After a long 
absence, once again the ticketing cases and law relating to incorporating terms 
and conditions will become relevant in consumer protection under the TPA.
x Personal injury is broadly defined, including mental injury, aggravation 
acceleration or recurrence of an injury or disease or any form of behaviour or 
circumstance that can result in harm or disadvantage to the individual or the 
community. 
x Recreation services is also broadly defined, being 
   services that consist of participation in a sporting activity or other similar leisure 
pursuit, or
  - any other activity that involves a significant degree of exertion or physical risk 
and is undertaken for the purposes of recreation, enjoyment or leisure (the ‘catch 
all’ provision). 
                                                          
91  Above, fn 86, [12.15] (within fn 56). 
92  Unreported, Qld Sup Ct (De Jersey J), 16 February 1996, Butterworths Unreported Judgements BC 
9600812. 
93 Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Bill 
2002 <http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/ems/0/2002/0/20020628tradeem.htm> [1.4] at 29 June 2004. 
94 No 146 of 2002, commenced 19 December 2002.   
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Whilst the Explanatory Memorandum claims the amendments are aimed at those 
who ‘choose to participate in inherently risky activities’,
95 in reality the amending Act 
extends much further than that.
96  A ‘sporting activity or similar leisure pursuit’ would 
seem to encompass many activities on board a cruise ship and it is unclear where the 
line would be drawn – aquatic games? Quoits?  Aerobics?  Darts?  Ballroom dancing? 
The provision is hardly limited to extreme or inherently risky sports.  One wonders 
whether a situation like that in the Gill v Charter Travel case mentioned above
97 where 
injuries resulted from skylarking around a pool, would fall within the amendment.  As 
for the catch all provision, much will depend on the court’s interpretation of the phrases 
‘significant degree of exertion or physical risk’ and ‘for the purposes of recreation, 
enjoyment or leisure.’  There is at least an argument that an entire cruise could be seen 
as recreational services, but it seems unlikely that the courts would so broadly construe 
a section limiting consumers’ rights.  One thing is certain - there is much scope for 
litigation to establish the reach of the new s68B. 
This is an amendment that is of great relevance to the cruise ship operator.  In a 
nutshell, the courts may, if the facts are right, enforce a properly drafted clause 
excluding liability for injury arising out of the provision of recreational services.    
Proposed further amendments to s74  - Ipp Report recommendations 
The recent amendments to the ambit of s74 appear to be only the beginning.   Those 
amendments had been drafted before the Ipp Report and were criticised by it.  The Ipp 
Report suggests that the amendments are both too narrow (because they only apply if 
there is a contract, and the exclusion is incorporated in that contract
98) and too broad 
(because the definition of recreational services extends even to low risk activities).
99
The Ipp Report instead favours the introduction of a separate statute which would, 
amongst other things, give all recreational providers
100 protection from claims for 
personal injury where that injury was caused by the materialisation of an obvious risk
101
and to provide that there be no liability for a failure to warn about an obvious risk.
102  In 
addition, the Ipp Report favoured amending the definition of ‘recreational services’ in 
the TPA so that it takes in only activities ‘undertaken for the purposes of recreation, 
enjoyment or leisure which involves a significant degree of physical risk.’
103 (‘Ipp 
Recommendations’)
The narrowing of the definition of recreational services would help clarify the 
uncertainty and difficulties of the definition used in the amending Act discussed above.  
However a claim against a cruise ship operator for personal injuries under s74 would, in 
most cases, not fall within the requirement of ‘a significant degree of physical risk’.  
The protection proposed by the Ipp Recommendations would be of minimal relevance 
to cruise ship operators, compared to other types of recreational service providers.   In 
that sense, the current law (with the new s68B) better protects the cruise ship industry. 
                                                          
95 Above, fn 93. 
96 As recognised by the Ipp Report, criticising the definition as being ‘extremely and unacceptably wide in its 
terms and very difficult to understand’ (at [5.61]).  See text accompanying fn 99. 
97 Text accompanying fn 92. 
98 Fn  66, [5.51]. 
99 Ibid, [5.61].   
100 Regardless of whether the claim was framed in tort, contract or beach of statute.  The Ipp Report proposed 
that the Act implementing its reforms be termed the Civil Liability (Personal Injuries and Death) Act. 
101 Recommendation 11. 
102 Recommendation 14. 
103 Recommendation 12. 
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At the time of writing, no legislation has yet been placed before Parliament to amend 
the TPA in accordance with the Ipp Recommendations. 
Importantly, the other proposals in the Ipp Report aimed at reforming the general 
law of negligence will, if enacted, be relevant to any claim for personal injury or death 
brought under the TPA.  The reforms would apply to any personal injury claim 
regardless of whether it is brought in contract, tort or under statute.
104  The reforms 
suggested are wide ranging.
105  At the time of writing, no legislation has been 
introduced into the Federal Parliament to implement those reforms, although several 
States and Territories have passed legislation adopting some of the Ipp Report 
recommendations.
106 However, these more general reforms fall outside the ambit of this 
paper. 
s74 is still relevant to other claims, both personal injury or other types of loss. 
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the recent amendment and Ipp 
recommendations as regards recreational services apply only to personal injury claims 
that arise out of recreational services.
107  There will, therefore, be some types of 
personal injury claims that do not fall within the new s68B
108 and most claims would 
fall outside the narrower definition proposed by the Ipp Report.
109  For instance, it will 
not catch a claim for injury associated with a lack of due care and skill in the navigation 
of the ship (such as was found in the Dillon case and is discussed above), the traditional 
‘slip and trip’ claims, food poisoning, negligence during beauty services, legionnaires 
disease and so on.
110  There are also those types of claim that do not involve personal 
injury that will not be affected by the amendment – such as damage to or loss of 
luggage or other economic loss.   
It can be seen that s74 is by no means a spent force for passengers seeking to bring a 
claim against cruise ship operators.  Ironically, it will assume greater significance if the 
Ipp recommendations are eventually enacted.
 111  The fact that s74 cannot currently be 
excluded for anything but recreational services causing injury or death means that it is 
still a significant source of potential liability for a cruise ship operator.  To ignore it 
would be perilous.   
                                                          
104 Recommendation 2. 
105 Suggesting changes to personal injury and death claims in such areas as limitation of actions, proportionate 
liability, contributory negligence, foreseeability, standard of care, causation and remoteness of damage, and 
caps on damages. As to the latter, see the discussion at fn 74. 
106 For example, Queensland (Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002), New South Wales (Civil Liability Act 
2002 and Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Bill 2002); Western Australia (Civil Liability 
Act 2002, Volunteers (Protection from Liability) Act  2002); South Australia (Statutes Amendment (Liability 
for Personal Injury) Act 2002, Volunteer Protection Act 2001), Victoria (Wrongs and other Acts (Public 
Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002).  Until the Commonwealth legislate to implement the Ipp Report 
recommendations, there is a potential conflict between State and Commonwealth law, which would be likely 
to be decided by the operation of s109 of the Constitution. 
107 A cruise ship operator might ambitiously claim that an entire cruise is a ‘recreational service’ but this 
would be unlikely to find favour with the courts who are committed to a broad interpretation of the TPA. 
108 Unless, as seems unlikely, the courts rule that an entire cruise is a contract for recreational services within 
s68B.  
109 Recommendation 12. 
110 Although those claims would be caught by the more general amendments proposed by the Ipp Report– see 
above, fn 105. 
111 Because the field of application of the amendment would be reduced if the Ipp Report definition of 
recreational services were to be adopted. 
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Conclusion – s52 and s74 
The ruction caused by the so called public liability crisis and the push to reform the 
laws of negligence has had a profound effect on the TPA and the liabilities of service 
providers such as cruise ship operators. From a principled perspective and using the 
cruise ship industry as an example of the provisions in operation, the amendments have 
created a hotch-potch of liabilities and exclusions.  The TPA has always scorned 
exclusion clauses where the aim is to cut down liability under the TPA, but in the 
context of s74, now they rise, phoenix-like, to assume significance.  Depending on the 
circumstances, in some cases contractual exclusions for personal injury claims will be 
effective. But in other cases they will be struck down, and mere reliance on those 
exclusions could of itself constitute misleading or deceptive conduct.
112  The amending 
Act and the Bill do not even show a consistent approach to personal injury claims:  if 
the Bill had been passed, such claims would be as good as excluded from s52, but a s74 
claim for personal injuries can only be avoided where the injury has resulted from 
recreational services for which there has been an effective disclaimer of liability.
113  The 
recreational service provider amendments proposed by the Ipp Report will make the law 
simpler, but will have less relevance to a cruise ship operator.  The approach to personal 
injury claims is made all the more poignant by the continued relevance of TPA in claims 
that would be classed as less significant, such as misleading representations about cabin 
size and luxury.   
Whilst there may be overall a lessening of the cruise ship operator’s liability for 
personal injury, there is a significant increase in complexity for those attempting to both 
‘manage’ their affairs in keeping with the TPA and assess their legal liabilities under it.  
From the passenger’s perspective, the resultant matrix of what is claimable and what is 
not could be described as perplexing and unprincipled. 
Other provisions of TPA that can be relevant to a cruise ship operator  
This paper has confined itself to an examination of s52 and s74 of the TPA.  However 
there are several other sections of the TPA that can be relevant to cruise ship operators.  
Closely aligned with s52 is s53, which deals with specific types of misleading 
representations; such as those concerning value, price or quality of goods
114 or 
services
115 or a false or misleading representation concerning the existence, exclusion or 
effect of any condition, warranty, guarantee, right or remedy.
116  Breach of provisions of 
the TPA (other than s52
117) is an offence and the court can impose penalties.
118  A cruise 
ship operator must also be careful not to accept payment for cruises at a time when it 
knows it will not be conducting that particular cruise or will be providing a materially 
                                                          
112 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(g). The breach of this section can be the subject of a penalty. 
113 This may be due to the fact that s74 does not find its remedy in the TPA but rather in common law 
damages; so a restriction of the type of claim that can be brought for breach of contract may have been 
regarded as problematic.  Also, a breach of implied warranties about the supply of goods and services often do 
result in personal injury or death, and perhaps this was felt to be too central to the rights of consumers to do 
away with in its entirety.  S52, with its remedies being an entirely statutory creation, is a different matter. 
114 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(a). 
115 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(aa). 
116 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(g).  Arguably claiming a right to limit liability for breach to 
performing the service again, claiming as it does a right to rely on s68A (which will not apply to the vast 
majority of cruise passenger contracts because they are consumers not business users) would be a breach of 
this provision and possibly misleading and deceptive in its own right. 
117 And some other provisions not the subject of this paper. 
118 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s79. 
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different cruise,
119 or overbooking a cruise because such conduct will offend s58.  In 
addition the TPA imposes statutory warranties about the quality of goods supplied under 
a contract, which would arguably apply to the quality of meals and beverages, and may 
apply to equipment supplied or hired to passengers.
120
Finally the significance of the unconscionability provisions in Part 4A has been 
bolstered of late by the introduction of damages as a remedy.  The unconscionability 
provisions in s51AB are of significance to all those in any industry, introducing ‘a 
general duty to trade fairly.’
121 As Baltic v Dillon showed,
122 the conduct of a cruise 
ship operator and its advisers as regards settlement of a claim may come under scrutiny 
for fairness. 
How does the TPA interrelate with a cruise-ship operator’s right to limit liability 
under International Conventions? 
As is explained above, the courts fiercely defend consumers’ rights to the protection 
offered by the TPA, to the point that exclusion clauses and disclaimers are rarely 
effective in excluding TPA liability.  However, there is a long tradition, enshrined in 
international conventions, of shipowners limiting their liability generally, and in relation 
to passengers in particular.
123  There are two categories of limitation regimes that are 
relevant to cruise ship passengers.   
First, there are general limitation regimes that seek to limit shipowners’ liability in 
various types of claims, including passenger claims.  There are two general limitation 
conventions in operation internationally, being the 1957 Convention
124 and the 1976 
Convention.
125  The latter has been in force in Australia since 1991 and is about to be 
updated by the 1996 Protocol.
126  Secondly, there are the limitation regimes specifically 
directed at passengers – namely, the Athens Convention and its various amending 
protocols.
127 Both the general conventions and the Athens Convention seek to limit the 
ultimate liability to passengers, but the mode of doing so is different.   The 1976 
Convention sets a global limit on all passenger claims arising on one distinct occasion, 
                                                          
119 It would be materially different if a particular port of call were to be left out, or the time there was to be 
appreciably reduced, or if the total time of the cruise was altered.  See Dawson v World Travel Headquarters 
Pty Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 455. 
120 The warranty requiring equipment to be fit for its purpose could fall under s74(2) (as an adjunct to 
services) or under s70 and s71 which deal with a contract for the supply of goods. 
121 Miller, [1.51AB.5]. 
122 Above at text accompanying fn 58. 
123This paper does not explore the restrictions or practical operations of the Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth).  For that, see Ch 10 of White (ed.), Australian Maritime Law (2
nd ed, 2000) 
(White), and Davies and Dickey (ed.), Shipping Law (2nd ed, 1995) Ch 15 (Davies & Dickey). 
124 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea Going Ships, Brussels 
1957.
125 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims done at London 1976. (1976 Convention). 
126 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth) (LLMC Act).  In 2001 the LLMC Act was 
amended by the International Maritime Conventions Legislation Amendment Act 2001 to incorporate the 1996 
Protocol.  The protocol will come into effect internationally on 13 May 2004 and the LLMC Act amendment 
incorporating the 1996 protocol into Australian Law will come into effect on the same day. –Commonwealth
Gazette(Special) 2004, No. S157 dated 13 May 2004.  
127 Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974 ( Athens 
Convention).  The 1976 Protocol to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their 
Luggage by Sea, done in London 1976 (1976 Protocol) introduced the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as the 
monetary unit, and increased the applicable limits.  The 1990 Protocol never came into force as it failed to 
receive sufficient ratifications. The 2002 Protocol to the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of 
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 (2002 Protocol) has 6 of the required 10 signatories as at 30 April 
2004 (Article 20).   
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calculated by multiplying a specific amount by the number of passengers the ship is 
permitted to carry.
128  The Athens Convention, on the other hand, sets a limit for the 
claim of each passenger.
129   Cruise ship operators find the Athens Convention scheme 
more attractive (which is understandable, as it is specifically geared to passenger 
claims).  Where there are only a few claimants, the Athens Convention limit will apply 
to each of their claims.  Contrast that with the 1976 Convention in the same scenario, 
which calculates a global limit for the sum total of all claims.  That limit will ordinarily 
be so large that, in reality, there is no cap on those claims at all.
130 As we shall see,
131 it 
is only in a very serious accident that the limit under the 1976 Convention would come 
into play. 
The existence of these limitation regimes, when taken with the attitude of the courts 
to exclusion or limitation of liability under the TPA, poses some interesting questions 
for injury and death claims.
132  This paper concentrates on whether a cruise ship 
operator can claim limitation under these conventions for a single catastrophic event 
caused by failure to provide navigational services with due care and skill in breach of 
s74– akin to the Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon fact scenario, but with a less happy 
outcome in terms of casualties.
133  This scenario has been selected because of all the 
passenger claims a cruise ship operator may have to face, this is the type where 
limitation would be critical. 
Athens Convention and its protocols 
The Athens Convention specifically covers liability to passengers on ships.  However, 
neither the original convention nor any of its subsequent protocols have been adopted 
by Australia nor incorporated in domestic law.  Australia is still considering its attitude 
towards the Athens Convention and the 2002 Protocol.
134 Therefore, at present, the 
Athens Convention will not apply to a cruise ship by force of Australian law.
135
As explained above, a cruise ship operator would prefer to have a ‘per passenger’ 
limit of liability, as offered by the Athens Convention, rather than a global limit for all 
passenger claims.  A cruise ship operator often seeks to incorporate the provisions of the 
Athens Convention (in one of its forms) into its carriage contract.  Whilst that may affect 
a claim for breach of contract or tort claims,
136 its effectiveness for TPA claims is 
somewhat less certain.  There would be a conflict between the intention of the TPA and 
the terms of a contractual limitation.  One would expect that the Courts would continue 
to express their strident view of the intended operation of the TPA and refuse to allow a 
                                                          
128 Article 7. 
129 Article 7. 
130 See further discussion of this limitation amounts commencing at text accompanying fn 146 below. 
131 See text accompanying fn 153 below.  Once the 1990 Protocol enters into force, the limit will be even 
higher – see text accompanying fn 157.  
132 As an aside, a breach of s52 for matters such as cabin size or number of days/stopovers would not fall 
within the terms of the Athens Convention, which applies only to personal injury and damage to or loss of 
luggage or valuables (Art 14).  The LLMC Act, however, is more broadly worded (see article 2, particularly 
2(c)).  In any event, a claim by a passenger for damage other than injury or death would be unlikely to reach a 
sufficient quantum to challenge the limitation amounts. 
133 The same reasoning would apply to luggage claims resulting from the same scenario. 
134 Email from Beta Zadnik, Australian Federal Department of Transport and Regional Services Friday 14 
November 2003. 
135 Although a cruise ship operator may be in a position to assert that it applies by force of law in another 
country: see fn139 below. 
136 And for instance it could affect the limit of a claim that falls within the Recreational Services amendment 
discussed in text accompanying fn 94 above. 
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cruise ship operator to rely on a contractual term
137 to limit liability for loss or damage 
caused by a breach of the TPA.
In a sense, the very situation in which the cruise ship operator would like to have 
limited its liability, a loss of a vessel with many passengers seriously injured or killed, 
may not be able to be subject to a contractually incorporated limitation.  A s74 claim for 
lack of due care and skill in the provision of navigational services causing injury can be 
brought, and would be protected by s68 from any contractual attempt at excluding or 
limiting liability.  The recent amendments limiting the reach of s74 are relevant only to 
recreational services, but that would not affect a claim for a breach of the obligation to 
exercise due care and skill as regards navigational services.
138  Therefore such a claim – 
or more likely, series of claims – for a breach of s74 for the failure to navigate with due 
care and skill would be unlikely to be limited by contractual incorporation of the Athens 
Convention.
139
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth) (LLMC Act) 
Although the Athens Convention has never been part of the law of Australia, there is 
still the shipowner’s more general right to limit offered by the LLMC Act.  In this case, 
Australia has ratified the 1976 Convention and enacted it into domestic law.   In this 
context, there is a potential clash between the TPA and LLMC Act, the latter enacting an 
international convention to which Australia is a party.  Both have the force of law in 
Australia.
140
As a matter of interpretation, one expects Australia to seek to comply with its 
international commitments - in this case, providing a limitation of liability scheme to 
shipowners who may find themselves before Australian courts.  As such, the LLMC Act
would have precedence over the TPA.  This is also a conclusion supported by the 
surrounding circumstances.  The LLMC Act has been amended as recently as 2001
141
and no effort has been made to exclude TPA claims from its operation.
142  Also, the 
1996 Protocol specifically allowed state parties to impose a higher limit than that in 
Article 7.  Australia has not done so, in relation to TPA claims or any other types of 
claims. 
The fact scenario being considered, though a breach of s74, would clearly fall within 
the operation of the LLMC Act.
143  In this writer’s view, the LLMC Act would take 
precedence over the TPA.  Therefore, whilst the liability to the passengers would still 
                                                          
137 As opposed to a legal right to limit liability, as would be the case if Australia had ratified the Athens 
Convention.
138 See text accompanying fn 97 above. 
139 If the ship is flying the flag of or is registered in a State Party to the Athens Convention then a cruise ship 
operator could assert that the Convention applies as a matter of law under Article 2.  There seems to be no 
case law within Australia that has arisen on this point.  In a similar but distinguishable situation, courts in the 
United States of America have been known to enforce the limitation applicable in the foreign country where 
their citizens have been injured on a foreign cruise: see Berman v Royal Cruise Line 1995 AMC 1926 (Cal 
sup. Ct 1995), Kirman v Compagnie Francais de Croisieres 1994 AMC 2848 (Cap Sup Ct 1993) and other 
cases cited in Kaye, Rose and Maltzman LLP, Batten the Hatches; the IMO sets a stormy course with a new 
Athens Convention (2003) <http://www.kayerose.com/Articles/articles46.html> at 14 April 2004. But the 
situation discussed here is distinguishable because it involves a contract to which Australian law applies (or 
else s74 would be irrelevant).  
140 See Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth), s6. 
141 To adopt the 1996 Protocol: see fns 126 and 155. 
142 Indeed, had the proposed Bill become law, then the issue would have evaporated in relation to personal 
injury and death claims based on s52. 
143 Article 2.1(a), Article 7. 
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exist and could not be excluded,
144 it would still be subject to limitation in accordance 
with the LLMC Act.
145
Some comments about the limitation amount under the LLMC Act, and forum 
shopping issues. 
Having concluded that the LLMC Act would provide cruise ship operators with the right 
to limit in the fact scenario in question, let us explore how the actual limitation amount 
would work under the 1976 Convention.
146 The limitation applicable to passengers is 
contained in Article 7, which provides that the liability for all passenger claims arising 
on any distinct occasion shall be limited to an amount arrived at by multiplying the 
number of passengers the ship is authorised to carry by 46,666 Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR).
147   The Article goes on to provide a cap on passenger claims of 25 million SDR, 
which is equivalent to the limitation amount multiplied by about 535 passengers (the 
cap).
148  It would seem
149 that each passenger’s claim is not limited to the 46,666 figure, 
but rather that the total pool of funds available is determined by the calculation set out 
in Article 7.
150  Therefore the limitation amount would only be relevant if the 
aggregated damages awards were in excess of the total pool of funds.  If only a few 
passengers are injured then they may recover amounts in excess of the 46,666 figure 
each, so long as the combined total does not exceed the total pool of funds.  If there are 
many injured passengers, and the total of all the claims exceeds the total pool of funds, 
then the individual payouts will be diminished accordingly.  
The larger cruise vessels are in a sense, better protected than the small ones by the 
provisions of the unamended 1976 Convention because of the cap.
151 Smaller cruise 
operators would be unlikely to get close to the cap, and are therefore carrying more 
potential liability per passenger than a larger ship.  A cruise ship with 3000 passengers 
on board would, under the 1976 Convention, have an upper cap on claims
152 of about 
AUD$49 million.
153  Without that cap, the calculated limit would be more like 
AUD$277 million. 
                                                          
144 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s68. 
145 An interesting question will arise if the Ipp Report reforms regarding negligence are fully accepted and 
enacted by Federal Parliament, as those reforms contain caps on personal injury claims.  Would the Ipp 
reforms or the LLMC provide the relevant cap on damages payable?  It is certainly arguable that the LLMC 
Act, being specific to maritime passengers, will override a more general statute implementing the Ipp reforms.  
In addition, the LLMC Act has a certain stature by reason of being the implementation of an international 
convention to which Australia is a party.  These same arguments would be available to a passenger should a 
carrier seek to rely on State based implementation of the Ipp Report reforms.  The writer has been informed 
by DOTARS that it is currently considering its submission to the Ipp Review about whether the convention 
caps ought to take precedence, or the Ipp reform caps. 
146  We will, for the moment, assume an event that occurs before the 1996 Protocol came into force. 
147 As at 29 April 2004 the SDR Rate was AUD$1.98.  It does fluctuate in keeping with the value of the 
various international currencies involved. 
148 See White, fn 123, 321. 
149 Ibid.  
150 Any attempt by a cruise ship operator to contractually impose an individual per passenger limit on a 
personal injury claim made under s52 or s74 of the TPA would probably fail, and in the case of s74, most 
certainly fall foul of s68 unless the recreational services provisions apply.  It may even breach s53 (g) as being 
a false or misleading representation concerning the exclusion or effect of any condition, warranty, right or 
remedy: see text accompanying fn 116 above.   
151 Being 25 million units of account - See Article 7(1). 
152 Assuming no right to break limitation under Article 4. 
153 Based on an SDR rate of AUD$1.98, as it was on 29 April 2004.  Current rates can be found at the IMF 
website: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/sdr/db/rms_five.cfm (visited 29 June 2004). 
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As already noted, the 1996 Protocol came into force internationally on 13 May 2004 
after receiving its 10
th signatory early in 2004.
154  The 1996 Protocol has been enacted 
as a schedule to the LLMC Act, and became part of Australian law on 13 May 2004 
also.
155  There are a number of significant changes for cruise ship operators.  For a start, 
the limitation figure for passenger claims has almost quadrupled.
156  But the more 
challenging aspect is that the amount for passenger claims will no longer be capped.  
That means a passenger ship carrying 3000 passengers will have a total limit of 
approximately AUD $1.039 billion.
157  The reality is that the limits of liability per 
passenger are now so high that all but the worst accidents involving large cruise vessels 
would fall under the limitation amount.
158
With the 1996 Protocol coming into effect, we will see at least 3 general 
international limitation regimes in operation simultaneously: the 1957 Convention, the 
1976 Convention in its original form and then the 1976 Convention as updated by the 
1996 Protocol.  There is no requirement of a connection between forum and dispute as a 
precondition for claiming limitation.
159  This must beg the question - can a cruise ship 
operator reduce the limitation amount applicable by choosing to set up the limitation 
fund in a jurisdiction with a friendlier limitation scheme than that of Australia?  Having 
opened this can of worms, this paper limits itself to a few comments.
160  The fact that a 
limitation fund can theoretically be constituted anywhere seems to suggest that the 
cruise ship operator has that very option.
161  Under the 1976 Convention, there is no 
provision concerning multiple proceedings
162 although it does give some protection to 
shipowners who constitute funds in a place with some connection to the claim but 
whose ship or property has been arrested elsewhere.
163  It seems that a cruise ship 
operator could gain a distinct advantage, if only tactical, by carefully and quickly 
choosing a location for the limitation fund to be constituted. An increased advantage can 
be obtained by choosing from the various places with some connection to the claim.
164
This will be particularly the case with the 1996 Protocol in force, as there will be 
relatively few jurisdictions that have ratified it. 
                                                          
154 International Maritime Organisation summary of status of conventions 
<http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247> at 29 June 2004. 
155 The 1996 Protocol has been enacted as an amendment to the LLMC Act by International Maritime 
Conventions Legislation Amendment Act 2001. The commencement date of the Act was proclaimed as 13 
May 2004 (Commonwealth Gazette 2004, No. S157 dated 13 May 2004). 
156 Increased from 46,666 to 175,000 units multiplied by number of passengers the ship is authorised to carry. 
157 175,000 units of account per passenger.  That sum is calculated on a passenger carrying capacity of 3000, 
using an SDR conversion rate of 1 SDR = AUD$1.98 (as at 29 April 2004), see fn 153.   
158 the other significant reform set out in the 1996 Protocol is the ‘default mechanism of the tacit acceptance 
procedure’ see National Interest Analysis  Protocol, done at London on 2 May 1996, to amend the Convention 
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, of 19 November 1976 [2001] ATNIA 15 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/other/dfat/nia/2001/15.html> at 1 September 2003. 
159 DC Jackson ‘Enforcement of Maritime Claims’ (3
rd ed.) LLP 2000, 586. 
160 For a lengthy discussion of the issues see Jackson, ibid, and the references to Davies & Dickey, and White 
(ed) above at fn 123. 
161 Though it is subject to stay of proceedings if a passenger contests that another court is in the correct forum. 
162 Namely where the passengers sue in one jurisdiction and the cruise ship operator constitutes a fund in 
another. 
163 Article 13.  A ship or other property that has been arrested within a state party shall always be released if a 
fund has been constituted at a port where the occurrence took place or the next port of call, if it occurred 
whilst at sea; at the port of disembarkation, or in the state where the arrest was made.  The Article stops short 
of ruling that a fund constituted in a manner that falls within Art 13 should be regarded as the proper forum of 
the limitation fund and able to resist attempts to have that limitation proceeding stayed. 
164 Ibid. 
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 So it would seem that forum shopping would have to be a risk worth taking - 
indeed, worth fighting for - for cruise ship operators, with at least several different 
jurisdictions suitable for setting up a limitation fund and defending the choice of forum.  
For instance, imagine if a Baltic Shipping v Dillon situation were to occur again, with a 
cruise ship on route from Australia to New Zealand when it founders and sinks, with 
many passengers injured.   There are passengers from both countries on board.  NZ has, 
so far, not adopted the 1996 Protocol, and so has a friendlier limitation fund for cruise 
ship operators.
165  Undoubtedly the shipowner would be advised to seek to constitute a 
limitation fund in New Zealand and thereafter defend its choice in the courts. 
In any event, the discussion is a worst case scenario for large cruise ships.  In reality, 
it is hard to imagine total damages claims approaching the LLMC Act limitation amount 
for a large cruise liner unless there are multiple passengers severely injured in one 
catastrophic event.  The limitation amount is likely to be of more assistance to those 
carrying only a handful of passengers, particularly where one or more of the passengers 
are badly injured.  
Conclusion 
Over the past 10-15 years the strength of the TPA has increased and it has become a 
very real threat to cruise ship operators.  The application of s74 has broadened and 
arguably includes a cruise ship carriage contract.  The significance of s52 continues to 
grow as the courts continue to interpret it expansively. 
But the pendulum has swung, at least a little.  The recent and proposed changes to 
the  TPA would measurably alter the cruise ship operator’s potential liability to 
passengers where personal injury or death has been the outcome.  In certain 
circumstances where the plaintiff suffered personal injury, a well drafted and properly 
incorporated contractual exclusion of liability will have a degree of force long 
considered banished from the legal landscape in Australia, certainly in so far as 
consumer claims under the TPA were concerned.   This is the case where the claim fits 
within the amendment to s74 allowing the operator to exclude liability for personal 
injury claims during recreational activities.   
This will represents a pegging back of the passenger’s potential causes of action 
against a cruise ship operator.  However there is a real state of flux at present because 
the ultimate package of legislative reforms is unknown.     
In any event, the TPA will remain a potent force for those aspects left untouched by 
the recent amendments.  For instance, even if personal injury claims are excluded from 
s52, the TPA will still respond to misleading or deceptive representations that result in 
other forms of damage, or personal injury caused by a failure to exercise due care and 
skill NOT involving recreational services.  One claim very much still currently within 
the ambit of the TPA would be for personal injuries arising out of the cruise ship 
operator failing to exercise due diligence in providing navigational services. The 
significance of this is heightened by the fact that in certain circumstances the TPA will 
apply to events that take place outside Australia.  However such a claim will, in this 
writer’s opinion, be subject to the shipowner’s right to limit under the LLMC Act.
The cruise ship operator will find that the burden will be attempting to accommodate 
these varying scenarios in its terms and conditions, and its claims management, without 
offending different provisions of the TPA - those that warn against excluding liability 
                                                          
165 As at 29 April 2004, New Zealand had not adopted the 1996 Protocol.
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for actions not able to be excluded pursuant to s68A, or making misleading 
representations about the effect of a contractual term.
166
It is difficult to imagine an industry so uniquely vulnerable to s52 and s74 as the 
cruise ship industry.  This is because of the complete responsibility of the cruise ship 
operator for the cruise ship experience and the profile of all passengers as consumers.  A 
cruise ship operator gains little protection against claims falling within the TPA by 
relying on contractual terms limiting liability. The extraterritorial reach of the TPA and 
the fact it extends to advertising for business in Australia means that even cruise ship 
operators with no presence in Australia offering cruises entirely outside Australia, may 
be bound by the Act.  As such, cruise ship operators, certainly within and even outside 
Australia, would be well advised to ensure all their dealings with and for passengers, 
before, during and after cruises, are in compliance with the TPA.
                                                          
166 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(g). 
71 
3.2 Significant  Developments 
3.2.1  Dianne Brimble case 
 
While not related to the TPA provisions, it is pertinent to note that cruise ship regulation and 
consumer rights have been a topic in the Australian press as a result of the tragic death of 
Dianne Brimble on board the P&O cruise ship ‘Pacific Sky’ in 2002.
80  The sordid details aired at 
the inquest, including claims of a cover-up by cruise ship staff, led then Prime Minister John 
Howard to remark that he was willing to consider proposals to regulate the cruise ship industry.
81 
As at the date of writing, the coroner has yet to hand down her findings, but the Brimble family 
have accepted a settlement from the cruise ship operator, P&O.
82 Once the findings are handed 
down, there may be some impetus to consider regulation of the industry, or at least a more 
streamlined approach to investigating crimes committed on board.  
 
Meanwhile in the United States of America, the rise and rise of claims against cruise ship 
companies has led to the springing up of websites concerning claims against cruise ships
83 and 
maritime commentators believe that a discrete sub-area of cruise ship law is developing.
84  
 
                                                      
80 See R Myers, below at 81, fns 1- 12.  
81 On 7 July 2006, as cited in R Myers ‘Cruise Industry Regulation: What Happens on Vacation Stays on Vacation’ 
(2007) 21 Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 106,106. 
82 ibid. 
83 For example, see http://www.cruisebruise.com. 
84 David W Robertson & Michael F Sturley ‘Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National 
Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ (2007) 31 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 463 at 540, 539 (Robertson & 
Sturley). 
   
 
723.2.2  Statutory changes affecting personal injury claims under s52 
 
The reforms concerning proportionality and contribution to damages awarded under the TPA apply 
equally to claims that may be brought by passengers against cruise ship operators.
85  In addition to 
those changes, there have been specific changes that affect a plaintiff’s right to claim damages for a 
breach of s52 where injury or death has been the result.  This section concentrates on those 
particular amendments. 
 
Soon after the article in 3.1 was published, the Government of the day watered down the Ipp Report 
proposal to prohibit awards of damages for personal injury or death as a result of s52
86 in order to 
secure the passage of the proposed changes through a hostile Senate. As a result, legislation was 
passed to enact a similar scheme of damages caps
87 and limitation period limits as had been 
implemented in the States and Territories as a result of the Ipp Report.
88  Under that amendment, a 
personal injury claim could still be brought for a breach of s52, although subject to the limitations of 
the new Part VIB of the TPA. This ensured that the TPA would not provide a ‘back door’ to a higher 
quantum award, but that the TPA was still preserved as a cause of action for personal injury claims.  
 
However, after the 2004 election the balance of power in the Senate passed to the Government.   
Using this parliamentary advantage, the original proposals were revived and in 2006 a new 
                                                      
85 See 2.2.1 above.  
86  Or other provisions in the same division: see p 40 of the article in 3.1, at text accompanying fn 68. 
87 The TPA provisions impose a limit on non-economic loss (s87L) loss on earning capacity (s87U) and damages for 
gratuitous attendant care services Division 5 of Part VIB). 
88 Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injury and Death) Act (No 2) no 113 of 2004. 
  73amending provision was enacted.  This amendment
89 removed the ability to use s52 to pursue a 
personal injury claim for damages under s82, unless it was for tobacco related injuries or death:  
S82 (1AAA) A person who suffers loss or damage by conduct of another person 
may not recover the amount of the loss or damage by an action under subsection (1) to the 
extent to which: 
(a) the action would be based on the conduct contravening a provision of Division 1 of Part 
V; and 
(b) the loss or damage is, or results from, death or personal injury; and 
(c) the death or personal injury does not result from smoking or other use of tobacco 
products. 
 
The potential liability under s52 of cruise ship operators for other non personal injury claims clearly 
still exists. However, as personal injury claims are likely to represent the larger quantum claims, the 
cruise industry is a happy beneficiary of the 2006 reforms to s82.  As the amendments are not 
retrospective, injuries sustained on cruise ships until the date of commencement
90 would appear to 
be entitled to rely on s52 should they so wish. 
 
Once s52 claims peter out, consumers will need to rely on common law or s74 TPA.  Whether a 
common law claim can be brought, and the quantum of any claim, depends on the civil liability 
reforms
91 and any exclusions properly incorporated in the contract.  Developments as to s74 are set 
out below. 
 
 
 
                                                      
89 Inserted by s2 of Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injury and Death) Act No 11 of 2006.   
90 The Act commenced on 20 April 2006: Office of Parliamentary Counsel Acts Table 2006, found on Comlaw site: 
www.comlaw.gov.au. 
91 Which are outside the scope of this paper. 
  743.2.3  Statutory changes affecting claims under s74 – personal injuries 
 
As was noted in the article itself,
92 the Ipp Report left intact the ability to claim personal injuries for 
breach of s74. This has been the effect of the amendments noted in 3.2.2 above.
93 Damages 
awarded for breach of s74 are not awarded under s82 as they are, in fact, common law damages.
94 
However, damages so awarded will be affected by the State and Territory legislation enacted in 
pursuance of the Ipp Report.
95
 
  As far as 74 is concerned, the focus of the Ipp Report related to contracts for recreational services.  
As discussed in the article at 3.1,
96 the Ipp Report recommended that s68B
97 be brought into line 
with the State legislation concerning liability for recreational services. State legislation provides that a 
provider of recreational activities should not be liable for injuries sustained as a result of inherent 
risks, or obvious risks in dangerous recreational activities.
98   
                                                      
92  See fn 70 of the article in 3.1. 
93 Section 87E makes the amendments applicable to various divisions of the TPA but not Part 5 Division 2, which 
contains the statutory warranties. 
94 See Miller at [1.74.5] citing Arturi v Zupps Motors Pty Ltd (1980) 49 FLR 283. 
95  For examples of the legislation enacted see fn 106 of the article in 3.1. 
96 See article in 3.1, at page 44. 
97 s68B (1) A term of a contract for the supply by a corporation of recreational services is not void under section 68 by 
reason only that the term excludes, restricts or modifies, or has the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying: 
(a) the application of section 74 to the supply of the recreational services under the contract; or 
(b) the exercise of a right conferred by section 74 in relation to the supply of the recreational services under the 
contract; or 
(c) any liability of the corporation for a breach of a warranty implied by section 74 in relation to the supply of the 
recreational services under the contract; so long as: 
(d) the exclusion, restriction or modification is limited to liability for death or personal injury; and 
(e) the contract was entered into after the commencement of this section. 
98 See for example s5K Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).  In the case of Lormine Pty Ltd v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200 
(Supreme Court of New South Wales – Court of Appeal) the Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that dolphin watching 
was not a ‘dangerous recreational activity’ where the vessel was within 35 metres from the beach, in waters the 
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However, the Ipp Report recommendations have not led to any amendments of s68B
99 and it is 
unlikely to be a priority for the new Federal Government which, in opposition, opposed the more 
draconian aspects of the reforms.
100  
 
As such, the discussion of that provision contained in the article set out in 3.1 still holds true.  For 
example, it is at least arguable that a cruise, in its entirety, constitutes ‘recreational services’.  If that 
is the case, then a properly worded exclusion clause, incorporated in the contract for cruise ship 
services, would be effective to exclude s 74 liability pursuant to s68B.
101  However, this writer 
remains of the view that a court is unlikely to interpret s68B so broadly as to find that an entire cruise 
ship is a ‘recreational service’, given the intent displayed in the explanatory memorandum of the Act 
which introduced that provision.
102 Further strength for that view can be drawn from the more recent 
interpretation of another exception to s74(1), being that contained in s74(3).
103  
 
If this is correct, and the courts do not take an ‘entire cruise’ interpretation of s68B, then the court 
should look at the actual activity that led to the injury and ask the question - was it within s68B’s 
                                                                                                                                                                 
defendant had represented as ‘calm’ and an activity suitable for all ages. An exemption clause contained in a form 
presented after the cruise had been booked and paid for was held not to be part of the contract (at [20]) nor sufficient in 
any event to cover the particular activity (at [21]). By contrast, one would expect that climbing the rigging of a tall ship 
would probably constitute a dangerous recreational activity.  A fall from the rigging in 1996 was the subject of a 
successful claim 1996 in Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation & Anor [2006] NTSC 4. The plaintiff 
successfully relied upon s74 TPA, even though she had not paid for the cruise which had been organised by Department 
of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs for recipients of social security benefits. The defendant was unable 
to rely on its terms and conditions excluding liability for personal injury as they breached s68 TPA.  The subsequent 
introduction of s68B would probably change the outcome if such an accident were to occur again. 
99 See the article in 3.1, at text accompanying fn 98. 
100 As is indicated by the history behind the Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injury and Death) Act (No 2) 2004  
and the Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injury and Death)2006 as outlined in 3.2.2 above. 
101 See the article in 3.1, text accompanying fn 95. 
102 See fn 93 of the article in 3.1. 
103 This is dealt with further in Chapter 4. 
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recreational service within s68B: a visit to the doctor
104 or hairdresser, or eating a meal, for example.  
Such services, if not carried out with due care and skill, may ground liability.  If they do, then s68 will 
render void any attempt to exclude or limit that liability; and as the contract is for ‘goods ordinarily 
acquired for personal domestic or household use or consumption’, s68A of the TPA will not permit 
contractual limitation clauses to operate.  Nor would such claims reach a quantum that would trigger 
international Limitation Conventions.
105 The cruise ship will, in that instance, bear the full quantum of 
liability. 
3.2.4  Amendments to TPA - State law may override s74 
 
In 2004, as part of the overall tort reform designed to ensure insurance was available and 
affordable,
106 the Federal Government introduced amendments to the TPA to protect professionals 
from claims that allege the TPA as an alternative cause of action to tort.  As part of those 
amendments a new s74 (2A) was introduced.  It reads: 
(2A) If: 
(a) there is a breach of an implied warranty that exists because of this section in a contract 
made after the commencement of this subsection; and 
(b) the law of a State or Territory is the proper law of the contract; 
the law of the State or Territory applies to limit or preclude liability for the breach, and 
recovery of that liability ( if any), in the same way as it applies to limit or preclude liability, 
and recovery of a liability, for breach of another term of the contract. 
 
                                                      
104 See the unreported case of Gordon v Norwegian Capricorn Line (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 517 in which the cruise 
ship operator was able to escape liability as a result of negligence on the part of the plaintiff’s solicitors who had allowed 
the writ of summons to elapse without service and failed to convince a court to allow proceedings to be issued out of 
time.  The plaintiff, to whom the court ascribed no fault for the delay, had sustained a heart attack on board a cruise ship.  
He alleged that the ship was negligent in failing to have thrombolytic medication on board which he alleged would have 
had a dramatic effect on his recovery and resultant health. In USA, there is a growing body of law holding cruise ship 
lines vicariously liable for the actions of on board doctors; See Robertson & Sturley above n 84, 540. 
105 Save in the event of a catastrophe, and a claim for breach of s74 focussing on navigation. See discussion of the 
various limitation conventions at p 48 – 52 of the article in 3.1. 
106 Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Legislation Amendment (Professional Standards) Bill 2003 (Cth), 1.1.  
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107 was to reverse the 
effect of the High Court’s decision in Wallis v Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty Ltd
108 so 
that State legislation could limit liability for professionals. However, subsection (2A) is clearly broader 
than that.  Should any State legislate to limit liability of cruise ships towards their passengers, then 
that will be effective to negate the effect of the implied warranty under s74. Although one would 
imagine such a step might be politically unpalatable, given the push for civil liability reform and the 
general erosion of plaintiff rights that has already occurred, it cannot be ruled out.  Section 74(2A) is 
also of significance for commercial operators - as we shall see in the next chapter.
109
 
The next chapter deals with the application of the TPA to maritime services, using the particular 
example of towage contracts.
                                                      
107 Ibid.   
108 (1994) CLR 388. 
109 See Chapter 4.3.1. 
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Chapter Four 
Towage contracts and the TPA 
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4.1  Article ‘What’s the Trade Practices Act Got To Do With It? Section 74 and 
Towage Contracts In Australia’ (2006) 13(1) Murdoch University Electronic Journal 
of Law 58 – 76 
 
This article was cited with approval by Justice Helman in PNSL Berhad v Dalrymple Marine Services 
Pty Ltd; PNSL Berhad v The Owners of the Ship Koumala [2007] QSC 101 at [48].  That decision is 
discussed at 4.2 below and has since been reported at (2007) 210 FLR 243. 
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What’s the Trade Practices Act Got To 
Do With It?  Section 74 and Towage 
Contracts In Australia 
 
By Kate Lewins 
Murdoch University 
 
The towage industry plays an integral part in shipping 
movements through Australian ports.  Usually the ship gets 
no choice of towage operator, nor usually any opportunity to 
negotiate the terms of the tow.  This article examines the 
extent to which contracts for towage in Australia might be 
affected by s74 Trade Practices Act, which imposes an 
obligation to exercise due care and skill in the provision of 
services to consumers.  If towage contracts are subject to 
s74, there are some steps that  towage operators can take  
to minimise their contractual exposure. 
 
1. Introduction 
As an island nation of exporters and importers, Australia relies heavily on its 
maritime industry.   The maritime industry plays an important supporting role 
for other Australian industries too, such as offshore oil and gas projects.  The 
maritime industry extends well beyond the visiting vessels to the extensive 
range of ancillary services required to satisfy the logistics of the maritime 
trade.  One of those ancillary services is the provision of towage in ports. 
 
Towage operators expect to have to comply with regulations of a maritime 
nature such as those found under the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth).  As an 
intensely commercial operation, it may come as a surprise that the contractual 
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terms upon which they provide their services might be affected by an 
Australian Act designed to protect consumers and encourage fair trade.
1 
 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) sets standards of obligation 
between consumers and their suppliers, whether supplying goods or services.  
However, the TPA manages to weave its tendrils far from its home base of 
consumer protection and well into the commercial and maritime industries.
2   
 
Section 74 of the TPA seeks to impose a duty to exercise due care and skill in 
a contract for the provision of services.  That duty is essentially non 
excludable, although as we shall see, it does not apply in all cases; further, it 
is also possible to limit the liability to some degree in certain circumstances.
3  
 
It has been said that s74 is: 
 
‘designed to achieve a large social purpose far beyond …commercial 
circumstances…’
4 
 
It is undoubtedly a thorn in the side of businesses that provide services in 
Australia.  Generally, those businesses providing services (‘service providers’) 
would prefer to be able to exclude liability in contracts so as to minimise the 
cost of doing business, in particular their insurance costs. It could be alleged 
by service providers that s74 interferes with their ability to be able to arrange 
their affairs with customers with a degree of certainty.  On the other hand, the 
law is often suspicious of exclusions - particularly where consumers are 
concerned.  This is heightened in situations where the service providers are in 
a position of some contractual strength, due to market circumstances or the 
                                         
1 “The object of this Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of 
competition and fair trading and provision for consumer protection” –Trade Practices Act 
1974, s2. 
2 See Kate Lewins,“Corporate morality and Commercial Maritime Contracts: Considering the 
Impact of s52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Australia) on Carriage of Goods by Sea” (2004) 
Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly (UK) 197.  On cruise ship operators 
contracting with or operating in Australia see Kate Lewins, “The Cruise Ship Industry – 
Liabilities to Passengers for Breach of s52 and s74 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)”  (2004) 
18 MLAANZ Journal 30. 
3 See discussion on s 74 (3) and s68A in 2. below. 
4 Justice Kirby in Qantas Airways Ltd v Aravco Ltd (1996) 136 ALR 510 at 516. 
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very nature of the services they provide: for instance, if the services are 
needed at short notice or in a remote area.  In those cases, the provider may 
well require a customer to agree to a set of standard terms, not in any real 
sense negotiable, which contain terms that prefer the interests of the 
providers. 
 
Where a contract for services contains a standard set of conditions which 
seek to exclude liability and/or seek indemnity, one must always have regard 
to s74.  S74 imports an implied term in the contract as to the basic ideal: that 
the services must be carried out with due care and skill.  Anything less is a 
breach of contract; any attempt to exclude restrict or modify that duty is void 
under the Act by virtue of the withering provision of s68.  While s68A allows a 
service provider to limit its liability under s74 where the transaction is not of a 
personal, domestic or household nature, that is subject to the consumer’s 
right to argue that reliance on that term is not fair or reasonable.
5   
 
The towage industry in Australia would seem to be peculiarly vulnerable to the 
impact of s74 for several reasons:  
 
• First, the definition of ‘consumer’ in the TPA deems that a service is 
provided to a ‘consumer’ where the consideration is less than a 
prescribed amount, currently $40,000.   The nature of the service 
provided is irrelevant to the definition of consumer.
6 Most towage 
services in Australian ports are for amounts well below this limit.   
 
• Secondly, there is at least an argument that unlike other parts of the 
shipping industry, towage contracts are not exempt from s74.  
Contracts concerned with the transportation of goods are lifted out of 
the ambit of s74 by s74(3).  Whether ss3 extends to contracts for 
towage is a moot point which will be discussed shortly. 
 
                                         
5 See s68A(2) which is set out and discussed in 2. below. 
6 This can be contrasted with the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UK) 1977 which looks to the 
nature of the service. 
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• Thirdly, the towage industry has a heavy reliance on overseas based 
standard terms.  These terms seek to exclude limit or in other ways 
offset any liability for a breach of contract in a manner which has not 
been designed to take s74 into account.  
 
• Fourthly, in many ports there is only one towage operator available.  If 
there is more than one operator, it seems that usually they contract on 
the same standard terms anyway.  The customer is therefore left with 
no choice of conditions, nor the option of trying for better terms with 
another operator. In other words, they must take what they can get.
7  
As we shall see, this may give the towage operator some headaches 
when trying to argue the reasonableness of  limitations permitted by 
the TPA under s68A.
8 
 
This paper focuses on the U.K. Standard Conditions For Towage and Other 
Services published by the British Tug Owners Association (UK Standard 
Conditions), which seem to be the most commonly used set of conditions in 
the towage industry in Australia.
9   
 
 
                                         
7 It is fair to say that this is a position which sits uncomfortably with many in government (with 
their unrelenting drive towards competition and price surveillance); and governmental reviews 
of the towage industry in particular are not unheard of: for example see the Productivity 
Commission report available at http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/harbourtowage/finalreport/ 
(accessed 5 January 2006). In it, the Productivity Commission accepts that in many ports 
there is a natural monopoly (at p XXV). 
8 See discussion in 4.2 below. 
9 This is the author’s view after internet research conducted over a range of Australian port 
internet sites within Australia, for example Port of Esperance: 
http://www.esperanceport.com.au/charges.asp Port of Bunbury: 
http://www.riversidemarine.com.au/assets/documents/Towage_Rates_For_The_Port_of
_Bunbury_2004.pdf  (Accessed April 2006) Port of Geelong 
http://www.esc.vic.gov.au/ports159.html, Port of Geraldton 
http://www.geroport.wa.gov.au/ (accessed September 2005).There are other forms of 
standard conditions, notably Towcon and Towhire produced by BIMCO: see 
http://www.bimco.dk/Home/Corporate%20Area/idea/List%20of%20documents.aspx 
(accessed 5 January 2006) 
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2. The relevant provisions of the TPA 
S 74 says:  
S74        Warranties in relation to the supply of services 
(1)  In every contract for the supply by a corporation in the course of a business of services to a 
consumer there is an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with due care and skill 
and that any materials supplied in connexion with those services will be reasonably fit for the 
purpose for which they are supplied. 
 
(2)   Where a corporation supplies services to a consumer in the course of a business and the 
consumer…makes known to the corporation any particular purpose for which the services are 
required or the result that he or she desires the services to achieve, there is an implied 
warranty that the services supplied under the contract for the supply of the services and any 
materials supplied in connexion with those services will be reasonably fit for that purpose or are 
of such a nature and quality that they might reasonably be expected to achieve that result…. 
 
(3)  A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that are, or are 
to be, provided, granted or conferred under:  
  (a) a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the 
purposes of a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on or engaged in by the person 
for whom the goods are transported or stored…. 
(emphasis added) 
Other relevant provisions: s68 and s68A TPA 
 
In a sense, these sections are the real power behind s74.  Section 68 renders 
void any contractual term that has the effect of excluding, restricting or 
modifying the impact of the Act: 
S68 Application of provisions not to be excluded or modified  
 
(1)  Any term of a contract (including a term that is not set out in the contract but is 
incorporated in the contract by another term of the contract) that purports to exclude, restrict or 
modify or has the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying:  
(a) the application of all or any of the provisions of this Division; 
(b) the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision; 
(c) any liability of the corporation for breach of a condition or warranty implied by such a 
provision; or 
(d) the application of section 75A; 
is void. 
(2)  A term of a contract shall not be taken to exclude, restrict or modify the application of 
a provision of this Division or the application of section 75A unless the term does so expressly 
or is inconsistent with that provision or section.  
 
 
However, and importantly for towage operators, s68A offers some relief from 
the impact of s68.  In contracts for services that are not of a personal 
domestic or household nature (such as most towage contracts), s68A allows 
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for a limitation of liability to the re-supply of services or what the re-supply 
would cost: so long as the consumer does not establish that reliance on the 
limitation clause is not fair or reasonable.  
SECT 68A  
Limitation of liability for breach of certain conditions or  
warranties  
(1) Subject to this section, a term of a contract for the supply by a corporation of goods or 
services other than goods or services of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption is not void under section 68 by reason only that the term limits 
the liability of the corporation for a breach of a condition or warranty… to:  
(a) in the case of goods, any one or more of the following: 
…..  
(b) in the case of services: 
(i) the supplying of the services again; or 
(ii) the payment of the cost of having the services supplied again. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a term of a contract if the person to whom the 
goods or services were supplied establishes that it is not fair or reasonable for the corporation 
to rely on that term of the contract.  
 
(3) In determining for the purposes of subsection (2) whether or not reliance on a term of a 
contract is fair or reasonable, a court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and 
in particular to the following matters:  
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the corporation and the person to whom the 
goods or services were supplied (in this subsection referred to as the buyer) relative to each 
other, taking into account, among other things, the availability of equivalent goods or services 
and suitable alternative sources of supply; 
(b) whether the buyer received an inducement to agree to the term or, in agreeing to the term, 
had an opportunity of acquiring the goods or services or equivalent goods or services from any 
source of supply under a contract that did not include that term; 
(c) whether the buyer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of 
the term (having regard, among other things, to any custom of the trade and any previous 
course of dealing between the parties)…. 
(underlining added)  
  
The effect of s68A can be illustrated by the High Court case of  Qantas 
Airways Ltd v Aravco Ltd.
10   Qantas was seeking to avoid paying a claim in 
the vicinity of $500,000 - $1 million for damage sustained to an aircraft leased 
to Aravco.  Qantas relied upon a clause in its services contract that limited 
liability to the cost of performing the service again.  In that case, the cost of 
the original service was $5000.  The majority of the High Court were prepared 
to accept, without deciding, that this would be the effect of s68A on the facts 
before them.
11  However, as the Court noted, that was subject to the 
                                         
10 (1996) 136 ALR 510. (Qantas v Aravco) 
11 Ibid, p 513-514. 
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consumer’s right to argue that such a limitation is not fair or reasonable on the 
facts of the case.  On the facts, the Court did not have to consider whether it 
would have been fair or reasonable for Qantas to so rely.  As a result, s68A(3) 
was not rigorously tested in that case.  We do not yet know the attitude of the 
Australian courts to the ‘fair and reasonable’ qualification in s68A(3). 
Having laid out the relevant provisions, the first question is - does s74 apply to 
towage contracts?   
3. Does S74 catch towage contracts? 
The implied warranty provisions of the TPA, of which s74 is one, will apply 
where the proper law of the contract is Australia.  Where the parties have 
contracted in Australia, for a service to be supplied in Australia by a 
corporation itself registered in Australia, the proper law of the contract will be 
that of Australia.
12  So the vast majority of towage contracts performed in 
Australia will be caught, in a general sense, by the TPA. 
 
 S74 itself will apply where the transaction involved is less than the prescribed 
amount (currently $40,000) and therefore deemed
13 to be a ‘consumer 
transaction’.  Most regular towage contracts would be for that amount or less.  
So far, towage contracts look to be ensnared.
14 
 
But can towage contracts escape by virtue of the proviso in s74(3)?  That 
subsection says: 
 
(3) A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that are, or 
are to be, provided, granted or conferred under:  
                                         
12 That is so even if the parties stipulate that the law of some other country should apply: s67 
TPA. 
13 By s4B. 
14 Other spheres of the maritime industry have been held subject to s74. In particular see 
Pondcil Pty Ltd v Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd (1994) ATPR (Digest) 46-134 
(shiprepairers), Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure Foundation Limited (sail training ships) 
and the cases referred to in “The Cruise Ship Industry – Liabilities to Passengers for Breach 
of s52 and s74 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)”  (2004) 18 MLAANZ Journal 30. 
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 (a) a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the 
purposes of a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on or engaged in by 
the person for whom the goods are transported or stored…. 
Whether towage contracts fall within s74(3) is in issue in the case of PNSL 
Berhad v Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Leasing (ACT)Pty Ltd (formerly known as 
Bain Leasing Pty Ltd
15 ( PNSL Berhad),   a Supreme Court action in 
Queensland due to go to trial in 2006.   
 
In order to fall within that exception, a towage operator will need to establish 
that the contract is “for or in relation to the transportation of goods…”  Is it 
sufficient that a towage operator is moving a ship that usually (though not 
always)
16 contains consignments of goods? The words ‘for or in relation to’ in 
ss3 could be seen to encompass the contract for towage as one of those 
many ancillary contracts necessary for the goods on board the ship to be 
delivered to their destination – similar to stevedoring contracts, for example.  
However, stevedores’ contracts are more directly concerned with the 
consigned goods, which are loaded and unloaded via the stevedore.  Towage 
operators however, bear a more remote relationship with the goods on board 
a ship.  And, indeed, the ship movement may have nothing to do with loading 
or unloading of goods.  Can it still be ‘in relation to the transportation of 
goods’? 
 
Towage operators can argue that it does.  The definition of goods in s4 says: 
 
“goods includes: 
(a) Ships, aircraft and other vehicles…” 
 
That has been the definition of goods since the original Act in 1974 so it must 
have been borne in mind at the time that subsection 3 was amended in 1986.   
Towage operators can also draw some comfort from the history of 
amendments to s74.  The original subsection 3 contained a narrow definition 
                                         
15 Summary judgement applications were dismissed: [2001] QSC 429 
16 Towage need not always be for cargo laden ships.  For instance, a tug may be assisting a 
ship into drydock or providing services to offshore mining which do not involve cargo laden 
ships. 
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of services that would be caught by the provision, and included transportation 
of goods amongst them.  As a result of some active campaigning, that 
changed in 1986 when the current subsection 3 was added.  The Explanatory 
Memorandum to that amending Act
17, explaining the change of attitude to 
transportation under s74, said: 
 
“..a new sub-s s74(3) will provide that the section does not apply to contracts 
for the storage or transportation of goods for a commercial purpose…in the 
area of transportation and storage of goods for the purpose of a business, 
business parties have well established insurance arrangements which 
sometimes involve the limitation of liability in a way contrary to s74.  No 
useful purpose would be served in upsetting these arrangements, and for this 
reason contracts for the storage and transport of goods for a commercial 
purpose have been exempted from the application of the section.”
18 
 
This explanatory memorandum does give strength to an argument that ss3 
does exempt towage contracts from s74 because the explanation given to 
justify the exemption of transport from s74 encompasses towage contracts.  
These contracts have well established insurance and liability arrangements 
with limitations of liability which are contrary to s74. 
 
However, one also has to look at the words of ss3 and whether it ought to be 
read narrowly or broadly.  Its more natural meaning might see the provision 
limited to everyday contracts for goods in the context of a consignment on 
board a ship, in that, for instance, a new fishing vessel might be the cargo on 
board a ship, rather than itself being the means of transportation.   
 
Whether this provision takes towage out of the ambit of s74 is, therefore, 
unsettled and controversial.  The PNSL case will, one hopes, present some 
answers. 
 
For the balance of this paper, we will assume that the section applies to 
towage contracts in order to determine what the effect of s74 would be.  As 
                                         
17 Trade Practices Revision Act (No 17 of 1986) 
18 Explanatory Memorandum Trade Practices Revision Act (No 17 of 1986). 
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stated earlier, the main impact of s74 is to impose a standard of due care and 
skill in the provision of contracted services.  Yet many towage contracts 
contain terms that contradict that imposed standard.  As between contracting 
parties, what impact will s74 have on contractual attempts to alter where the 
liability falls? 
 
Whilst the effect of s74 is to insert a statutory term in the contract between the 
parties, if one party breaches that term, the remedy follows at common law in 
much the same way as any other breach.  However, if the terms relied upon 
by the party in breach somehow diminish the impact of the s74 warranty, then 
parties need to consider sections 68 and s68A.
19  
Having completed an overview of s74 and its related provisions, and 
considered the potential that these provisions might indeed be relevant to 
towage operators in Australia, let us now consider what the effect of these 
provisions might be on the terms of a towage contract. 
4. Towage contracts – how their terms might be affected by 
TPA.  
Commonly, a towage operator has a set of conditions which purport to 
somehow relieve it of liability should there be any form of collision or accident 
during the tow.
20  A wide range of devices are used in modern day contracts 
to shift liability between the parties.  We have seen that the power of s74 is 
not only to impose an obligation of due care and skill but to render void 
attempts to exclude or limit it, unless they comply with s68A. 
 
So how do these TPA provisions react when mixed with the traditional liability 
shifting devices found in towage contracts? 
                                         
19 Set out in full in section 2 above. 
20 The towage operator needs to have incorporated the standard conditions into the particular 
towage contract in order for them to be part of the contract.  
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4.1 Exclusion clauses  
Total exclusions fall foul of s68 as being attempts to exclude, restrict or modify 
liability under s74 and will be void.  For example, much of clause 4 (a)
 of the 
UK Standard Conditions
21 would be likely to suffer that fate in the event that 
the loss disclaimed was caused by a lack of due care and skill on the part of 
the tugowner. 
4.2 Limitation of liability clauses 
The position is not as clear for limitation of liability clauses.  If they are crafted 
in the language of s68A TPA, then there is a chance that they will be effective.  
As we have seen, in order to rely on s68A: 
 
• the limitation must expressly limit the liability to re-supplying the service 
or the cost of having the service re-supplied; and 
 
• the consumer must either fail to argue or be unable to establish that it 
is not fair or reasonable to rely on that term of the contract based on all 
the circumstances of the case, and in particular the factors in s68A(3). 
 
In maritime contracts if s74 applies, s68A makes it permissible to limit liability 
in maritime contracts in the manner contemplated
22 to either the re supply of 
the service or the payment of the cost of having those services supplied 
                                         
21 Clause 4 reads: 
 “4.  Whilst towing, or whilst at the request, either expressed or implied, of the Hirer rendering 
any service of whatsoever nature other than towing— 
(a)The Tugowner shall not (except as provided in Clauses 4 (c) and (e) hereof be responsible 
for or be liable for 
(i)damage of any description…or 
(ii) loss of the tug or tender or the Hirer's vessel or of any cargo or other thing… 
or 
(iii) any claim by a person not a party to this agreement for loss or damage of any 
description whatsoever; arising from any cause whatsoever, including (without 
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing) negligence at any time… 
(b)The Hirer shall (except as provided in Clauses 4(c) and (e)) be responsible for, pay for and 
indemnify the Tugowner against and in respect of any loss or damage and any claims of 
whatsoever nature or howsoever arising or caused, whether covered by the provisions of 
Clause 4(a) hereof or not… and which shall include, without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing any loss of or damage to the tug or tender or any property of the Tugowner even if 
the same arises from or is caused by the negligence of the 
Tugowner his servants or agents.” 
22 Because maritime contracts are rarely of a personal domestic or household nature. 
91 69
again.
23 In other words, the limit of liability can be to the contract price for the 
services in question.  However, if the customer can prove that it is not ‘fair or 
reasonable’ for the towage operator to rely on such a clause then the clause 
will be void.
24 As already discussed, the High Court was not required to 
consider that point in Qantas v Aravco
25 and there has yet to be any other 
judicial guidance on what will constitute ‘fair and reasonable’ in the context of 
s68A.   
 
However, faced with such an argument under s68A in the context of a towage 
case, there are several factors which would come to the fore.  First, no doubt 
the consumer would argue that it had no choice in terms: that the strength of 
bargaining position was wholly in the hands of the towage operator 
particularly if it was the only operator in the port.  However most ‘consumers’ 
of towage services are hardly corporate minnows: rather, they themselves are 
multinational corporations well used to imposing terms and benefiting from 
contracts which displace liability.  Such corporations, in shipping, would 
expect there to be standard conditions at play.  Consumers of towage 
services would invariably know of the likely existence of terms and conditions 
of the tow: as it is indeed customary in the trade. However, to satisfy s68A(c), 
towage operators should ensure that they notify their consumers of the s68A 
compliant limitation clause.
26   
 
In any event, towage operators in Australia who incorporate the UK Standard 
Conditions into their contracts would not be in a position to rely on s68A.  The 
UK Standard Conditions in their pure form, do not comply as they do not seek 
to limit to re-supply of the service, or the equivalent amount.   
 
                                         
23 S68A(1)(b). 
24 S68A(2) & (3).  What constitutes ‘fair and reasonable’ has yet to be the subject of caselaw 
in Australia.  In England, a similar provision in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) was 
considered in the case of George Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds [1983] 2 AC 803.  The House 
of Lords held that in a case where the wrong seed type had been supplied, it was not fair or 
reasonable for the company to rely on a limitation provision similar to S68A to reduce its 
liability to the customer from £61,000 to £200.   
25See above at text accompanying fn 11. 
26 One would imagine this is easily done, by notifying the various shipping agencies in that 
port. 
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Of course whether s74 will apply to towage contracts at all remains uncertain, 
as we have discussed. However, towage operators would be well advised to 
re-word their conditions around s68A so they can argue that the limitations do 
not fall foul of s68.  That simply requires a clause seeking to limit the liability 
to the cost of the services (and need not concede that the TPA does apply).  If 
the towage cost was $5000 then liability would be limited to $5000. In the 
event of a major incident, such a rewording may mean the difference between 
unlimited liability and notional liability.
 27 
4.3 Indemnity clauses. 
There are several other limitation devices that are often used in towage 
contracts in an attempt to ensure that liability offloaded does not rebound.  
One such device is the indemnity clause.
28   This device is in evidence in the 
UK Standard Conditions.
29 The indemnity clauses in contracts are a way of 
laying off the cost of liability, although not the fact of it.  In Qantas v Aravco
30, 
Qantas was able to convince the High Court that its entitlement to the benefit 
of a contractual indemnity for any liability to third parties arising from its own 
negligence was not an attempt to exclude or limit its liability under s74, and 
did not fall foul of s68.   
 
In that case, Qantas had agreed with Aravco (the lessee of the plane) that it 
would service the aircraft (‘the service agreement’).  In so doing, Qantas 
damaged the aircraft.  The owner of the plane, BAT, sued Qantas and was 
held liable in negligence for the damage.  Qantas claimed an indemnity from 
                                         
27 In Qantas v Aravco,(above at fn 10) Qantas had a s68A compliant limitation of liability 
clause which would have seen it pay only $5000 for a claim against it in the region of $1M.  In 
obiter, it seemed to be accepted by the High Court that Qantas could so limit subject to the 
clause being ‘fair and reasonable’. 
28 Another is the deemed employee clause: see clause 3 UK Standard Conditions.  The 
deemed employee clause is where the tugowner and its employees is deemed to be 
employees of the tow and therefore the hirer is vicariously liable for it.  It is an open question 
as to whether that has effect to ‘exclude, restrict or modify’ any liability under s74.  A similar 
debate could be had about the ‘agreements to insure’ clause which has been upheld as 
effective in Canada but not permitted in the US: Christopher Giaschi ‘Standard Towing 
Conditions and Agreements to Insure’ at http://www.admiraltylaw.com/papers/TUG.htm 
accessed 7 March 2006. 
29 See clause 4(b). 
30 Above fn 10, also discussed at 4.2. 
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Aravco for its liability to BAT in accordance with the terms of the service 
agreement. 
 
This decision is a powerful but dangerous one for the maritime industry 
generally and the towage industry in particular.  It is powerful because it 
shows that contractual indemnities between the parties to a service contract 
can stand outside the prohibition in s68.  But the Qantas v Aravco decision is 
dangerous because it can give service providers a false sense of security.   
 
Looking at the headnote of the case, or even references to it in well regarded 
TPA commentaries
31 one gets the impression that an indemnity clause can 
slip under the s74/s68 radar.  However, in the Qantas v Aravco case there 
was particular set of circumstances – fortuitous events – during the litigation 
that would not be easy to replicate but were crucial to the High Court’s finding.  
Critical to the outcome was the fact Aravco had not claimed a breach of s74 
but instead alleged that Qantas could not rely on the indemnity clause 
because it was void under s68.  This caused Aravco some difficulty when the 
matter got to the High Court.  Aravco had not itself alleged that Qantas had 
breached its contract by failing to exercise due care and skill in completing the 
service agreement.  Had Aravco claimed Qantas had breached s74 then the 
issue would have become whether it was fair and reasonable
32 for them to 
rely on the limitation of their liability to $5K.  But because there had been no 
claim of breach of s74, the case did not unfold that way.  Aravco had not 
claimed that there was a breach of contract, therefore the indemnity did not 
alter Qantas’ liability to Aravco for breach of contract.  There was no ‘mischief’ 
for s68 to cure, because there was no explicit allegation of a breach of s74.  
The indemnity provision was held to be effective – and Aravco had to pay.  
 
                                         
31 Russell Miller, Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act (26
th ed. 2005) at par. 1.74.15 sets 
out the facts of Qantas v Aravco and then states ‘The indemnity clause was found not to be 
void under s68.’ Trade Practices Law and Consumer Law, Trade Practices Commentary 
(CCH) states: Provisions entitling a supplier of services to indemnity in respect of those 
services was void under sec 68, and subject to sec 68A, but not void insofar as they provided 
that the acquirer would indemnify the supplier as against liability to third parties. (at [¶23-
145]). Accessed online ( subscription service) 1 April 2006. 
32 See discussion of s68A and ‘fair or reasonable’ in section 4.2. 
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 The case is open to criticism that it supports form over substance – quite the 
opposite of the High Court’s pronunciations in earlier cases
33.  Certainly the 
dissent of Kirby was a powerful one: 
“This court has a choice.  It may adopt a narrow construction of the Act.  But 
that would be inconsistent with the wide words used by parliament and with 
the achievement of their apparent purpose.  By a simple device, it would 
permit the neutering of protections afforded by the Act in wide terms….’
34 
 
“It would be extremely odd, as it seems to me, if the prohibition effected by 
s68(1) of the Act were so readily susceptible to circumvention by the mere 
use of the device of a promise of “indemnity”. “
35 
 
Justice Kirby considered that the words of s68 were intentionally broad, and 
focussed on the ‘effect’ rather than the language of the impugned term.
36  In 
His Honour’s view, the contractual indemnity did in fact have the effect of 
modifying and probably restricting the application of the provisions of the TPA, 
and modifying the liability of Qantas for the breach of warranty implied by 
s74.
37   
 
Lawyers faced with a case concerning the effect of s 74 on limitation 
provisions would be well advised to make this case bedtime reading so as not 
to repeat the mistakes that Aravco made.  In that sense the case is likely to be 
restricted to its particular facts and the circumstances of how that case was 
pleaded by Aravco.  However, this case does tell us that while a contractual 
indemnity can be relied upon by the party in breach, it can be countered 
effectively by an alleged breach of s74.  That in turn will trigger s68 and s68A 
in much the same way as for limitation clauses discussed above. 
 
The Qantas and Aravco case concentrated on the dispute between the two 
contracting parties, although the initial liability to a third party was fundamental 
to the case.   In the context of the towage industry, how can the claim of a 
third party to the towage contract lead to allegations of a breach of s74? 
                                         
33 Wallace v Downard Pickford (North Queensland) Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 388 at 398-399 
as cited by Justice Kirby in the Qantas case at 525. 
34 Qantas at fn 10, at p515 -516. 
35 At 524. 
36 Id. 
37 Ibid, at 523.  
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5. Strangers to the towage contract: third party claims and s 
74 
 
Section 74 requires the exercise of due care and skill, which in a towage 
context would amount to a requirement for competency and safety in the 
provision of the towage service.  A failure to exercise due care and skill could 
cause significant damage (be it to wharves, port installations or other ships) 
and injury (to the members of the crew of either tug or tow, or to members of 
the public).  However, the obligation to exercise due care and skill under s74 
can only be enforced by a contracting party.  It cannot be enforced  by 
strangers to the contract - at least, not directly. 
 
However, s74 could still play a fundamental role.  The third parties who have 
suffered injury or damage will still sue someone, usually in tort. Let’s assume 
a towage contract contains an indemnity clause, as UK standard conditions 
does.   If the third party sues the tugowner, the tug will try to seek an 
indemnity from the hirer under the contract.  The hirer can counter by alleging 
a breach of s74.
38  If there is a breach, then no exclusion clause will be 
allowed to operate, and limitation clauses will need to comply with s68A.  If 
the third party sues the hirer, then the hirer can seek indemnity for the cost by 
reason of it being caused by the tug’s breach of s74.  The tug cannot rely on 
its exclusion clauses to resist liability because they offend s68. 
One should bear in mind though that it is common in commercial maritime 
contracts for parties to be given the benefit of the contract; by widely defining 
the contracting parties there could be an increased pool of potential claimants 
and defendants.
39  In that situation, a person who falls within the wide net of 
                                         
38 It is important that they do not just allege that there is no entitlement to exclude liability – 
that is where Aravco fell down – but rather allege an actual breach of an implied term of the 
contract, being s74. 
39 While it does limit the ambit of the potential claimants able to rely on s74, if the tugowner 
used a ‘Himalaya’ type clause or indeed broadly defined the parties, then that would increase 
the potential defendants caught by s74 by effectively making them parties to the contract. The 
UK Standard Conditions clause 1(b)(vii) provides: 
 
(vii) The expression 'tugowner' shall include any person or body (other than the Hirer 
or the owner of the vessel on whose behalf the Hirer contracts as provided in Clause 
2 hereof) who is a party to this agreement whether or not he in fact owns any tug or 
tender, and the expression 'other Tugowner' contained in Clause 5 hereof shall be 
construed likewise. 
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description for ‘tugowner’ or ‘hirer’ might find that they can sue or be sued 
directly under s74. 
 
6. Personal injury: S74 and UK Standard Conditions 
 
As the effect of s74 is to impose a contractual term rather than a new cause of 
action, plaintiffs can rely upon a breach of the implied term contained within 
s74 in claiming relief for personal injury.  
 
The 1986 revision of the UK Standard Conditions makes no attempt to 
exclude liability for personal injury.  The Standard Conditions recognise the 
effect of the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UK) that forbids the exclusion of 
liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence.
40  For Australian 
towage operators, this is significant.   Where an Australian operator 
incorporates the 1986 UK Standard Conditions in their towage contract, a 
personal injury claim against them will be unrestricted by their contract and 
s68 will have no work to do.
41 
 
Some operators have cannily kept their reference to the 1974 terms (which do 
attempt to exclude liability for personal injury) rather than the 1986 revision.
42  
For those operators, s74 and s68 will override that contractual exclusion for a 
personal injury claim where there is a direct contractual relationship between 
the injured and the towage operator.  If there is no direct contractual 
                                                                                                                      
 
40 See Simon Rainey Law of Tug and Tow (LLP, 1996) at p 16. In this sense, as regards 
personal injury claims, the English provisions are broader than the TPA. 
41 Recent amendments adding Part VIB to the TPA have incorporated the recent civil liability 
reforms which seek to restrict and cap the damages awards available to claimants suffering 
personal injury.  
42 For example, Adsteam Marine. See website http://www.esc.vic.gov.au/ports159.html 
(port of Geelong) and http://www.geroport.wa.gov.au/ (port of Geraldton) accessed 
September 2005. Where that is the case, s74 will apply to the claim for personal injury only if 
the injured party has a direct contractual relationship.  If the injured party has a right of action 
against one of the parties to the contract, s74 may become an issue indirectly as discussed 
under the previous heading 
97 75
relationship, s74 can still be indirectly relevant to potential liability in much the 
same way as the third party liability discussed above.
43  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
One can certainly debate whether the TPA should apply to towage contracts.   
Many would have expected that argument to have been resolved in 1986, 
when ss3 was added to s74. The proper interpretation and parliamentary 
intent behind s74(3) is at the heart of the PNSL case
44 being argued before 
the Queensland Supreme Court this year.  One cannot see either side being 
content to let the matter rest on a first instance decision, and so it may be 
several years before the courts hand down a final decision on the ambit of 
s74(3).  
 
It is noteworthy that other countries also impose protective provisions which 
can extend to towage.  Both the UK and the USA impose some limits on the 
towage operator’s ability to exclude liability.   In the UK, the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 purports to apply to towage, albeit using a different formula 
and to a much more limited extent
45 than our TPA does. In the US, the 
Supreme Court has refused to allow tugs to exclude all liability for 
negligence.
46  
 
It is not uncommon for an accident involving tug and tow to cause substantial 
damage and consequent disputes about liability.
47  With the applicability of 
                                         
43 In section 5. 
44 See fn 15 above. 
45 The UK Act looks to the nature of the contract. If it is commercial in nature then the Act only 
applies to a limited extent, as concerns liability for personal injury.  If one party is transacting 
as a consumer (not entering the contract in the course of a business.) then the provisions of 
the Act: see s12. The EC provisions are even narrower, applying only if the consumer is a 
natural person. See Rainey Law of Tug and Tow (1996) at p 16 – 17. 
46 Bisson v Inland Waterways Corp. 39 US 85, [1955] AMC 899 as quoted in Giaschi above fn 
28, part II. 
47 A recent example occurred on 24 January 2006 in the Port of Gladstone. A tug pierced the 
fuel tank of a bulk coal carrier during berthing causing significant oil spillage. See 
http://www.abc.net.au/capricornia/stories/s1555714.htm (accessed 1 April 2006) 
98 76
s74 uncertain, and the effect of s74 and s68 on standard conditions seemingly 
severe, the towage industry ought to engage in some legal risk management. 
 
If s74 does apply to towage, then conditions drafted with the TPA in mind can 
allow towage operators to limit liability, potentially to a reasonably nominal 
amount. This is always subject to attack as to the term’s reasonableness;
48  
nevertheless, it is still a far better position for a towage operator than to find 
oneself with a series of conditions which can give virtually no protection.   
 
Assuming that s74 does apply to towage contracts, towage contractors would 
be well advised to reconsider their reliance on UK standard conditions.  Either 
they should be finessed to account for local law; or perhaps it is time for the 
towage industry to come up with a set of Australian standard conditions for 
towage.    
 
                                         
48 S68A; see section 2 and 4.2 above. 
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Introduction 
 
This case
1concerns damage done to the ship Pernas Arang (the Ship) as a result of a collision between 
it and the tug Koumala (the Tug) whilst the Tug was readying itself to tow the Ship. The case deals 
with the important question as to whether the warranty to exercise due care and skill imposed by s74 of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) applies to a towage contract, or whether such a towage 
contract can be said to fall within the exception contained within ss3, which reads: 
 
S74 Warranties in Relation to the Supply of Services 
 
(3)   A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that 
are, or are to be, provided, granted or conferred under: 
 
(a)  a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the 
purposes of a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on or 
engaged in by the person for whom the goods are transported or stored. 
 
The case also considers whether the collision occurred ‘whilst towing’ within the meaning of that 
phrase in the contract. 
 
The facts 
 
The towage was the subject of a contract between Dalrymple Marine Services Pty Ltd (the Defendant) 
and the owner of the Ship, PNSL Berhad (the Plaintiff). The terms of the towage contract were the UK 
Standard Conditions for Towage and Other Services (1974 revision) (UK Standard Conditions), and 
the fee for the service to the Ship was agreed at A$12,500.
2
 
The collision occurred on 28 February 1995. The Ship, a dry bulk carrier, was approaching the 
Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal (the Terminal) at the port of Hay Point, Queensland in order to load a 
cargo of coal. The Tug and another tug, the Kungurri, were preparing to tow the Ship to the Terminal. 
A pilot was on board the Ship and had ordered the tugs, then on the port side of the Ship, to ‘make fast’ 
at points on the starboard side. The Tug crossed ahead of the Ship, but once on the starboard side it 
turned quickly to starboard and was seen to be blowing black smoke.
3 It lost steering due to a blocked 
air filter element in the starboard generator which provided power for steering. Within a minute or so,
4 
the Tug collided with the Ship, causing damage sufficient to abort the planned loading of cargo and 
require repairs to be effected in Brisbane.
5
 
The finding - negligence 
 
Helman J found as fact that the Master of the Tug and its engineer had been negligent on several 
grounds (many other grounds alleged were not made out). His Honour found that the engineer should 
have promptly switched power from the failed starboard generator to the port generator, rather than 
                                         
∗ Senior Lecturer, Murdoch University School of Law.  
1 PNSL Berhad v Dalrymple Marine Services Pty Ltd; PNSL Berhad v The Owners of the Ship ‘Koumala’ [2007] QSC [29]. 
2 Ibid, [28]. 
3 Above n 1, [4]. 
4 The exact time between loss of steering and collision was not certain, but the judge found it was between one and a half and two 
minutes – par [11]. It was another 5 -7 minutes before the steering control was restored. 
5 Above n I, [4]. 
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having wasted time attempting to operate the generators in parallel.
6 If the engineer had done so, the 
power would have been restored in time to prevent the collision. The Master was negligent in failing to 
steer the Tug away from the Ship in the time available between the first sign of a generator problem 
and the loss of steering.  He was also negligent for not immediately stopping the main engine to slow 
the movement of the Tug towards the Ship.
7 However, Helman J found that the effective cause of the 
collision was the engineer’s negligence because, if power had been restored to the steering when it 
should have been, then the Master would have been able to steer the Tug off the collision course or 
stop it completely.
8
 
The parties had agreed that if the Defendant was liable, the damages were limited to 167,000 special 
drawing rights pursuant to the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth).
9
 
Applicability of s74 and s68 TPA – the arguments  
 
The decision then focused on the applicability of two provisions under the TPA, s74 and s68. They read 
as follows: 
S74  Warranties in relation to the supply of services 
(1)  In every contract for the supply by a corporation in the course of a business of services to a 
consumer there is an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with due care and skill 
and that any materials supplied in connexion with those services will be reasonably fit for the 
purpose for which they are supplied. 
 
(2)  Where a corporation supplies services to a consumer in the course of a business and the 
consumer…makes known to the corporation any particular purpose for which the services are 
required or the result that he or she desires the services to achieve, there is an implied warranty 
that the services supplied under the contract for the supply of the services and any materials 
supplied in connexion with those services will be reasonably fit for that purpose or are of such 
a nature and quality that they might reasonably be expected to achieve that result…. 
 
(3)  A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that are, or are to 
be, provided, granted or conferred under:  
(a)  a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the purposes of a 
business, trade, profession or occupation carried on or engaged in by the person for whom the 
goods are transported or stored…. (emphasis added) 
 
 
S68 Application of provisions not to be excluded or modified  
 
(1)   Any term of a contract (including a term that is not set out in the contract but is incorporated in 
the contract by another term of the contract) that purports to exclude, restrict or modify or has 
the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying:  
 
(a)  the application of all or any of the provisions of this Division; 
 
(b)  the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision; 
 
(c)  any liability of the corporation for breach of a condition or warranty implied by such a 
provision; or 
 
(d)  the application of section 75A; 
is void. 
 
(2)   A term of a contract shall not be taken to exclude, restrict or modify the application of a 
provision of this Division or the application of section 75A unless the term does so expressly 
or is inconsistent with that provision or section. 
 
                                         
6 Ibid [40]. 
7 Ibid [38]. 
8 Ibid [40]. 
9 Ibid, [2]. 
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It was not in issue that the towage contract was a contract for the supply of services to which the TPA 
applied – it was a contract for the supply of services by a corporation in the course of a business, for a 
sum less than A$40,000.
10 The Plaintiff contended that s74 applied to the contract, and was breached 
by the failure of the engineer and/or the Master to act with due care and skill. The Plaintiff claimed that 
the Defendant was not entitled to rely upon the exclusion clauses in the UK Standard Conditions 
because they had the effect of excluding the liability of the Defendant under s74 and as such were 
rendered void by s68. 
 
The Defendant alleged that the warranties in s74 did not apply as the contract fell within the exception 
contained in s74(3) as the contract was ‘for or in relation to the transportation … of goods’. The 
definition of ‘goods’ in the TPA includes ships. The Defendant submitted that either the contract was 
one for or in relation to the transportation of goods, being the Ship, or alternatively, the contract was 
one in relation to the transportation of goods, being the coal, which was to be loaded onto the Ship. The 
Defendant argued
11 that if the towage contract was not a contract ‘for’ the transportation of the Ship it 
was undoubtedly a contract ‘in relation to’ transportation of either the Ship or the coal.
12 The 
Defendant submitted that this construction of ss3 accorded with a common sense and commercial 
approach to the statute,
13 relying on Comalco Aluminium Limited v Mogul Freight Services Pty Ltd
14 
(Comalco) and Wallis v Downard –Pickford (North Queensland) Pty Ltd.
15  
 
The decision – TPA 
 
Helman J considered whether the towage contract could be said to have been a contract for or in 
relation to the transportation of goods. 
 
‘Contract for the transportation of…’ 
 
Helman J pointed out that the two cases relied upon by the Defendant had not decided what constitutes 
the transportation of goods; and that  in the Comalco case, Sheppard J had been content to apply the 
section to ‘the commercial shipping of goods to an overseas destination’.
16 He posed the question - is 
towing a ship the same as transporting that ship or its cargo?
17 His Honour considered definitions of 
transport and concluded: 
 
There is, I think, a distinction in ordinary language between carrying or conveying something 
and towing it… in my view then the towing contract was not a contract for the transportation 
of either the ship or any cargo carried by the ship. Was it however a contract in relation to the 
transportation of ship or cargo?
18
 
‘Contract in relation to the transportation of…’ 
 
Helman J cited with approval the treatment given to that phrase by the Full Court of the Federal Court 
in the judgement of Braverus Maritime Inc. v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd & Anor.
19 While only 
obiter, the court in that case stated that if the pilotage services had been by way of a contract, it would 
not have been for the transportation of goods, nor in relation to the transportation of goods for the 
purposes identified by s74(3). As the Full Court had noted, ‘the purpose of ss3 was to ensure the well 
known law governing transportation of goods (by air land or sea) was not radically amended by s74’ 
and ‘with that purpose in mind, there is no relevant relationship between the contract to provide the 
services and the transport of goods’.
20 Helman J agreed with this analysis, and applying the same 
reasoning, found that there was no relevant relationship between a contract to provide towing services 
                                         
10 Ibid [43]. 
11 Ibid [45]. 
12 Ibid [44] and [47]. 
13 Ibid, [47]. 
14 (1994) 113 ALR 677. 
15 (1994) 179 CLR 388. 
16 Above n 1, [46]. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid [48]. 
19 (2005) 148 FCR 68. 
20 Above n 1, [59], quoting the Braverus judgement ibid at 118. 
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and the transportation of goods.
21 While agreeing that there is a connection between the services and 
transportation of goods, in His Honour’s view it lacked the relevant relationship, and there was ‘no 
reason to conclude that the purpose of s74(3) extended to removing contracts like towing contracts 
from the purview of s74(1) and (2).’
22
 
As a result the Defendant was not able to rely on the UK Standard Conditions to exclude liability as the 
exemption clause was rendered void by s68 TPA.
23
 
If the UK Standard Conditions apply, did the accident occur ‘whilst towing’? 
 
Whilst not necessary given his conclusions on the TPA argument, Helman J outlined his findings on the 
effect of the UK Standard Conditions. The Defendant relied on cl 1, 3 and 4 asserting that it was 
exempt from liability as the collision occurred ‘whilst towing’. That phrase is defined in the UK 
Standard Conditions as follows: 
 
The expression ‘whilst towing’ shall cover the period commencing when the tug … is in a position to 
receive orders direct from the Hirer’s to commence pushing, holding, moving, escorting, or guiding the 
vessel or to pick up ropes or lines or when the tow rope has been passed to or by the tug, whichever is 
the sooner… 
24 (the Definition) 
 
The Defendant relied on the fact that the collision occurred while the Tug was in the course of moving 
in response to the pilot’s direction, and that as such it was in the course of carrying out orders at the 
time of the steering failure. The Plaintiff claimed the Tug was not at that time ready to receive orders 
such that would fall within the Definition. 
 
His Honour conducted a review of the case law concerning the phrase ‘whilst towing’. In essence it 
depended on whether the pilot’s order requiring the Tug to move to starboard of the Ship was of such a 
nature that it was part of the towing process or merely preparatory. He drew considerable support from 
Herring CJ in Australiasian Steamships Pty Ltd v Koninklijke-Java-China Lynen
25who said: 
 
The orders that a tug is to be in a position to receive are orders which can only be carried out 
when the tug is in a state of readiness, and this means both correctly positioned so far as the 
vessel is concerned and with everything ready on the tug itself to pick up the necessary ropes 
or lines…
26
 
and from Simon Rainey’s text The Law of Tug and Tow: 
 
The towage service is to commence… when the tug, in all practical respects, is alongside and 
at the disposal of the tow… the epithet “direct” signifies the close proximity and immediacy of 
preparation between tug and tow… such, realistically and commercially, is when the towage 
service in fact begins.’
 27
 
His Honour concluded that the order given by the pilot was a general order, not a specific order as 
contemplated in the definition. The true question was whether at any time after that general order was 
given and before the steering failure, the Tug was in fact in a position to receive orders direct from the 
Ship to commence pushing, holding, moving escorting or guiding it or to pick up ropes or lines.
28 His 
Honour concluded that the Tug was not in the requisite position to respond to any of the specific orders 
referred to in the definition.
29 It was manoeuvring to put itself in that position but had not yet reached it 
at the time when the steering failed. From that point on, it was not in a position to receive orders direct 
from the Ship in due to the failure.
30 As a result, the Defendant would not have been entitled to rely on 
the exemption clause, even if it had not been rendered void by the operation of the TPA. 
                                         
21 Above n 1, [50]. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid [51]. 
24 Ibid [32], quoting cl 1(b)(iv) of the UK Standard Conditions. 
25 [1955] VLR 108. 
26 Ibid p112. 
27 Above n 1, [59] citing Simon Rainey the Law of Tug and Tow (and allied contracts) London LLP 1996 p 61. 
28 Above n 1, [60]. 
29 Ibid [64]. 
30 Ibid [62]. 
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Comment 
 
As yet it is not clear if the Defendant plans to appeal the decision. Regardless of any appeal, towage 
operators and their advisors should now consider rewriting their standard terms to comply with the TPA 
and, in particular, to take advantage of s68A.
31 By doing so, a towage operator can reduce their 
likelihood of being liable for the full amount of the loss.
32 A towage operator could effectively limit its 
liability for damage arising from negligence to the invoice cost of the service in question. In the PNSL 
case, that would have been the difference between A$12,500 (plus interest) and approximately 
A$306,000.
33
 
 
                                         
31 ‘SECT 68A  
Limitation of liability for breach of certain conditions or  warranties 
  
(1)   Subject to this section, a term of a contract for the supply by a corporation of goods or services other than goods or 
services of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption is not void under section 68 by 
reason only that the term limits the liability of the corporation for a breach of a condition or warranty… to:  
(a)   in the case of goods, any one or more of the following:.. 
(b)   in the case of services: 
(i)   the supplying of the services again; or 
(ii)   the payment of the cost of having the services supplied again….’ 
32 Subject to any right to limit liability under the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989(Cth). 
33 Being the approximate value of 167,000 SDRs as at 20 April 2007. 
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4.3 Significant  Developments 
4.3.1 Appeal in Koumala case 
The towage operators Dalrymple Marine Services Pty Ltd (Dalrymple) appealed from the first 
instance decision of Helman J noted in 4.2 above.  The appeal was on 2 primary grounds –  
•  first, that the collision occurred ‘whilst towing’ (in which case an exclusion clause in 
the contract would apply) and  
•  secondly, that the towage contract was caught by the exception in s74(3), such that 
s74 did not neutralise the contractual exclusion (the TPA issue).  
 
The Supreme Court of Queensland - Court of Appeal handed down its decision dismissing the 
appeal on 30 November 2007.110 Only the TPA issue need concern us here. 
 
S74 (3) exempts certain contracts from the scope of s74: 
S74(3) A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that 
are, or are to be, provided granted or conferred under: 
(a) a contract for or in relation to the transportation… of goods for the purposes of a 
business… 
 
Dalrymple argued that this subsection was triggered in one of two ways – either because the towage 
contract facilitated the transportation of coal which the vessel was about to load, or that the towage 
contract was itself a contract for the transportation of goods, as the definition of ‘goods’ in s4 of TPA 
                                                      
110 Unreported, [2007] QCA 429. 
  106includes a ship. The Court of Appeal rejected Dalrymple’s arguments unanimously,111 finding no 
error in the trial judge’s findings in this regard.  
 
Briefly disposing of the first argument, the Court found that the contract was not a contract to 
transport, carry or take the ship from one place to another.  It was for the purpose of guiding the ship 
to its berth under its master and on the pilot’s advice.112 The key to the operation of s74(3) was to 
identify the purpose of the contract.113  Here the contract could not be said to be ‘for’ the purpose of 
transporting the coal (although the towage contract was a necessary prerequisite for loading the 
coal).  The contract: 
concerns a service to be rendered to the ship itself without regard to whether the ship is 
laden or unladen, and without regard to the identity, characteristics or movement of any 
goods. Nor can the ‘purpose of the business for whom the [coal is] transported’ be relevant 
to a contract of towage.  Such purposes and the identity of the relevant business are not 
matters of concern to the tug owner.114
 
Justices Williams and Muir both cited the dicta of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Braverus 
Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Anor,115 (Braverus), that had been similarly relied on 
by the trial judge in Koumala.116  
 
In the Braverus case, already discussed,117 the Full Court of the Federal Court decided that there 
was no relevant contract for pilotage onto which the warranty in s74 could be grafted.118 
                                                      
111Ibid.  Williams JA, [32] –[ 35]; Muir JA [73] – [83].  Daubney J concurred with the reasons for judgement of Williams 
and Muir JJA: [87]. 
112 Ibid. Muir JA ,[81], with whom Daubney J concurred.  Williams JA did not deal with this argument expressly. 
113 Ibid. Williams JA at [33]; [80] – [83]. 
114Ibid.  Muir JA at [83].  A similar point was made in the article reproduced in 4.1 above at text accompanying fn 16. 
115 (2005) 148 FCR 68. It has been discussed already in the context of carriage of goods by sea (see 2.2.2 above), and 
is discussed below at 4.3.2. 
116 As discussed in the article at 4.2 above, at text accompanying fn 19. 
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from the operation of the warranty.  A contract for pilotage would not be a contract ‘in relation to 
transportation of goods’: 
Was it a contract in relation to the transportation of goods for the purposes identified by the 
subsection? We think not. The purpose of s 74(3) was to ensure that the well-known law 
governing transportation of goods (by air, land or sea) and storage of goods was not to be 
radically amended by s 74, in particular given the well established insurance arrangements 
in respect thereof: Explanatory Memorandum accompanying Trade Practices Revision Bill 
1986 at para 153; see Heydon JD Trade Practices Law Vol 2 at para 16.850. With that 
purpose understood, there is no relevant relationship between the contract to provide the 
services and the transportation of goods. It could be no more said that a contract to provide 
pilotage services related to the transportation of goods because it was a necessary 
precondition to get the ship to the berth, than it could be said that a contract to repair the 
ship before sailing related to the transportation of goods because, without the repairs, the 
ship would not sail.119
While this view of ss3 awaits the imprimatur of the High Court, the Full Court’s interpretation was 
approved and applied in the Koumala case.   
 
With respect, the Koumala decisions, both of the trial judge and the Court of Appeal, seem right.  In 
keeping with its role as an exception to the warranty, subsection 3 ought to be interpreted, not 
broadly, but in such a way that it does not thwart the intentions of s74 and the TPA more generally.  
While one hesitates to call this a ‘narrow’ reading of the subsection, it is a realistic interpretation of 
the intended reach of a provision, given the legislative history of s74. Dalrymple has lodged an 
application for special leave to appeal to the High Court, due to be held in the coming months. 120 
That application should see the appropriate reach of this exception settled - finally.  In the meantime, 
towage operators, and other maritime service industries in Australia, would be forgiven for holding 
their breath. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
117 Above at n 111. 
118 (2005) 148 FCR 68 [192]. 
119 Ibid, [195]. 
120 As at the date of writing, no date for the hearing has been set but it is expected to be heard sometime in June 2008.** see end     of chapter for update. 
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4.3.2  Other maritime services caught by s74 – the way forward 
 
This Chapter deals with towage services as a particular manifestation of the application of s74 to 
maritime services contracts in Australia.  Towage contracts, in the writer’s view, provide a good 
example of the type of maritime services industry that is less than likely to escape the TPA 
provisions,121 but which could protect itself against those provisions reasonably easily – by including 
in their contracts a limitation clause which fits s68A.  At this moment in time, the approach of the 
towage industry still appears122 to be to thrust their collective heads in the sand.  If the High Court 
affirms the lower court judgments, as it should, then perhaps then the towage companies will finally 
consider a small rewrite of their conditions in order to better protect their business.123
 
Other ancillary maritime industries will also be caught by s74, subject to their ability to rely on the 
subsection 3 exception.  Given that the contract needs to be ‘in relation to’ transportation, probably 
the industry with the strongest argument to fall within that exception would be stevedores.  They are 
directly involved with the loading and unloading of goods on vessels which have, or are about to, 
transport them.  It would satisfy, it seems, the nexus required by Muir JA when, to paraphrase His 
                                                      
121 For the reasons set out at p 60 of the article reproduced in 4.1 above; and at least while the TPA provisions are in 
their current form. 
122 When the original paper was written, many towage operators set out their conditions on their website.  That practice 
appears to be the exception rather than the rule; rarely can one locate a reference to towage conditions on the websites 
of either the major towage companies (such as Australian Maritime Services: http://www.ams2000.com.au/main-nb.htm  
Adsteam, now taken over by Svitzer http://www.svitzer.com/Frontpage ) or ports - for instance, Geelong, Melbourne, 
Fremantle, Brisbane ( as at 18 March 2008) 
123 Alternatively they could lobby either Federal or State Government as outlined in the previous paragraph. 
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the ship is unladen or laden, and to the identity, characteristics and movement of the goods.124
Whatever the decision of the High Court, 125 if Federal Parliament disagrees with it, amending 
subsection 3 is a possibility.  For instance, an amendment could extend the exception to ancillary 
services, preferably by specifying the types of contracts it means to cover: such as towage, or 
stevedoring.  Specifying the types of contracts would leave less room for argument, because 
extending the exception using general words such as ‘ancillary contracts’ would lead to greater 
uncertainty.  But it would also create the need to limit the ambit of the subsection –for instance, 
should contracts for ship repairs be included?  What about providor contracts?  
 
A far less satisfactory method of negating the Koumala case might occur via the newly presented 
route of s74(2A).  This subsection was introduced in the previous chapter.126 If a State Government 
could be persuaded to legislate a right to limit or exclude liability for towage operators, then that 
would override the s74 warranty.  However, this is hardly a route to be encouraged; better a 
considered amendment at Federal level than a piecemeal approach at a State and Territorial level. 
 
While amending s74(3) would be a possibility so as to better protect the ancillary maritime service 
industries,
127 it is the writer’s view there is no good reason to exempt Australian maritime service 
operators, contracting in Australia for the provision of services within Australia, from the operation of 
s74 – particularly when they can escape liability easily with a well constructed limitation clause.   
 
                                                      
124 (2005) 148 FCR 68, [83]. 
125 Either by dismissing the application for special leave to appeal, or upon hearing the appeal. 
126 See 3.2.4 above. 
127 Assuming for a moment that the High Court confirms the lower decisions in Koumala. 
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4.3.3   Personal injury reforms and contracts for maritime services 
As we saw in chapter 3, the new s68B seeks to deny a claimant the right to rely on s74 for a 
damages claim as a result of personal injuries or death – but this is only in the context of recreational 
services.  As such, the provision will not apply to towage contracts or other maritime services 
contracts.  It is unlikely that the person killed or injured will be a party to the towage contract itself 
and trigger s74 in his or her own right.  However, s74 may still be relevant to any action establishing 
liability for the accident as between, for instance, the wrongdoer, the injured party and his or her 
employer. 
 
The following chapter will look at the particular difficulties facing an Australian litigant who wishes to 
rely on the TPA in the face of a contractual provision which either stipulates that another law applies, 
obliges litigation to take place in the exclusive jurisdiction of an overseas court, or requires the 
parties to undertake arbitration overseas. 
 
 
 
 ** since submission of this thesis, the High Court of Australia has refused special leave to appeal.
For the author's casenote see Kate Lewins 'UK Standard Conditions for Towage and s74(3) Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) before the Queensland Court of Appeal and the High Court of Australia' 
(2008) 22 Australia & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal  228 – 233. 
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Chapter Five 
TPA - A lion in its own backyard but a toothless tiger 
overseas? Conflict of laws implications of TPA in 
maritime law. 
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and England: Confusion and consternation?’ (2008) 36 Australian Business Law 
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statute” in Australia and England: Confusion
and consternation?
Kate Lewins*
This article is concerned with the clash between party autonomy in contracts
and mandatory rules of a State in the context of maritime law. Where litigation
takes place in Australia, the Trade Practices Act (TPA), as a mandatory law of
the forum, applies to the contract. However, in many transnational contracts
involving Australian parties, the parties have agreed that the law of a different
country is to govern their contract or granted a non-Australian court exclusive
jurisdiction over any disputes. Alternatively they may have agreed to submit
disputes to arbitration outside Australia. Commonly the parties choose
English Courts or London Arbitration. In doing so, the parties have exercised
a choice, which, if permitted to operate, will take their contract out of the
reach of the mandatory law of Australia. How do Australian and English
courts treat this apparent clash of policies and what is the consequence for
contractual parties who ﬁnd themselves litigating a jurisdictional dispute both
in Australia and England?
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) constitutes arguably the most signiﬁcant reform of the
commercial law of Australia. Its so-called consumer protection provisions are a misnomer – they
extend well beyond mere consumers thanks to a wide deﬁnition of consumer in the Act itself, and the
Courts’ expansive interpretation of its substantive provisions.
1 Signiﬁcantly, the Act also provides for
extraterritorial application in certain circumstances.
2 A proper awareness of the scope and impact of
the TPA is imperative when doing business in Australia, whether with or by Australians.
It is trite to say that the commercial sector is now more multinational than ever. It is
commonplace for large-scale commercial transactions to involve overseas parties and performance in
a number of countries. In particular, much of Australia’s economy is geared to international trade –
both international sales contracts and international contracts for the carriage of goods. It is clear that
*Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia.
The author is grateful to Paul Myburgh, Robert Merkin, Vernon Nase and the anonymous referee for their helpful comments on
drafts of this paper.
This paper was written while on sabbatical at McGill University. The author would also like to thank Professors Kasirer and
Tetley for their welcome and encouragement.
The following abbreviations are used in relation to commonly cited texts: Nygh P and Davies M, Conﬂict of Laws in Australia
(7th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) (Nygh and Davies); Miller R,Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act (28th ed,
Thomson Lawbook Co, 2007) (Miller); Dicey and Morris, The Conﬂict of Laws (11th ed, 1987) (Dicey and Morris); Dicey
Morris and Collins, The Conﬂict of Laws (14th ed, 2006) (Dicey, Morris and Collins); Nygh P, Autonomy in International
Contracts (Clarendon Press, 1999) (Nygh); Tetley W, International Conﬂict of Laws (1994) BLAIS (Tetley); Davies M (ed),
Jurisdiction and Forum Selection in International Maritime Law (Kluwer, 2005) (Davies); Whincop M and Keyes M, Policy
and Pragmatism in the Conﬂict of Laws (Ashgate, 2001) (Whincop and Keyes); Tilbury M, Davis G and Opeskin B, Conﬂict of
Laws in Australia (Oxford, 2002) (Tilbury Davis and Opeskin); Davies and Dickey, Shipping Law (3rd ed, Thomson Lawbook
Co, 2004) (Davies and Dickey). Gaskell N, Asariotis R and Baatz Y, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (LLP, 2000) (Gaskell).
1See Miller at [1.52.45]: For instance, in Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191, the
HCA decided that s 52 did not apply only to litigation by consumers but could be used by trade competitors in the context of
challenging representations in advertising; in Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594, the HCA
held that the person misled need not be a member of the public to be misled. Initially, private contracts were held to be outside
the purview of s 52: Westham Dredging Co Pty Ltd v Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd (1983) 66 FLR 14 (FCA); but
by 1985, the FCAFC held otherwise: Bevanere Pty Ltd v Lubidineuse (1985) 59 ALR 334.
2See Pt II of this paper.
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114the TPA can have an impact in this realm,
3 although it is probably the case that the exact extent of its
inﬂuence is yet to be established. For instance, there have been several maritime cases where the TPA
has, in the end result, added little to the more traditional analysis of liability.
4 Nevertheless, the TPA
remains a force to be reckoned with insofar as litigation conducted in Australia is concerned.
The TPA is one of the few Australian statutes concerning commercial matters that are regarded as
being “mandatory rules” of Australia.
5 The other Commonwealth Acts are the Insurance Contracts Act
1984 (Cth) (ICA) and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth) (Australian COGSA). The
Australian Parliament has attempted to enshrine the mandatory status of each by differently-worded
provisions designed to overcome contractual attempts to avoid them.
6
Commonly, parties to a contract will insert clauses as to applicable law, exclusive jurisdiction and
submission to arbitration, and such clauses will usually be upheld by the courts – both in Australia and
abroad. It is an accepted tenet of international commerce that the terms to which the parties have
agreed are of utmost importance – this is the notion of party autonomy. Exclusive jurisdiction clauses
have been described by Bell as “anticipatory forum shopping”
7 – where the shopping is done in
advance – although with the notable difference being that the exclusive jurisdiction clause is in fact
the result of “consensual stipulation for which … a premium may have been paid by the party who
principally beneﬁted by the choice.”
8 The English courts, as primary providers of legal services to
international maritime industries,
9 have a distinct interest in upholding the right of parties to choose
English law to govern their contracts and English courts to resolve their disputes. To this end, the
dictum of Lord Denning is still relevant to many in international trade and carriage:
[England] is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the goods and the speed of the service.
10
Clearly in many cases of international trade, these clauses as to applicable law, jurisdiction and
arbitration may well have been freely negotiated between the parties. However, it is just as likely that
the clauses have been presented by one party to the other on a “take it or leave it” basis – so-called
“boilerplate” provisions. In a carriage of goods context, the terms are drafted to beneﬁt the carrier,
who wishes to ensure, for its convenience, that all suits are brought in one central location.
11
Not only are the clauses commonly not open for negotiation, it is often the case that the party
wishing to sue on the contract did not know of the contents of those clauses prior to shipment.
12 The
clause may have been “inherited” by a consignee or indorsee via a sea-carriage document that is only
3Examples of cases where the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has been successfully relied upon include Comalco v Mogal
Freight Services (Oceania Trader) (1993) 113 ALR 677 (freight forwarder liable for representations of competency);
Woolworths Ltd v APL Co Pte Ltd [2001] NSWSC 662 (carriage of goods); PNSL Berhad v Dalrymple Marine Services Pty Ltd;
PNSL Berhad v The Owners of the Ship “Koumala” [2007] QSC 101 (towage contract); Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co
Ltd [1988] 3 VR 380 (bank guarantee).
4See, for example, Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [2000] FCA 660; Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v Hyundai
Merchant Marine Co Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 507; Westpac Banking Corp v Stone Gemini [1999] FCA 434.
5Nygh p 202; Mortensen RG, Private International Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006) at [15.12]. There are also
some examples of mandatory statutes to be found in the State statute books – such as the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).
This paper is primarily concerned with Commonwealth legislation.
6As we shall see, however, express provisions in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) apply only to s 74 and not to s 52.
7Bell A, “Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in Transnational Contracts (Pt 1)” (1996) 10 J Con L 53 at 53.
8Bell A, n 7, at 53-54.
9David J, “The Modern Maritime Judge – Policeman or Salesman?” (2003) 17 MLAANZ J 6 at 7, 18.
10The Atlantic Star [1973] QB 364 at 382.
11Although Von Ziegler argues that transport law should not be tasked with the responsibility of seeing that the consignee is
informed of exclusive jurisdiction clauses, the consignee is able to require the seller to negotiate transportation to its liking, so
long as it is prepared to pay the inevitably higher freight rate that would result: Von Zeigler A, “Jurisdiction and Forum
Selection Clauses in a Modern Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea” (Ch 3) in Davies M (ed), Jurisdiction and Forum Selection
in International Maritime Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Force (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 85 at 115-116.
12Although the consignee/indorsee is taken to know that such clauses exist.
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115seen after the goods have been loaded on board the ship;
13 it may have been incorporated in a sea
carriage document issued pursuant to a charterparty, where the exact terms of the charterparty are not
made available; or it may have been included in a contract that the original carrier of the goods
entered with a sub-bailee. In those cases,
14 cargo interests will nevertheless be bound by the standard
form of the carrier. In England the courts make no legal distinction between the situation where both
parties actively negotiate such a clause as opposed to when the clause is imposed on a consignee by
reason of a small printed clause not known or brought to its attention beforehand. Indeed, a number of
legal devices have been employed to bind a consignee or indorsee to the terms of the carrier’s contract
without any direct or actual knowledge of the terms of the sea carriage document;
15 and there is no
concern that such contracts might be what are called “contracts of adhesion” in other countries.
16 In
the main, Australia also adopts the convenient compendium of legal devices developed in English
law.
17
In any event, most consignees are regular parties to contracts of international trade, who insure
their risks and knowingly take on the vagaries of the trade such as the likely inclusion of an exclusive
jurisdiction or arbitration clause.
18 Nonetheless, these issues are not the focus of this article; rather, the
assumption is that the particular contractual clause in question has been incorporated in the contract
and is enforceable.
The area dealt with by this article is where the notions of mandatory law and party autonomy
collide. To what extent can the parties sidestep the Australian mandatory law by the simple expedient
of a contractual term choosing the law or jurisdiction of another place?
19 Or put another way, can the
Australian legislature expect courts of other countries to, in effect, defer to Australian mandatory law
rather than uphold the notion of party autonomy?
This article will examine the tension between the parties’ right to select the law and court
applicable to their contract, and the mandatory laws of a State (in this case Australia) in an
international maritime law context. Given the dominance of the English jurisdiction in the area of
maritime dispute resolution, the attitude of Australian and English courts will be explored in the
context of relevant clauses in the contract and conﬂict of laws principles. Because the question of
jurisdiction often also decides the question as to applicable law
20 or even the outcome of the dispute,
21
the article will concentrate on the jurisdictional dispute – namely, which country’s claim to
jurisdiction over a particular dispute should be paramount; and in what circumstances an arbitration
13While it might be said by some that the consignee, as the buyer in a sales contract, has the power to insist that its seller
negotiate a more favourable choice clause, it would be extremely unlikely in practice for a buyer to do so, or a seller to agree
to it.
14However, in the context of sub-bailment on terms, we are still awaiting the authoritative acceptance of the doctrine for
Australia from the High Court.
15The various devices include the deeming of contracting on usual terms; the use of Himalaya and circular indemnity clauses
and the doctrine of sub-bailment on terms (which has not yet been authoritatively accepted for Australia by the HCA).
16However, in the United States, adhesion contracts for carriage containing exclusive jurisdiction clauses are not invalid per se
– see The Bremen v Zapata Off-shore Co 407 US. 1, 1972 AMC 1407 (1972) (US Supreme Court) as cited in Sturley M
“Overruling Sky Reefer in the International Arena: A Preliminary Assessment of Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses in the
New UNCITRAL Transport Law Convention” (2006) 37(1) J Mar L & Com 1 at 2, and Carnival Cruise Lines v Shute 499 US
585, 1991 AMC 1697 (1991) (US Supreme Court) as cited in Nygh at 153 and Sturley at 2.
17Although it would seem unlikely that an Australian court would reach the same conclusion as the English court in the Thyssen
“saga”, so named and discussed in Force R and Davies M, “Forum Selection Clauses in International Maritime Contracts” in
Davies M (ed), Jurisdiction and Forum Selection in International Maritime Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Force (Kluwer
Law International, 2005) p 1 and from p 12 onwards.
18Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418. For example, where the Australian party and Singapore
party could not agree on which of their laws would apply and therefore selected the law of England. The Akai decision will be
discussed in Pt II of this paper.
19Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418.
20See Dicey, Morris and Collins at 1-004.
21This was the result of a survey conducted in the United States of cases which had undergone a jurisdictional challenge based
on an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The survey found that enforcement of a forum selection clause by the United States courts
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116clause will operate to remove a claim from the jurisdiction of a court.
22 Pt I of this article outlines the
relevant clashing policies: party autonomy and mandatory rules. Pt II considers the Australian
manifestation of mandatory rules, namely the TPA provisions before considering how the Australian
and English courts have dealt with the clashing principles in the skirmish for jurisdiction. That Pt
concludes that, with one important exception,
23 the courts in Australia and England currently approach
such a scenario in such a way that each considers they have a superior right to deal with the dispute.
As such, the outcome may well be dictated by an unseemly race to court for pre-emptive relief against
the other party. Pt III discusses the ramiﬁcations of this state of affairs, and the various options open to
Australian policymakers and Australian litigants.
PART I
If contract is silent as to law and jurisdiction – default position
This article addresses situations where a contract contains clauses agreeing on proper law, exclusive
jurisdiction clauses or an arbitration clause. Those clauses alter the enquiry that the courts would
otherwise make to establish proper law and appropriate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, many of the
concepts are similar. Therefore it is as well to outline the position where there is a dispute between
contracting parties in different countries, whose agreement contains no express terms as to law,
jurisdiction or arbitration.
Plaintiffs have “ﬁrst mover” advantage… there is nothing neutral about the choice of jurisdiction by a
plaintiff… motivations for choosing a venue vary: some are perfectly legitimate and some offend any
objective test of the purposes of the administration of justice…in between such cases of legitimate and
illegitimate motivation is a wide range of advantages and disadvantages in the litigation process about which
different opinions can be held. This includes…[amongst other factors] the existence of “mandatory rules”
under local statutes, which provide causes of action or procedural advantage unique to a particular
jurisdiction.
24
Where the contract does not stipulate a preferred jurisdiction or governing law, the party who has
suffered loss will commence litigation in the forum of their choosing; it might be, for example, the
forum with a suitable connection to the defendant, the breach of the contract, or where the loss was
suffered.
The plaintiff’s selected forum is assessed as a question of jurisdiction of the court in question; in
Australia and England, this is contained in the Rules of Court.
25 As Australia’s civil procedure rules
are derived from those of England, historically these provisions have been very similar.
26 No leave is
required to commence proceedings against a defendant based in the territory of the court in which the
plaintiff commences proceedings (the forum court). However, if the plaintiff has to serve proceedings
adversely affects the rights of the plaintiff, either by diminishing the value of its claim or depriving it of the claim altogether:
Force R and Davies M, “Forum Selection Clauses in International Maritime Contracts” in Davies M (ed), Jurisdiction and
Forum Selection Clauses in International Maritime Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Force (Klewer, 2005) 1 at 8.
22As questions of choice of law can be relevant to that enquiry, so choice of law provisions will be explained and dealt with
where relevant.
23That of arbitration – see “Litigation Despite Agreement to Arbitrate” in Pt I and “International Convention Upholding Party
Autonomy – What Effect Domestic Mandatory Law? The Exceptional Case of Arbitration Clauses.” in Pt II of this paper.
24Spigelman CJ, “International Commercial Litigation: An Asian Perspective” (2007) 35 ABLR 318 at 324.
25The forum non conveniens test no longer applies in England to matters involving parties within the European Union (EU) due
to the operation of the 1968 Brussels Convention (Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters), since replaced by the Brussels Regulation, European Council Regulation 44/2001 as found in the United
Kingdom (UK) Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Brussels Regulation). There is a parallel provision which regulates
jurisdictional matters between EU countries and three non-EU countries, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland– the Lugano
Convention 1989, which is due to be replaced by a new version agreed at the end of 2007. See Nygh and Davies at 7.14 fn 56;
Dicey and Morris at 391-395.
26Although the United Kingdom has now codiﬁed its Rules in the Civil Procedure Rules, see r 6.20.
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117on a defendant who is outside the forum court’s territory,
27 then at some early stage of proceedings the
plaintiff must satisfy the court that its jurisdiction has been properly invoked – in other words, that the
court is the appropriate forum because prima facie the required connection between the court and the
defendant exists.
Disputing the plaintiff’s choice of jurisdiction
As the above quotation from Spigelman CJ shows, the plaintiff (and their advisers) will be
inﬂuenced by a range of factors in selecting a venue. In particular, if a plaintiff has grounds to allege
a breach of the provisions of the TPA then the plaintiff’s lawyers will advise that proceedings are best
commenced in Australia because, if the TPA is applicable, the courts in Australia are obliged to
enforce it.
Assuming the court does grant leave to serve the defendant, the defendant can dispute the
plaintiff’s choice of jurisdiction by application to the court for a stay on forum non conveniens
28
grounds.
29 The test is different in England and Australia. In England, and the many other countries
who have adopted it
30 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Consulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460 dictates that the test
is whether there is a “more appropriate court” than the English court to hear the dispute. The court
looks for the forum with which the action has the most real and substantial connection, considering a
range of factors. These factors include convenience and expense of proceedings, availability of
witnesses, law governing the relevant transaction, and the places where the parties reside or carry on
business. If there is no “more appropriate” forum than England, the courts will refuse a stay. If there
is a forum that is prima facie more appropriate, then the court will normally grant a stay unless there
were circumstances militating against a stay, such as if the plaintiff would not obtain justice – or
would lose some juridical advantage – in the foreign jurisdiction.
31
In Australia, to the regret of many
32 the enquiry is different. The case of Voth v Manildra Flour
Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 (Voth) determined that the test for Australia is whether the
Australian court is a “clearly inappropriate” forum; again looking at a range of factors. The same
factors cited in Spiliada will be relevant to that enquiry.
33 Because of the requirement that the
Australian court must be clearly inappropriate, a stay is less likely to be granted under the Australian
test.
34 If a plaintiff in Australian proceedings is seeking relief under the TPA then it will more easily
rebuff a forum non conveniens stay application by a defendant. The plaintiff can assert that it would be
at a “juridical disadvantage” if the action proceeded elsewhere as it would probably be deprived of its
27In some Australian Supreme Courts, leave is required to issue and serve proceedings on a foreign defendant – see for example
Western Australia (WA) Rules of the Supreme Court O 5, r 9. In other Supreme Courts, and the FCA, leave is not required to
issue, but is required to serve a defendant overseas. In this sense proceedings in those courts are more attractive as they can be
commenced rapidly without leave.
28While Davies regards this as somewhat of a misnomer when used to describe the Australian position (Davies M, “A Curate’s
Egg: Good in Parts – Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd” (1997) 25 ABLR 214 at 219) the terminology is frequently
used, and has been adopted in this paper on that basis.
29The forum non conveniens test is ousted where the defendant is domiciled in England and the English court is the court ﬁrst
seized of the action. In that situation the English court is precluded by the Brussels Regulation from declining jurisdiction, at
least in the absence of an exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration clause: Case C-281/02, Owusu v Jackson [2005] QB 801.
30Including Canada and New Zealand: see Nygh and Davies at [7.8].
31Plaintiffs in Australia who are intending to assert reliance on a mandatory law of Australia then can – and do – use this to repel
the defendant’s attempts to transfer the matter overseas: see Garnett R, “The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Clauses in Australia”
(1998) 21 UNSW LJ 1 at 18.
32See Garnett R, “Stay of Proceedings in Australia – A Clearly Inappropriate Test?” (1999) 23 Melb Uni L Rev 30 at 64; Nygh
and Davies at [7.18]; and Justice Kirby of the High Court: see Regie National Des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR
491; 187 ALR 1 at 24.
33See Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 565.
34Garnett R, n 32, at 31.
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118cause of action under the TPA.
35 In Australia, then, the assertion of a TPA cause of action will mean
it is more likely that the stay will be refused and litigation will be permitted to continue in Australia.
Where proceedings are on foot in one country and the defendant has applied for a stay of those
proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds, a court in the second country is unlikely to get
involved on the basis of lis alibi pendens.
36 If the defendant does commence proceedings in the
second country, the defendant in that case (plaintiff in the ﬁrst country) can seek a stay in that foreign
action until the courts have played out the jurisdictional point in the ﬁrst country. If the case does have
a stronger connection with the ﬁrst country, then the forum non conveniens analysis should lead to the
stay in the second country in all but the most ﬁnely weighted cases.
37 However, this is where the
differences in tests between Australia and England might lead to an “unseemly clash of
jurisdictions”.
38 Although such a result might occur anyway, because of the judicial discretion in
weighing the factors to be considered, the differences in tests increases the likelihood of inconsistent
results. In the abstract at least, one would hope that respect between judicial authorities in different
countries, so-called “judicial comity”, would ensure that such a stay is granted in all but the most
difficult cases.
39
As between the European Union (EU) States, the likelihood of such an unseemly disagreement
between the courts has been reduced by the provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 (Brussels Convention).
40 It provides
that the ﬁrst court seized of the matter is left to resolve the jurisdiction point without interference from
any other court from which the other party has sought assistance, although this formulation has not
been free from criticism.
41
Applicable law
If it is unsuccessful in obtaining a stay on forum non conveniens grounds, the defendant may
nonetheless assert, as a matter of substance, that a foreign law, not the law of the forum court law, is
the proper law of the contract. Determining the proper law of the contract, where the intention of the
parties cannot be ascertained, is a question of establishing the country with the “closest and most real”
connection with the contract.
42 This would require pleading the foreign law and proving the law, and
its effect, at trial.
43 If the forum court concludes that the foreign law is the proper law of the contract,
then it will apply it – but unless the parties bring evidence as to the content of the foreign law, the
court will assume that the foreign law is the same as the forum law.
35Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418. Also see Garnett, “Australian Jurisdiction and Judgments
Law” (2004) 25 ABR 205 at 216 and Garnett, “Stay of Proceedings in Australia – A Clearly Inappropriate Test?” (1999) 23
Melb Univ L Rev 30 at 46-47 for a criticism of this ready capitulation to the plaintiff.
36Dicey and Morris, r 33 at 395.
37For instance, if the would-be plaintiff in England can establish that there is some personal or juridical advantage in the English
action only available in England and that is of such importance that it would cause injustice for him to be deprived of it: Dicey
and Morris at 395. We are assuming, in this section, that there are no contractual choice of law/jurisdiction clauses.
38Nygh and Davies at [7.18].
39One such extreme case involves just the scenario this paper considers – where one court claims its entitlement to hear a matter
based on application of its mandatory statute, and the other claims an entitlement based on a contractual clause agreed by the
parties. This is dealt with further in due course.
40See discussions at “Concept of Party Autonomy” in Pt I and “The Way Forward: a More Digestible Stew?” in Pt III of this
paper.
41Even where there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the second court, the second court must await the decision
of the ﬁrst court. Further, it has now been established by the European Court of Justice that the second court is not to issue an
anti-suit injunction where the Brussels Convention applies – Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101. No such restriction exists as
between an EU country and a country outside the EU, such as Australia.
42Dicey, Morris and Collins (14th ed, 32-005, p 1539). The EU Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
1980 (Rome Convention) refers to the country to which the contract is most closely connected: see Art 4.
43If the plaintiff was alleging a breach of s 74 of the Trade Practices Act, it can assert that the objective proper law is not
Australian law. That will mean it escapes from s 74 by reason of s 67. However, if the claim against it is based on s 52, this
argument will be of no assistance. If s 52 applies to the case (because there has been misleading or deceptive conduct either in
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119We move on now to see how the agreement to certain contractual terms can complicate this
default position. We will see that the key difference, where the parties have agreed on some relevant
express term, or there is a likelihood of a mandatory law applying to the facts, is that a court is much
more willing to get involved: making the “unseemly clash” a near certainty.
Important concepts in the debate – party choice and mandatory rules
There are two important “principles” at work when a dispute between parties includes a term of the
contract specifying a particular law or jurisdiction, or resolution by arbitration, but the effect of that
clause clashes with a statute upon which one of the parties wishes to rely. The ﬁrst principle is party
autonomy, the cornerstone of freedom of contract. The second important principle is the concept that
some rules (often in statutes) are to be regarded as being of such importance that the wishes of the
parties will be subservient to them. This is the principle of mandatory rules. Of particular relevance is
the reach of those rules beyond the territory of their own country, in circumstances where the subject
matter of the dispute is transnational.
Both of these principles are brieﬂy outlined below.
44
Concept of Party Autonomy
It is a critical premise of contract law that parties be free to enter arrangements as they wish and be
entitled to have their “legitimate expectations” of the bargain upheld by the courts. This is the concept
of party autonomy – or to put it another way, the “sanctity of the contractual bargain”,
45 which has had
a chequered history outside of Europe
46 and Anglo-Australian law
47 but
… has now almost universal support. It is the cornerstone of the Rome Convention
48 and the ALRC has
recommended that the parties’ right to choose the law governing their contract should be upheld.
49
Examples of the manifestation of party autonomy include clauses in the contract stipulating that:
• the law of a certain country is to apply to the contract (choice of law clause);
• litigation should take place in a particular country (exclusive jurisdiction clause); and/or
• the parties will submit any dispute to arbitration, usually with a stipulation as to where the
arbitration should take place (arbitration clause).
Commonly, a contract will contain more than one of these clauses – for instance, a choice of law
and arbitration clause, or a choice of law clause coupled with an exclusive jurisdiction clause. In
particular, the parties’ choice of law or jurisdiction can have a very real bearing on the outcome of a
dispute:
[such] clauses are inserted in international commercial contracts not simply for “neatness” and
“certainty” but also as an important function of transactional negotiation..[they] go to the value of the
contract in question to either party.
50
Australia or outside Australia but caught by the Trade Practices Act), the courts will impose s 52 even if the proper law of a
contract is other than Australian: Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160. The
defendant had better then prepare its defence to the s 52 claim based on its substantive provisions.
44Discussion in greater detail can be found in the authoritative texts in the area of conﬂict of laws as regards contractual
obligations – see, for instance, Dicey and Morris, Cheshire and North, Nygh and Davies, Nygh etc.
45Per Waller J in Phillip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd v Bamberger [1996] CLC 1757 at 1778.
46See discussion of Art 3 Rome Convention in Giuliano/Lagarde Report, available online at http://www.rome-convention.org/
instruments/i_rep_lagarde_en.htm viewed 5 December 2007.
47See Dicey Morris and Collins at 32-063 (p 1561) where it is explained that the United States will uphold party autonomy so
long as important policies of the law which would otherwise be applicable, are not avoided. This seems to suggest that
arguments based on mandatory laws otherwise applicable may fare better in the United States than in England, and is considered
further at “Mandatory Rules of a Third Closely Connected’ Country (Other Than the Forum or Chosen Law)” in Pt I of this
paper.
48European Union Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (Rome Convention).
49Nygh and Davies at 19.1.
50Bell A, n 7, at 57.
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120Generally the courts, both in Australia and abroad, are keen to keep the parties to their contract.
To do so aids certainty, and keeps down transaction costs. Further, Anglo-Australian law does not
require any connection between the territory of the contract and the chosen law or venue of litigation.
The choice of a “neutral” venue will be upheld by the courts.
51 Where the parties have actively
negotiated the clause, the courts talk of “keeping the parties to their bargain”. In the leading English
case of Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd
52 Lord Wright said:
Where there is an express statement by the parties of their intention to select the law of the contract, it
is difficult to see what qualiﬁcations are possible, provided the intention expressed is bone ﬁde and
legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public policy.
53
As already mentioned,
54 even if the clause has not been freely negotiated, but rather imposed by
one party upon the other, in a so-called “boilerplate provision” in standard set of terms and conditions,
the courts, particularly the English courts, will uphold the enforceability of the clause. What is more,
prior to the abolition of privity in England,
55 the English courts had developed doctrines
circumventing privity issues in order to allow a carrier to enforce such a term against third parties to
the contract – such as the doctrine of sub-bailment on terms, which was given new life in the Pioneer
Container case. The Privy Council held that the exclusive jurisdiction clause bound the cargo
claimants, despite the fact that they were not parties to the contract, because they had authorised the
contractual carrier to subcontract “on any terms”. Lord Goff, at the opening of the Council’s judgment,
set the tenor for what was to come:
[We] think it right to observe, at the outset, that in commercial terms it would be most inconvenient if
these two groups of plaintiffs were not so bound [by the exclusive jurisdiction clause]. Here is a ship
upon which goods are loaded in a large number of containers… one incident may affect goods owned
by several cargo owners, or even (as here) all the cargo owners with goods on board. Commonsense and
practical convenience combine to demand that all these claims should be dealt with in one jurisdiction,
in accordance with one system of law. If this cannot be achieved, there may be chaos…It is scarcely
surprising therefore that shipowners seek to impose an exclusive jurisdiction and an agreed governing
law, as in the present cl. 26 in the shipowners’ standard bill of lading. Within reason, such an attempt
must be regarded with a considerable degree of sympathy and understanding.
56
The cargo owners’ proceedings in Hong Kong were stayed, as there was not “sufficiently strong
grounds” to exercise the discretion to ignore the clause, and because they had not issued proceedings
in the contracted jurisdiction of Taiwan within time, their claims were time-barred.
Examined under the previous heading is the “default” situation where no clause as to
jurisdiction/choice of law or arbitration is inserted. We saw that if the defendant wishes to dispute the
plaintiff’s preferred forum then the issue becomes, on a jurisdictional point, whether the court in
which the plaintiff has commenced proceedings is forum non conveniens (using the different tests
adopted in Australia and England.) The onus is on the defendant, being the party bringing the
application, to “show cause” why the court ought to stay the proceedings before it. One relevant factor
will be where the parties have chosen a different law to apply. However, if the parties have included an
exclusive jurisdiction clause,
57 then the courts of Australia and England will uphold the contract and
51Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 at 290. The facts of the case are outlined in “Domestic
Mandatory Laws of a Foreign Country with Close Connection to the Contract vs Party Choice for Forum Court?” in Pt II of this
paper.
52Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 at 290.
53Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 at 290.
54See text accompanying nn 15-17 above.
55Privity was subsequently abolished in England by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, which has no equivalent
in Australia.
56The Pioneer Container; KH Enterprise [1994] 2 All ER 250 at 255. It is interesting to note that Lord Goff then goes on to
note the “technical problem” raised by the English privity of contract, and the ability of bailment to “circumvent this difficulty”.
England now has the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
57If the clause is non-exclusive, Garnett (above n 32, at 62) says that the general test of Voth is to be used, citing Contractors
Ltd v MTE Control Gear Ltd [1964] SASR 47.
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121issue appropriate relief – unless the party in breach can show “strong reasons”
58 as to why the court
should exercise its discretion not to uphold the contract. What constitutes “strong reasons” will be
discussed below in the context of exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Alternatively, where the parties have
agreed on arbitration of their disputes, then the typical effect of the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards entered into in New York 1958 (New York Convention) is to
compel courts of signatory States to stay legal proceedings before them in favour of arbitration as
contracted.
59
The party seeking to enforce the contractual term will either apply for a stay of the litigation in
breach of the contract, or will seek what has become known as an “anti-suit injunction” in the
jurisdiction speciﬁed in the contract. That injunction restrains the errant party from commencing
proceedings elsewhere in breach of either the exclusive jurisdiction clause or the arbitration
agreement.
60 If the litigation before the court itself has been commenced in breach, that court should
protect party autonomy by staying its own proceedings in favour of the contracted forum. There is an
important distinction between a court ordering a stay of proceedings, or an anti-suit injunction. A stay,
issued by a court over its own proceedings, is an “act of self denial”.
61 However, the anti-suit seeks to
control litigation in another jurisdiction, is an “act of self elevation in spite of another forum” on the
part of the court issuing the injunction.
62 For example, if the parties have agreed in their contract to
commence proceedings in England, but party A commences proceedings in Australia, an application
by party B to the Australian court will usually result in the Australian court ordering a stay of its own
proceedings. The English court is not imposed upon by the Australian court. However, if party B
chooses to enforce the contract in England, then the English courts will most likely issue an anti-suit
injunction – which does, at least indirectly, proclaim that the Australian court should not continue
albeit through attempting to control A’s behaviour.
63
While this represents the common law position in Australia and England, for England the
treatment of contractual clauses and jurisdictional disputes is subject to certain EU Conventions,
which will be outlined below.
Litigation contrary to exclusive jurisdiction clause
Tussles over jurisdiction have become more prevalent than choice of law arguments before the courts.
Securing as the venue the most beneﬁcial court (whether that beneﬁt comes in the form of the
procedural or substantive laws of the plaintiff’s preferred jurisdiction) can be viewed as so crucial that
parties will engage in signiﬁcant litigation to determine the point, leaving the substantive dispute to be
58In England, the authority is The Eleftheria [1970] p 94. In Australia, Huddart Parker Ltd v Mill Hill (1950) 81 CLR 502. See
Peel E, “Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements: Purity and Pragmatism in the Conﬂict of Laws” [1998] LMCLQ 182 at 190-200 for
a discussion of the various elements of the “strong reasons” test and his view that the English courts are less quick to grant a
stay of English proceedings in favour of a foreign arbitration clause than they are to grant an anti-suit injunction in favour of an
English arbitration clause: at 201. See, for example, Gaskell at 20.218 discussing the MC Pearl [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 566
where a Korean exclusive jurisdiction clause was not enforced.
59See discussion below at “The ‘Sting in the Tail’– Enforcement of Judgments, and Costs” in Pt I and “International Convention
Upholding Party Autonomy – What Effect Domestic Mandatory Law? The Exceptional Case of Arbitration Clauses” in Pt II of
this paper.
60The topic of anti-suit injunctions has excited academic commentary in this area of law. Apart from the major works on conﬂict
of laws listed at the outset of this paper, see: Bell A and Gleeson J, “The Anti-suit Injunction” (1997) 71 ALJ 955; Elliot M,
“The Anti-suit Injunction: A Review of its Development and Application in Australia and Abroad” (2000) 28 ABLR 405;
Gross P, “Anti Suit Injunctions and Arbitration” (2005) LMCLQ 10; Males S, “Comity and Anti-Suit Injunctions” (1998)
LMCLQ 543. There is also a raft of papers dealing with the position of anti-suit injunctions in EU law.
61Whincop and Keyes at 151-152 (Whincorp).
62Whincorp, n 61.
63The anti-suit injunction is a crucial element in this debate and is discussed further throughout this paper. The English courts
have continually stressed that an anti-suit injunction does not impinge upon the autonomy of a foreign court and is no way
binding upon it, given that the order acts only against the plaintiff in the foreign proceedings. The indirect effect can nevertheless
not be doubted.
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122dealt with a long time in the future
64 – or not at all. A US study has shown that the jurisdictional battle
can be one from which the plaintiff never recovers, so that it effectively decides the outcome of the
case.
65
Proceedings brought in breach of exclusive jurisdiction clause should be stayed unless there are
“strong reasons”
Where there is no (or no effective
66) exclusive jurisdiction
67 clause, the forum non conveniens test
as outlined above applies, with some variation, in Australia and England.
68 However, there is a
different test where the parties have agreed to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.
[The test is] of a different order from that required in a case where the plaintiff has simply chosen to sue in
one form rather than another, both being available to him
69
Where proceedings have been brought in a non-contractual forum in breach of such a clause, then the
court should stay the proceedings
70 in order for it to be commenced or continued in the contracted
forum, in the absence of “strong cause” to the contrary.
71 The basis of the test was outlined by
Brandon J in The Eleftheria:
The principles established by the authorities can, I think, be summarized as follows: (1) Where plaintiffs
sue in England in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign Court, and the defendants apply
for a stay, the English Court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the jurisdiction, is not bound to
grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not. (2) The discretion should be exercised by
granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing so is shown. (3) The burden of proving such strong
cause is on the plaintiffs. (4) In exercising its discretion the Court should take into account all the
circumstances of the particular case. (5) In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following
matters, where they arise, may be properly regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of
fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense
of trial as between the English and foreign Courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign Court applies and,
if so whether it differs from English law in any material respects. (c) With what country either party is
connected, and how closely. (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or
are only seeking procedural advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue
64See, for example, the Akai litigation, and OT Africa litigation discussed in Pt II of this paper.
65Force R and Davies M, n 17, pp 8-10.
66One basis upon which an exclusive jurisdiction clause can be attacked is by alleging there was no consent to it. The issue of
consent to the terms of a bill of lading in the hands of the consignor is dealt with by common law: Leduc & Co v Ward (1888)
20 QBD 475, Pyrene v Scindia [1954] 2 QB 402 and the position of the consignee/indorsee has been neatly sewn up in
Anglo-Australian law by legislation: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (UK); Sea Carriage Documents Acts in all Australian
States and Territories. However, in other countries, the requirement of consent to such a clause is a very real stumbling block to
its enforcement. For an explanation of this, and a survey of American and European attitudes to the validity of such clauses, see
Yackee JW, “A Matter of Good Form: the (Downsized) Hague Judgments Convention and Conditions of Formal Validity for the
Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements” [2003] 53 Duke LJ 1178. See also Tetley WT, “Jurisdiction Clauses and Forum
Non Conveniens in the Carriage of Goods by Sea” published in Davies M (ed), Jurisdiction and Forum Selection Clauses in
International Maritime Law–Essays in Honor of Robert Force, (Kluwer Law International, 2005), available online at pp 11-16
http://www.mcgill.ca/ﬁles/maritimelaw/jurisdiction.pdf viewed 17 October 2007. Another attack can be made on the basis that
the exclusive jurisdiction clause was not properly incorporated into the contract because it was not contained in the bill of
lading itself – this is often the case when a bill of lading seeks to incorporate underlying charterparty terms: see Heilbrunn v
Lightwood PLC [2007] FCA 1518; for the United States position, see Force R and Davies M, n 17, p 27; and the discussion in
Dicey, Morris and Collins at 12-098–099.
67The English courts do not require the word “exclusive” to be present in order to determine that it is indeed an exclusive
jurisdiction clause: see Steel J, “The Modern Maritime Judge – Policeman or Salesman” (2003) 17 MLAANZ J 6 at 15,
referring to Sohio Supply Company v Gatoil (USA) Inc [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 588.
68For a summary of the position as regards the treatment of exclusive jurisdiction clauses in other countries, see Peel E, n 58,
at 212.
69Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 per Brennan J at 230-231.
70In the United States, the usual order is a dismissal. Martin Davies argues that in fact stays should be sought in that jurisdiction
so that the staying court retains a residual jurisdiction. See Davies M, “Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Cases” (2003) 27
Tul Mar LJ 367 at 382.
71The Eleftheria [1970] p 94.
Maritime law and the TPA as a “mandatory statute” in Australia and England
(2008) 36 ABLR 6 15 ©
123in the foreign Court because they would (i) be deprived of security for that claim; (ii) be unable to
enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in England; or (iv) for
political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial.
72
The “strong cause” or “strong reasons” test has been pronounced time and again in the English
courts
73 and adopted in Australia.
74 In England there are critics of the test, because it is felt that in fact
too much discretion can be given to the court to ﬁnd a reason to ignore the party’s choice. It is said
that the test invites overturning the exclusive jurisdiction clause on grounds that would have been
known to the parties at the time of contracting.
75 Bell and Peel say that court should disregard factors
to the extent that parties would have known of them at time of contracting.
In England, the courts have on only rare occasions ignored an exclusive jurisdiction clause in
favour of a foreign court, where it considers “strong reasons” have been made out.
76 Almost
invariably, the factor that seems to tip the balance in favour of overlooking the clause is the necessary
involvement in the litigation of strangers to the contract. Being strangers to the contract, they cannot
be compelled to appear in the contracted forum, and this means there is a likelihood of parallel
proceedings in different countries. As the courts have an overall interest in effective justice between
the parties to the litigation and prefer all the issues in dispute to be resolved in one place, the
involvement of these other parties in related litigation properly brought in a foreign court can
constitute strong reasons militating in favour of a stay.
77 However, in England, the fact that the
plaintiff’s action is time-barred in the contracted jurisdiction usually does not constitute “strong
reasons” of itself, because failure to protect the time bar by commencing proceedings in the forum
court is typically seen as unreasonable on the part of the plaintiff.
78
Australian courts have historically been more likely to ﬁnd “strong reasons” exist, with the result
that the plaintiff in Australia is permitted to continue its Australian litigation in breach of the exclusive
jurisdiction clause.
79 This can be said to be consistent with the “homeward” trend exhibited by the
High Court in Voth. However, in more recent times the Australian courts have been more rigorous in
upholding the exclusive jurisdiction clause.
80 In any event, both the Australian and English courts
have been subject to criticism on the grounds of parochialism.
81
Proceedings can be brought in the stipulated forum to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction clause –
anti-suit injunctions.
72The Eleftheria [1970] p 94, at 100.
73The Eleftheria [1970] p 94; Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425.
74Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 per Brennan J, at 259 per Gaudron J and adopted by
numerous cases since.
75See Peel E, n 58; Bell A, n 7, at 67.
76For a relatively recent example, see Bouygues Offshore SA v Caspian Shipping Co [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 461 in which the
English Court of Appeal chose to discharge an anti-suit injunction preventing litigation in South Africa in breach of an exclusive
jurisdiction clause favouring England. The “strong reasons” made out were the necessary involvement of another party not
bound by the contract, the proper founding of jurisdiction by the South African Courts as a result of the presence and arrest of
the vessel, and the fact that the natural seat of the dispute was South Africa. The court made this ﬁnding despite the fact that the
limitation regime in England would be more favourable to the defendants than that applicable in South Africa, although decrees
had been made as to the defendant’s maximum limitation and the limitation proceedings themselves were not stayed. It was for
the South African courts to decide whether or not that decree would be applied: see the judgment of Sir John Knox at [474-475].
See also the article which Evans J referred to in his judgment.in Peel E, n 58.
77Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425; see particularly the cases cited by Lord Bingham at 433-434. The Donohue
case was relied upon in the Australian case of Intec Ltd v Alkimos Shipping Corp; Incitec Ltd v Alkimos Shipping Corp (2004)
206 ALR 558 (Allsop J, FCA) In that case, the court decided not to enforce an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of English
courts by granting a stay of Australian proceedings because of the involvement of third parties in local proceedings and
consequent fragmentation which would occur if the stay was granted.
78The Pioneer Container; KH Enterprise [1994] 2 All ER 250.
79See Garnett R, n 31; also Keyes M, Jurisdiction in International Litigation (Federation, 2005) at 159-177.
80Garnett R, n 31 at 7; 15; 19.
81See n 58 for criticisms of English decisions; Garnett R, n 31 and Keyes M, n 79 for criticisms of Australian decisions.
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124The wronged party will increasingly turn to the courts in the jurisdiction stipulated in the contract
seeking an enforcement order, termed an anti-suit injunction, to prevent a breach of contract that
would occur if the other party commenced proceedings elsewhere than the agreed forum. The English
courts, particularly in recent times, have been strident in the protection of the contracts entered that
have selected England as their forum, even if it might mean treading on the jurisdictional toes of
another country. The modern attitude to granting anti-suit injunctions was stated by Millett LJ in The
Angelic Grace:
The time has come to lay aside the ritual incantation that this is a jurisdiction which should only be
exercised sparingly and with great caution. There have been many statements of great authority warning
of the danger of giving an appearance of undue interference with the proceedings of a foreign Court.
Such sensitivity to the feelings of a foreign Court has much to commend it where the injunction is
sought on the ground of forum non conveniens or on the general ground that the foreign proceedings are
vexatious or oppressive but where no breach of contract is involved…. But in my judgment there is no
good reason for diffidence in granting an injunction to restrain foreign proceedings on the clear and
simple ground that the defendant has promised not to bring them.
82 (emphasis added)
Initial hesitancy on the part of the English Court of Appeal
83 and some conﬂict of laws scholars
84
about this more strident approach has been overcome by the House of Lords, with two recent cases
citing The Angelic Grace with approval.
85 Australian courts have also embraced The Angelic Grace.
86
The English courts are not prepared to await the ﬁnding of the foreign court as to whether they have
jurisdiction, for fear that they make what the English court considers to be the wrong decision, and
that the interference would be greater at that point should the English courts then try to reclaim
jurisdiction.
87 In other words, better a pre-emptive anti-suit, which heads off the errant party at the
pass, than a messy wrestle between courts in different countries.
88
The rise and rise of the anti-suit injunction since then is well documented
89 as are the
protestations from courts issuing them that they are not intending to interfere with the sovereignty of
the foreign court, but merely restrain the party from commencing or continuing foreign proceedings in
breach of its bargain.
90 However, this has only led to the development of the anti-anti-suit injunction,
and even the anti-anti-anti-suit injunction
91 as each court attempts to prevent what it perceives as an
82Per Millett LJ, The “Angelic Grace” [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 at 96. Millett LJ went on to say, “I see no difference in
principle between an injunction to restrain proceedings in breach of an arbitration clause and one to restrain proceedings in
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause” (at 98). However, the latter has more likelihood of interference with the machinations
of a foreign court, while the former does not.
83See PASF v Bamberger [1996] CLC 1757 at 1789-1790. See also the discussion on this point by Males S, n 60, at 548.
84Briggs A, “Anti-Suit Injunctions in A Complex World” (Ch 12) in Rose F (ed), Lex Mercatoria: Essays on Commercial Law
in Honour of Francis Reynolds (LLP, 2000) p 238. See also the discussion by Peel E, n 58.
85Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425; West Tankers Inc (Respondents) v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA
(Appellants) [2007] UKHL 4 (The “Front Comor”). However, in the latter case, despite their Lordships’ view that the English
approach was justiﬁed, the House of Lords felt compelled to submit to the European Court of Justice the question as to whether
the use of an anti-suit injunction to prevent breach of arbitration agreement was consistent with the Brussels Convention. As at
the time of writing, that case is pending.
86CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 146 ALR 402; Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd
[2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457.
87See Males S, n 60 at 549.
88For an example, see the OT Africa litigation discussed in Pt II of this paper.
89For example, see Peel E, n 58; Gross P, n 60; Dickenson A, “A Charter for Tactical Litigation in Europe?” (2004) LMCLQ
273; Ambrose C, “Can Anti-Suit Injunctions Survive European Community Law?” (2003) 52 ICLQ 401; Blobel F and Spath P,
“The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the European Law of Civil Procedure” (2005) 30(4) EL Rev 528; Williams H, “Anti-suit
Injunctions: A Damp Squib or Another Shot in the Maritime Locker? Reﬂections on Turner v Grovit” (2006) 20 ANZ Mar LJ 4.
See also general conﬂict of laws texts such as Dicey and Morris, Cheshire and North.
90See Ambrose C, n 89, at 408, citing Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425.
91Williams J, n 89, p 5.
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125abuse of its own jurisdiction. This has led one commentator to muse that there is in theory, no end to
the anti-suit,
92 and another to refer to the battle of the “duelling anti-suits”.
93
Consternation, particularly in Europe,
94 about the question of exclusive jurisdiction clauses led to
various multilateral attempts to standardise courts’ approaches to exclusive jurisdiction clauses.
95 In
EU countries, the effect of the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I) and its successor, the Brussels Regulation
96
is that the ﬁrst country seized of the matter is required to consider and decide on jurisdiction, and any
other court must stay its own proceedings until the ﬁrst court has decided, and then respect that
decision. This is a more civilian notion, excising the degree of discretion to which the English courts
are accustomed. English courts initially took the view that they were not prevented by Brussels I from
issuing anti-suits to prevent litigation in other EU States in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled otherwise in the case of Turner v Grovit.
97 The ECJ stated
that concept of “mutual trust” underpins the jurisdictional framework of Brussels I and that concept is
paramount.
98 However, Australian lawyers should note that, as Brussels I and Brussels Regulation
only bind EU States, English courts are free to issue anti-suit injunctions against defendants in non-
EU countries such as Australia according to common law principles of conﬂict of laws.
99
Litigation in different country than choice of law clause
Parties will often elect which law shall apply to their agreement. The effect of mandatory laws on
choice of law provisions will be considered later, but absent such a law, an express choice of law will
be enforced by a court in England
100 and Australia.
101 This is also the effect of the EU Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (Rome Convention), which an English court will
apply to any proceedings before it. Under the Rome Convention, a contract shall be governed by the
law chosen by the parties.
102
Usually such a clause is coupled with an exclusive jurisdiction clause as well, but in some cases
the contract will be silent as to forum. A party may then elect to commence proceedings in a court
with jurisdiction over the matter according to the usual procedural rules of that Court.
103 If the chosen
law is different to that of the forum court, the defendant may decide to bring an application for a stay
alleging that the more appropriate court would be the court that naturally applies the chosen law. In
other words, that if there is an express choice that German law be applicable to the contract, then the
case would generally be better heard in the German court rather than an Australian or English court.
92Briggs A, n 84, p 220.
93Hawke F, “The Innocents Abroad” (2006) 17 ILJ 18 at 33.
94Civil law countries do not seem to have a procedural equivalent to the anti-suit injunction – see Spigelman CJ, n 24 at 324
quoting Kessedjian C, “Dispute Resolution in a Complex Society” (2005) 29 MULR 765 at fn 134.
95For a comprehensive explanation of the impact of EU jurisdictional conventions on maritime law, see Gaskell at 20C.1.
96Council Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels Regulation). The Regulation has introduced important changes particularly for
enforcement of judgments throughout EU member states. See Blobel F and Spath P, n 89, at 530.
97Art 6.
98Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101 at [24]-[26], [28] as cited in Blobel F and Spath P, n 89, at 529.
99Dickenson A, n 89, at fn 5.
100Dicey, Morris and Collins at [32R -061] r 203.
101Nygh and Davies at [19.2].
102Art 3.1. The Rome Convention applies to neither jurisdiction clauses nor arbitration clauses. Arbitration clauses are subject to
the New York Convention. See also Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (2005 Convention) discussed in
Pt III of this paper.
103For examples of circumstances where proceedings can be commenced when the defendant is not based in the jurisdiction, see
English Rules of Court CPR Pt 6.20, and O 11 of the former Rules of the Supreme Court; O 11 of the Rules of Supreme Court
(WA); Rules of Supreme Court (Vic) and Federal Court Rules at O 8, r 2. Of particular note is the ground allowing service
where the parties have agreed for the forum to be the court in question.
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126This is a forum non conveniens argument,
104 and the parties’ express choice of law will be one of the
factors likely to sway the court towards granting a stay in favour of a court that exercises the law
chosen by the parties.
105 Another relevant factor will be where the foreign court may apply its own
public policy to defeat a claim based on a contract. As we will see, this was a relevant factor in the
English decision in Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (Akai).
106
Depending on the weight of the other factors, the choice of law clause does not guarantee a stay
in a court other than the chosen country. If the court does not stay the proceedings, the action will
proceed in that court. In this context, the Australian and English courts will accept evidence as to the
effect of foreign law.
107 If none is presented, there is a presumption that the foreign law will be the
same as the law of the forum.
108 In other words, it is for the litigants and their lawyers to plead and
present evidence of the effect of the foreign law that they agree applies in the case. If the foreign law
is repugnant to the forum court, then it will, as a matter of its own public policy, ignore that law.
109
Litigation despite agreement to arbitrate
The most predictable outcome of dispute concerning court jurisdiction is where the plaintiff has
commenced proceedings in breach of a submission to arbitration.
110 Both Australia and England have
enacted provisions giving effect to the New York Convention. The New York Convention has been
broadly accepted, and ensures countries and their courts enforce the parties’ agreement to arbitrate
their disputes. For example, s 7(2) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (IAA), which gives
effect to the New York Convention, states:
7 Enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements
(1) …
111
(2) Subject to this Part, where:
(a) proceedings instituted by a party to an arbitration agreement to which this section applies
against another party to the agreement are pending in a court; and
(b) the proceedings involve the determination of a matter that, in pursuance of the agreement, is
capable of settlement by arbitration; on the application of a party to the agreement, the court
shall, by order, upon such conditions (if any) as it thinks ﬁt, stay the proceedings or so much
of the proceedings as involves the determination of that matter, as the case may be, and refer
the parties to arbitration in respect of that matter.
104Which has been outlined above at text accompanying n 29.
105Spiliada Maritime Corp v Consulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460. This is also the case with tort cases, to which s 52 claims might
be more akin. For instance, in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538, four justices of the HCA stated “in
deciding whether it has been established that the chosen forum is clearly inappropriate, the extent to which the law of the forum
is applicable in resolving the rights and liabilities of the parties is a material consideration” (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 566; as
quoted by Callinan J in Regie National Des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; 187 ALR 1, at 55.
106Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90. See discussion in Pt II of this paper.
107Dicey, Morris and Collins at [9-001] Rule 18; Nygh and Davies at 325-327.
108Dicey, et al, n 107.
109This is explained further in “Mandatory Rules of the Forum” in Pt I of this paper.
110Although historically the courts viewed arbitration clauses with suspicion, they now uphold the right of the parties to choose
alternative dispute resolution: see Allsop J, “International Commercial Law, Maritime Law and Dispute Resolution: The Place
of Australia, New Zealand and the Asia Paciﬁc Region in the Coming Years” (2007) 21 ANZ Mar LJ 1 at 10.
111Where:
(a) the procedure in relation to arbitration under an arbitration agreement is governed, whether by virtue of the express terms
of the agreement or otherwise, by the law of a Convention country;
(b) the procedure in relation to arbitration under an arbitration agreement is governed, whether by virtue of the express terms
of the agreement or otherwise, by the law of a country not being Australia or a Convention country, and a party to the
agreement is Australia or a State or person who was, at the time when the agreement was made, domiciled or ordinarily
resident in Australia;
(c) a party to an arbitration agreement is the Government of a Convention country or of part of a Convention country or the
Government of a territory of a Convention country, being a territory to which the Convention extends; or
(d) a party to an arbitration agreement is a person who was, at the time when the agreement was made, domiciled or ordinarily
resident in a country that is a Convention country; this section applies to the agreement.
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127(3) Where a court makes an order under subsection (2), it may, for the purpose of preserving the rights
of the parties, make such interim or supplementary orders as it thinks ﬁt in relation to any property
that is the subject of the matter to which the ﬁrst-mentioned order relates.
(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), a reference to a party includes a reference to a person
claiming through or under a party.
(5) A court shall not make an order under subsection (2) if the court ﬁnds that the arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
The English equivalent is s 9 Arbitration Act 1996 (UK):
9 Stay of legal proceedings
(1) A party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal proceedings are brought (whether by way
of claim or counterclaim) in respect of a matter which under the agreement is to be referred to
arbitration may (upon notice to the other parties to the proceedings) apply to the court in which the
proceedings have been brought to stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter.
(2) …
(3) …
(4) On an application under this section the court shall grant a stay unless satisﬁed that the arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.
(5) …
Parties are regarded as free to choose the law applicable to the arbitration clause as well as the
law applicable to the agreement as a whole.
112 However, in an assessment of an application for a stay,
the forum court will determine the right to a stay based on its own law. Signiﬁcantly, the English
provision does not give an express right to the court to impose conditions on the stay of litigation,
while the Australian provision does.
Therefore, the court will stay proceedings if a party to an arbitration agreement seeks such an
order and the matter falls within the equivalent to s 7(2). Further, if litigation is commenced in a
different country in breach of the arbitration clause, the courts of the stipulated seat of arbitration may
issue an anti-suit injunction to keep the errant party to their contract – although this is a product of
common law, because the New York Convention gives no right to issue such relief. As arbitration is
excluded from the ambit of the Brussels Convention and Brussels Regulation, the English Courts may
do so even if the proceedings have been issued in an EU Member State – although there is currently
a case pending before the European Court of Justice as to whether the English approach is correct.
113
In determining whether it should stay proceedings, typical questions involve whether the
arbitration clause is broad enough in scope to cover the precise dispute between the parties. This is
sometimes called the “engagement issue” – namely, has s 7(2) been engaged so as to lead to a stay.
114
For some time the approach of the courts to contracts containing an arbitration clause, both in
England
115 and Australia,
116 was dogged by semantic arguments over the proper construction to be
given to arbitration clauses chosen by the parties. In this regard, pre-contractual representations have
been contentious, with the courts analysing closely the breadth of expressions such as “arising under”
112See Nygh at 76.
113See West Tankers Inc (Respondents) v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA (Appellants) [2007] UKHL 4. Neil Brown QC
suggests that the limitations placed on the English Courts by Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101 have led to an increase in
arbitration clauses rather than exclusive jurisdiction clauses, because the English Courts’ ability to enforce those clauses with
anti-suit injunctions remains intact in common law. See Arbitration: Anti-Suit Injunctions to Restrain Foreign Court
Proceedings in Breach of an Arbitration Agreement p 5, http://www.arbitrators.org.au/asset/Arbitration-Anti-suit-injunction-
casenote.pdf viewed 27 November 2007. He discusses Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Limited v
New India Assurance Association Company Limited (2004) EWCA Civ. 1598. See also the commentary on that case by Dicey,
Morris and Collins at 16-091, p 748.
114See Allsop J in Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 (unreported) at [88].
115For a detailed discussion of principle by an English court, see the widely cited case of Ethiopian Oilseeds & Pulses Export
Corp v Rio del Mar Foods Inc [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 86. Approved by Gleeson CJ in Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin
Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160 at 165 and by Allsop J in Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc
Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 (unreported) at 9.
116See Kiukiang Career litigation outlined in Pt II of this paper.
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128or “arising out of” the agreement, to determine if they were intended to capture pre- contractual
representations. In Australia, pre-contractual representations are fertile ground for s 52 claims and as
such TPA claims have brought new focus to these discussions regarding the scope of the arbitration
clause.
However, in very recent times, calls have been made in Australia for an end to such semantics:
A liberal approach … ought to be taken [to interpreting an arbitration clause] without any policy
attempting to restrict their scope. That is not to say that all arbitration clauses should be given an
identically broad meaning. The parties… are free to choose such language as they wish. A liberal
interpretation of words with an elastic meaning does not entitled one to give the words in question
meaning they do not bear… This liberal approach can be seen as underpinned by the following
consideration. The courts will presume that the parties did not intend the inconvenience of having
possible disputes from their transaction being heard in two places.
117
This “liberal approach” has been embraced by the House of Lords in the recent case of Premium
Nafta Products Limited v Fili Shipping Company Ltd [2007] UKHL 40:
The distinctions [between wordings of different clauses] reﬂect no credit upon English commercial
law…the time has come to draw a line under the authorities to date and make a fresh start… the
construction of an arbitration clause should start from the assumption that the parties are likely to have
intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered …to be decided by the
same tribunal. The clause should be construed in accordance with this presumption unless the language
makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.
118
This area has not been free from judicial disagreement in the past,
119 but, subject to the mandate
of the High Court (about which one can be fairly certain, but is never guaranteed), the new liberal
approach to interpreting arbitration clauses, casting aside semantic analysis, will be cemented in
Anglo-Australian law.
120
The “sting in the tail” – enforcement of judgments, and costs
Anti-suit injunctions have already been outlined above as a tool (some say weapon
121) available to a
court looking to keep a party to its contract to litigate before that court, or to arbitrate.
122 However,
anti-suit injunctions will not always be granted in those circumstances. As some cases show,
sometimes it is inappropriate to do so; usually because of the necessary involvement of strangers to
the contract in the litigation, which is proceeding in a place that, absent the contract, would have been
an appropriate forum.
123
Apart from anti-suit injunctions there are other methods by which the courts enforce the parties’
agreement. First, the English courts have made it clear they will use costs, and awards of damages, to
117Allsop J in Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 (unreported) at [41]–[42],
citing cases in support of these propositions at [43].
118Lord Hoffman at [12], with whom the other Law Lords agreed.
119See, for example, the criticism of the Kiukiang Career contained in Allsop J’s judgment in Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett
AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 (unreported) at [68]. Allsop J regarded “arising out of” and “arising from” as
being the same in effect, and as a result considered himself bound by the Full Court decision in Kiukiang Career. That case had
decided upon what Justice Allsop considered to be a narrow interpretation of the words “arising from”. The effect of the Full
Court decision in Kiukiang Career, and consequently in Walter Rau, was that the pre-contractual representation claims founded
on s 52 were regarded as outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. This aspect of the decision in Kiukiang Career was
ﬁnally overturned by Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457
which is discussed in Pt II of this paper.
120There has been the occasional hiccup while the lower courts adjust to this new approach. For an example, see Clough
Engineering Ltd v Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd [2007] FCA 881 (unreported, Gilmour J) One should note, however, that
the decision was made on an ex parte application for injunctive relief as well as leave to serve proceedings out of the
jurisdiction.
121Gross P, n 60 at 26.
122See discussion at “Litigation Contrary to Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause” in Pt I of this paper.
123For example, Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425 (HL); Bouygues Offshore SA v Caspian Shipping Co [1998]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 461 (CA).
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129compensate those parties forced to litigate contrary to their contracts. As such, the court will grant the
innocent party costs of the anti-suit injunction or stay application on an indemnity basis.
124 The
English courts also recognise the entitlement of the innocent party to damages for breach of contract
as a result of litigation other than in accordance with the contract.
125 Further, the party may be entitled
to damages even if the court in its preferred jurisdiction has refused an anti-suit injunction because of
the legitimate involvement of strangers to the contract in the foreign litigation.
126
Secondly, the courts can refuse to enforce a foreign judgment obtained in breach of contract. Both
Australia and England have entered into a reciprocal arrangement for the recognition of foreign
judgments and have agreed to enforce those judgments in their own territories subject to certain
conditions. Section 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (UK) allows the English
courts to refuse to recognise a judgment obtained contrary to an agreement under which the dispute
was to be settled somewhere other than the judgment country. A similar provision is found in s 7(4) of
the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth). The clear policy is to counteract systems of law that disregard
arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clauses. If the plaintiff wishes to enforce judgment obtained in
Australia against English assets despite a contractual clause to either arbitrate or submit to English
courts, this will be a major difficulty that may render the judgment hollow.
Party autonomy – conclusion
The Australian and English approach to party autonomy is very similar. Both countries seek to uphold
party choice. Both countries are willing to uphold that choice by the issuing of anti-suit injunctions
against the errant party; England is permitted to do so where the other court involved is outside the
EU. If the errant party nevertheless proceeds in the other forum, the English courts may well grant
indemnity costs against it.
127 The English courts are also willing, at least in theory, to hold that party
liable for damages for breach of contract; even if the court has agreed that there are “strong reasons”
not to uphold the jurisdiction clause.
128 Further, if the errant party has ignored an exclusive
jurisdiction clause or arbitration clause, but needs to enforce that judgment in England or Australia, it
may ﬁnd that the courts will refuse to recognise the judgment under the reciprocity of judgments
provisions.
129
Concept of Mandatory Rules
The law applicable to a particular contract will be determined according to the express terms of the
contract, or absent that, by a court locating the place that has the “closest and most real connection” to
the contract.
130 Once the law applicable has been determined, then that is the law that is applied by the
forum court. Therefore, if the court in country A determines that the laws of country B are in fact the
proper law of the contract then it will apply the law of country B.
However, even if country B’s laws apply, the courts in country A may still be obliged to override
B’s laws and supplant their own law, where their law makes it clear that this is what is required. Laws
that do so are termed mandatory rules.
131
In domestic contract law there are now two very different sorts of rules. There are the traditional rules which
are concerned with settling disputes between parties, such as the rules on consideration. Then there are the
124A v B [2007] EWHC 54 (Comm); Westminster Bank plc v Rabobank Nederland (No 3) [2007] EWHC 1742 (Comm).
Contrast C v D [2007] EWCA Civ 1282 where there was no breach of contract.
125Dicey Morris and Collins at 12-142.
126See discussion in House of Lords in Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425, at [36].
127A v B [2007] EWHC 54 (Comm).
128Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425 (HL) at [36] and[48], although the point was conceded by counsel.
129Assuming that the other litigation took place outside the European Union.
130Bonython v Commonwealth [1951] AC 201 at 219 per Lord Simons.
131There are mandatory rules covering a whole raft of legal issues, from human rights, to money laundering and racketeering,
but our discussion is limited to those relevant to commercial contracts.
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130more modern rules which are concerned with protecting some group of persons or the national economic
system – rules that arise as the result of state interference with contracts. The concept of mandatory rules
only deals with this second class of rules….
132
A state’s interest in upholding protectionist laws may be so strong that it prohibits the parties from
contracting out of such rules in a domestic situation. Going beyond this and into the realms of private
international law, the State’s interest in upholding certain laws may dictate that those laws must apply even
though the issue is, in principle, governed by a different law selected by contract choice of law rules. An
exception to the normal choice of law rules is therefore created…. In English law [it] is called an overriding
statute ie the statute overrides normal choice of law rules so as to apply the rules in the statute.
133
Mandatory rules need not be encapsulated in statutes, but they are increasingly so. Statutes intended to
be of mandatory status usually indicate their intent to take effect regardless of the proper law of the
contract using one of a number of different drafting methods.
134 As a result, the court may have to
apply a law despite the fact that the proper law of the contract, determined using the traditional
analysis, is not the law of the mandatory rule. In that way, mandatory rules skew the traditional choice
of law analysis. Those mandatory rules encapsulated in statutes perhaps have a worse effect: it is
difficult for legislative drafters to anticipate every situation and draft a clear provision accordingly.
135
Despite academic criticisms of such provisions
136 and the complications posed by interpreting their
intended effect,
137 they exist; and the courts and parties are placed in the difficult situation of having to
deal with them.
In transnational litigation there are usually two or more countries which can legitimately claim
that the dispute falls within their territory. The multifaceted nature of a court’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction makes this the case. Undoubtedly, the laws of the two (or more) countries are different,
both procedurally and substantively. One of the countries might have a mandatory rule that would
have applied had the proceedings been instituted in that jurisdiction. However, the litigation is
commenced in the other jurisdiction that also has a legitimate jurisdictional entitlement to adjudicate
the dispute. If both parties are content to avoid the mandatory rule in question, then the forum court
will never be troubled by the question of the foreign mandatory rule. That is because of the useful and
pragmatic presumption already discussed, that the forum court will assume foreign law is identical to
local law. Indeed, nor will the other country be troubled because its jurisdiction was never triggered by
the issuing of proceedings in that country. In that sense then, it is possible to avoid a mandatory law of
another country – where both parties wish to do so.
138
More troublesome is the situation where one party wishes to rely on the mandatory law of country
B in the litigation taking place in country A. Practical and conceptual difficulties arise in this situation.
Each country expects its own laws to be respected by the parties when they are operating within that
132Cheshire and North at 576.
133Cheshire and North, n 132.
134See Dicey and Morris (14th ed) at 1-036.Academic commentary often categorises various types of mandatory rules contained
in statutes – although, regrettably, without necessarily agreeing on categorisation or terminology. See Dicey and Morris (14th ed)
at [1-036] at n 5.
135Kelly D, Localising Rules in the Conﬂict of Laws (Woodley Press, 1974) at 125 citing criticisms of the involvement of
legislative interference in conﬂict of laws by Unger (“Use and Abuse of Statutes in the Conﬂict of Laws” (1967) 83 LQR 427
at 444) where Unger refers to such provisions as “parasitic”, and Morris (“The Choice of Law Clause into Statutes” (1946) 62
LQR 170 at 172) who says “confusion is bound to result unless clear distinction is maintained between domestic rules and
conﬂict rules…”.
136See n 138; also see Whincop and Keyes Chs 3 and 4, Nygh Ch 9, Keyes M, Jurisdiction in International Litigation
(Federation, 2005) Chs 3-5.
137For instance, some commentators refer to “domestically mandatory statutes” as opposed to “internationally mandatory
statutes”. The former category includes those statutes that cannot be excluded by a contractual provision in a domestic setting,
but are subject to normal rules of private international law; whereas the latter category of statutes is intended to be so important
that they will apply “whatever the law otherwise applicable to the contract”. See Hartley T, “Mandatory Rules in International
Contracts: The Common Law Approach” (1998) Recueil des Cours, Academie de Droit International de la Haye 266 at
348-349; Tetley at 100.
138Whincop and Keyes at 52.
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131jurisdiction, but can one party simply avoid the operation of such a law by commencing proceedings
in another jurisdiction? What, if any, consideration should the forum state give to the mandatory laws
of another country? If consideration should be given to a foreign country’s laws – how and in what
circumstances should this occur? As any review of the English and European academic commentary
will show, this is a vexed question, with some for
139 and many against
140 the broad recognition of
foreign mandatory laws.
141 Furthermore, there is debate about what, if any, methodology of
recognition could or should be adopted.
142 The adoption of conﬂict of laws rules in statutes remains a
quagmire, interfering as they do with the relatively ordered principles of conﬂict of laws.
What makes a law mandatory is an expression of policy which overrides bilateralism and, in effect, denies
it… it is unilateralism triumphant.
143
In Anglo-Australian law at least, it would seem that the concept of mandatory laws has traditionally
been more a preoccupation with the application of the forum’s own laws as overriding any choice of
law of the parties,
144 rather than a consideration of the mandatory rules of another country altogether.
However, the English and Australian courts have had to consider whether and in what circumstances
they will take into account the mandatory rules of a country that is neither the forum country nor
represents the proper law of the contract. The application of mandatory rules in each of these three
situations is different as is outlined below. In this regard, as we shall see, the Rome Convention is
relevant, as an EU Convention
145 that seeks to standardise the treatment of choice of law provisions in
contracts. There are several provisions concerning mandatory rules within the Rome Convention. It is
of universal application to conﬂict matters appearing before any court in a contracting State and is
therefore relevant to an Australian party appearing in the English Courts. However, its effect is
restricted only to assessing the proper law, rather than the effect of an exclusive jurisdiction or
arbitration clause.
146
Mandatory Rules of the forum
A court in country A is bound to enforce the (internationally)
147 mandatory rules of country A, even if
it has concluded that the proper law of the contract is that of country B.
The basic principle that some forum laws can override the law otherwise applicable, in English
law at least, appears to have grown from an exception to the party autonomy principle enunciated in
1939 in the famous Vita Foods case. It was held in that case that the parties’ choice of law should be
given effect provided it was “bona ﬁde, legal and not contrary to public policy”
148 namely – the public
139Hartley T, n 137, Giuliano-Lagarde Report, at fn 173, Chong A, “The Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries
in International Contracts” (2006) 2 J Priv Int L 27 at 28; Greene J, “Party Autonomy in Choice of Law in Contract: Through
the Lens of Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Company” (1997) 25 ABLR 330.
140See authorities cited in nn 134-136, also Dickenson A, “Third Country Mandatory Rules in the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations: So Long, Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu?” (2007) J Priv Int L 53 at 59-60, 85.
141As opposed to a form of recognition on narrow grounds, such as when the law of the place of performance renders the
contract illegal: see “Mandatory Rules of a Third ‘Closely Connected’ Country (Other Than the Forum or Chosen Law)” in Pt I
of this paper. See also Chong A, n 139, at 33-34.
142See Dickenson A, n 140. Necessarily only a broad overview of the complex issues posed by mandatory statutes can be raised
here. For more, see authorities cited in Chong A, n 139, at 28, fn 9.
143Nygh at 202.
144In some European courts, the principle is applied without apparent distinction, to enforce either local or foreign mandatory
laws: ALRC Rep 8.28. However, if one looks at Dicey and Morris (11th ed), the main discussion of mandatory rules concerns
the imposition of English overriding statutes on transnational litigation in England: see pp 21-25.
145A full discourse on the Convention, and its effect on English law, is beyond the scope of this paper.
146The question of proper law is of course relevant to a discussion as to forum, because it is one of the factors in the forum non
conveniens test.
147See n 137.
148Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277, per Lord Wright, delivering the judgment of the Privy
Council. For a summary of the criticisms of the Vita Foods case, see Tetley W, “Vita Food Products Revisited (Which Parts of
the Decision are Good Law Today?)” (1992) 37 McG L J 292.
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132policy of the law of the forum court. The idea of public policy was used to ensure rejection of an
objectionable foreign law – for example, a country permitting the sale of slaves – or to apply local law
where concepts of justice had been disregarded – for instance, when the parties had, by contract,
attempted to evade the mandatory law of the forum.
149 It is, in a sense, the ultimate escape clause – if
the court concludes a foreign law applies, but is discontented with that result due to a clash of that law
with some fundamental principle, it can refuse to apply the foreign law to the extent of the
repugnancy.
150
This public policy can be exempliﬁed in statute form, where the statute makes it clear that it bears
that nature. Where a statute embodies public policy, the courts will not allow parties to contract out of
it.
151 One of the main reasons it does so is because “otherwise the intention of the legislature to
regulate certain commercial matters could be frustrated if it were open to the parties to choose some
foreign law to govern their contract.”
152 Therefore, once triggered, the forum will apply the mandatory
law of their territory, and disregard the law chosen by the parties to the extent of any inconsistency.
153
A commonly cited example is The Hollandia [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1. The dispute concerned a
shipment loaded in Scotland. The carrier sought to stay proceedings brought in England in breach of
the exclusive jurisdiction clause favouring Amsterdam. The bill of lading stipulated that the law of the
Netherlands applied to the contract. A lower limitation amount would have applied to the cargo claim
in Amsterdam, as the Netherlands had not yet enacted the Hague Visby Rules. The House of Lords
applied English laws enacting the Hague Visby Rules, because those Rules are a mandatory law of
England that cannot be ousted by a contractual clause to the contrary, and that applied mandatorily
because the shipment was from a Scottish port.
154 The court held the exclusive jurisdiction clause
constituted a clause lessening liability under those Rules, and was to be treated as null and void as
required by Art III Rule 8. In rejecting the carrier’s argument that the exclusive jurisdiction clause fell
outside Art III Rule 8, Lord Diplock said:
To ascribe to it the narrow meaning…would leave it open to any shipowner to evade the provisions of
Article III Rule 8 by the simple device of inserting in his bills of lading… a clause in standard form for
resolution of disputes in what might aptly be described as a Court of convenience, viz one situated in a
country which did not apply the Hague Visby Rules.
155
The Hollandia is an example of the principle that if they are applicable, mandatory rules of a
particular State will be enforced by that State within their own territory.
156 Australian examples are the
149See Cheshire at 583.
150Chong argues (n 139, at 34-35) that the public policy of the forum can also operate positively where it recognises a foreign
law rendering performance of a contract in that country as being illegal, saying that this constitutes an indirect application of
foreign mandatory law under the guise of applying English public policy. However, she notes that the line of cases used to
support the argument is likely to have been overruled by the Rome Convention, and in any event is distinguishable from the types
of rules the subject of this paper. Other commentators view the same cases as being an application of English public policy rather
than conformance with foreign mandatory statutes: See Dickenson A, n 140, at 78-81. For our purposes, it is important to note
that the commercial Acts being discussed in this paper, such as Trade Practices Act, Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and
Insurance Contracts Act, do not render performance of contracts illegal.
151For an oft-cited Australian example, see Golden Acres Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd [1969] Qd R 378.
152Dicey Morris and Collins at 1-053.
153If a forum court ﬁnds that a mandatory rule of that forum is applicable, then it does not alter the proper law of the contract.
Instead, the mandatory law will override the chosen law, to the extent necessary. See Gleeson CJ in Francis Travel Marketing
Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160 (NSWCA) at 164.
154This would also be the effect underArt 7(2) because the mandatory law of the forum (England) would override the mandatory
foreign law (eg Australia’s Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.)
155The Hollandia [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at 7.
156Had the exclusive jurisdiction clause been for a country that had enacted the Hague Visby Rules, then it would not have
offended Art III, r 8. Presumably that other jurisdiction would have applied Art X to establish that the shipment, from a
contracting state, was one to which the Hague Visby Rules applied. Similarly, if the shipment was one to which the Hague Visby
Rules were not mandatorily applicable, then the court would not impose the Hague Visby Rules: See Hellenic Steel Co v
Svolamar Shipping Co Ltd (Komninos S) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 541.
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133ICA, COGSA and TPA. Although each operates slightly differently,
157 each is regarded as being a
mandatory rule of the Australian forum that overrides any law otherwise applicable.
The Rome Convention
158 recognises the power of the forum to override the proper law of the
contract in Art 7(2):
Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a
situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract.
Mandatory Rules of the Proper Law of the Contract
A forum court will apply foreign law if it is established to be the proper law of the contract.
159 Clearly
part of that bundle of foreign law includes any mandatory laws of that forum. Thus, if an English court
held that Australian law was the proper law of the contract, it would apply Australian law such as the
TPA or ICA.
160 However, as seen under the previous heading, the forum court would retain the right
to override the effect of these laws as a result of the general principle of conﬂict of laws that courts
will not apply any foreign law if and insofar as its application would lead to results contrary to the
fundamental principles of public policy of the forum.
161 That public policy could be exempliﬁed by its
own mandatory statute, or it could be as a result of general public policy. What is the public policy of
one country can be the opposite of that in another country. For instance it might be the public policy
of one country that an insurer be entitled to rely on its right to avoid the contract in the case of
misrepresentation, while another country may have a public policy determined to minimise the
insurer’s rights in that regard. Thus if either court concludes that the law of the other country applies,
it will be placed in a difficult position of assessing whether to override the policy of that country with
its own public policy. This highlights the importance of forum non conveniens applications and that
appropriate weight be given to the importance of a local court deciding issues of local law.
Mandatory Rules of a Third “Closely Connected” Country (Other than the Forum or Chosen
Law)
Foreign mandatory laws will not be applied in England unless they are part of the proper law of the
contract;
162 at least, not directly.
163 Historically, this attitude can be seen as a natural consequence of
the principle of territoriality.
164 States are competent under international law to regulate persons and
157Contrast the provisions of s 54 of the Insurance Contracts Act, s 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, s 67 of the Trade
Practices Act (applicable to, amongst other provisions, s 74 of the Trade Practices Act) with the silent but imputed mandatory
nature of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act. See also Opeskin B, “The Use of Choice of Law Rules in Statutes Affecting Contracts:
A Note on the Insurance Contracts Act 1984” (1996) 10 J Con L 231 at 238 for a comparison of the terminology used in s 54
of the Insurance Contracts Act and s 67 of the Trade Practices Act.
158European Union Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (Rome Convention).
159Either at common law, or in England, pursuant to the provisions of the Rome Convention.
160Although it is accepted that a foreign court will not be as familiar with that foreign law and errors are more likely: Whincop
and Keyes, Policy & Pragmatism in the Conﬂict of Laws (Ashgate, 2001) pp 28, 41.
161Dicey and Morris, p 1226. See also Tetley, Ch 5 where the so-called “public order” reservation is discussed in the context of
the laws of various countries.
162Of the few English cases where the courts appear to apply or recognise foreign laws, the foreign laws criminalised acts that
constituted performance. There are the occasional hints, by some judges, that they might be willing to recognise a foreign
legislative provision on a contract by virtue of the comity of nations: Al Battani [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 219 at 214 as cited by
Davies M, n 28. This decision seems out of step with the tide of recent English authority and perhaps it can be better
summarised as saying that the English courts will recognise it where it gives assistance to their conclusion that England should
have jurisdiction – as was the case in Al Battani. There the Judge held that as the exclusive jurisdiction clause was void in
Egyptian law, “there is no reason why as a matter of comity this court should enforce this contractual clause.” (at 224). The
Judge did not say he would have enforced the clause – rather that the judge was of the view he did not have to consider it. To
that extent, Al Battani should not be relied upon as supporting the view that the English judiciary will take into account the
statutes of other countries as a matter of comity.
163See Chong, Dickenson at n 150 above.
164See Nygh P, “The Territorial Origin of English Private International Law” (1964) 2 U Tas L Rev 28, as cited in Tilbury
Davis and Opeskin at pp 307-308.
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134activities within their territory, and its citizens wherever they may be, but it has no right to impose its
laws on other states or insist that they be applied by foreign judges.
165
The English position is encapsulated in the eminent commentary of Dicey and Morris:
Where [mandatory] legislation is part of the law of the forum it applies because it is interpreted as
applying to all cases within its scope. Where the legislation is part of the applicable law it will be
applied, subject to English public policy, in accordance with the normal rules. Where the legislation is
neither legislation of the forum nor of the applicable law, it has no application in England.
166
In continental Europe, the recognition of foreign mandatory rules is still controversial
167 but
Nygh says that there is “considerable support in principle for some recognition of the mandatory rules
of third States”, although the support “is far from universal”.
168 European scholars have argued that
the social purpose or function of a mandatory rule may, if it is important enough, constitute a ground
for its application internationally, even if it is neither the proper law nor the law of the forum,
169
particularly where the rule exists in the place of performance of the contract.
170 While outside the
parameters of this paper, it is interesting to note that the US position is similarly adaptable to foreign
mandatory law; the Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws the chosen law will be applied to the
contract unless:
the application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which
has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.
171
When the EU decided to standardise treatment of choice of law in contracts to avoid forum
shopping, this continental inﬂuence led to Art 7(1) of the Rome Convention, which recognises that a
court could apply foreign mandatory laws in certain circumstances.
172
Article 7 Mandatory rules
1. When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules
of the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under
the law of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In
considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and
purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.
165Dickenson A, n 140, at 74-75. See though the distinction made by Chong between public policy in statute as opposed to
general public policy: Chong A, n 139, at 68.
166Dicey and Morris, 14th ed. at [1-055].
167Lando O and Nielsen P, “The Rome I Proposal” (2007) 3(1) J Priv Int L 29 at 45.
168Nygh at 222. For example, Germany will apply foreign public laws that have a “special connection” with the contract: Chong
A, n 139, at 42.
169See Hartley T, “Mandatory Rules in International Contracts: the Common Law Approach” 341 at 356-358 where he
discusses in particular the work of Professor M I De Winter; and the cases of The Alnati [1977] Ned. Jur. No 3, 16. See also the
Giuliano/Lagarde Report found at http://www.rome-convention.org/instruments/i_rep_lagarde_en.htm, viewed 5 December
2007, which discusses the law of various European countries in this regard.
170Particularly where the law of place of performance renders the performance of the contract illegal: See Chong A, n 139, at
46; 61-70.
171See Dickenson A at 71-72 for a discussion of s 187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of the Conﬂict of Laws (US), which
would apply in the other major commercial dispute resolution centre of New York. While that section disarms parties’ choice of
law, it does so only in favour of the otherwise applicable law.
172Mandatory Rules are also referred to in other parts of the Rome Convention, but are of limited effect. For example, Art 3
prevents derogation from a mandatory law of a country where all other relevant elements are connected to that country. In
international matters this will not be the case.
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135Art 7(1) was unacceptable to England and seven other countries, who exercised their right to “opt
out”.
173 The provision was criticised for being too uncertain in its effect.
According to European commentators,
174 there have been no reported cases on Art 7(1) – perhaps
this is, as they say, because the parties have recognised the applicability of the foreign laws, or
because actions were unreported. Alternatively, perhaps Art 7(1) has proved to be a toothless tiger
because of the number of reservations, or that it is too vague to apply. In any event, there are plans to
replace the Rome Convention with an EU Regulation (Rome Regulation). As there is no concept of
reservations in European regulations, the UK has refused to agree to the Rome Regulation, citing its
concerns about the new Art 8.3; and at the time of writing it is unclear what the fate of Art 8.3 will
be.
175
The history of Art 7(1) is a clear illustration of English intransigence on the question of
recognising foreign mandatory laws and the supremacy of party autonomy in that country. The Rome
Convention, being the outcome of compromise within the EU, probably represents the “high water
mark” of likely English acceptance of foreign mandatory laws – which is, in actual fact, a refusal to
accept them as relevant to the law applicable to the contract.
176
It has been suggested in literature and case law on the continent that the forum may take account of foreign
mandatory rules even if they do not form part of the applicable law. This suggestion is reﬂected in Article 7
[of what is now known as the Rome Convention]. That this provision is contrary to the English approach is
evidenced by the fact that the United Kingdom exercised its right of reservation to Article 7(1) when it
signed the Convention.
177
There is nothing to suggest that the current state of the law in Australia is any more receptive to
foreign mandatory law than that in England.
178 In its Report on Choice of Law, the Australian Law
Reform Commission (ALRC) was critical of this stance and by majority
179 proposed developing an
exception to party autonomy based on the mandatory laws of the place of most real and substantial
connection.
180 The ALRC proposed that Australia recognise and apply the mandatory laws of that
country which is indicated as the objective proper law of the contract.
181 While the ALRC proposal
has some similarity with the Rome Convention Art 7
182, it is less discretionary in nature, and perhaps
more similar to the approach taken in the US as outlined above. The proposal, like the Report itself,
has been left to wither on the vine.
173Lando and Nielsen at p 45 cites Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Portugal, Latvia, Slovenia and Ireland.
However, as Dickenson notes, much depends on the wording of the reservation by each country – in some cases, this is not
necessarily a statement that the courts will not apply Art 7, merely that they are not are entitled not to do so. See s 2(2)
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 (UK).
174Lando O and Nielsen P, n 167, at 46.
175Lando O and Nielsen P, n 167, at 46.
176Tellingly, the UK Government stated that: “[Art 8.3] introduces an unacceptable degree of legal uncertainty. In addition to
increased legal costs and litigation, it could lead to the loss to other jurisdictions, probably New York, of signiﬁcant volumes of
international contract business such as commercial and governmental securitisations”: as cited by Dickenson A, n 140, at 53.
177Dicey and Morris (14th ed) at [1-055].
178See Nygh and Davies at 19.7 at 366. The ALRC report recommended that Australia apply the proper objective law of the
contract, and if that is a foreign law which includes a mandatory law, then that mandatory law ought to apply. As already noted,
the recommendations of the ALRC report have not been taken up.
179Nygh J dissented, holding the view that the only way Australian courts should protect the mandatory laws of a foreign
country should be by treaty. See Ch 8, fn 52.
180Ironically, while that was not the position of the initial Rome Convention, the proposals for change in the EU Regulation
(Rome Regulation) seemed to have adopted a similar test – for criticisms of the proposed Art 8(3) as compared to Art 7, see
Dickenson A, n 140.
181See ALRC Rep No 58 at 8.35-8.36 and cl 9(8) of the proposed Uniform State and Territory Choice of Law Bill 1992.
182Although the Rome Convention goes on to stipulate the presumption that the contract will be most closely connected with the
law of the country in which the party who is required to perform the characteristic obligation of the contract has his habitual
residence.
Lewins
(2008) 36 ABLR 6 28 ©
136In summary, England will apply foreign law only if it is the proper law of the contract, and even
then, always subject to its own public policy (of which mandatory statutes form a part) to override that
foreign law to the extent it is abhorrent to its public policy. In this regard, England, parts from the
majority of EU countries who may recognise foreign mandatory laws according to the provisions of
the Rome Convention. Despite attempts to change Australian law so as to recognise foreign mandatory
statutes in certain circumstances, the Australian position appears to remain closer to the English
position at common law.
Conclusion – Part 1
The primary jurisdiction of choice for maritime contracts is the UK. If there is an express provision in
the contract, it is more than likely that it will stipulate English law. Australian litigants who comply
with their contract terms who might want to rely on TPA will then ﬁnd themselves in a forum that
does not favour the enforcement of mandatory laws of a third State over the parties’ choice. Therefore,
the most likely outcome is that the action will be decided without reference to the TPA.
For that reason, a party who wishes to rely on a mandatory law will do their best to improve their
chances by commencing proceedings in the place bound to apply the mandatory law (for our purposes,
Australia), so that the application of that mandatory law to the substance of the dispute is beyond
question – at least once the court has accepted that the mandatory law does, of its terms, apply.
Conversely, a party who wishes to retain the advantage of the initial bargain will be doing everything
to avoid an Australian court. This will include applying for a stay of the Australian proceedings, or
seeking the aid of the court initially chosen by the parties to enforce the contract against the errant
party by anti-suit injunction.
In this context, the battle to establish forum is critical.
In the next part we will look at the TPA as a mandatory rule and its effect on the parties’ scramble
to establish jurisdiction in their preferred court.
PART II
Relevant provisions of the TPA - a summary
This section provides an outline of the relevant provisions of the TPA, dealing with the main
substantive provisions and the related provisions concerning extraterritoriality and contracting out.
Section 52 – Misleading or Deceptive Conduct
For those involved in international carriage, the most relevant provision
183 is s 52.
184 It reads:
TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 – S 52
Misleading or deceptive conduct
S 52(1) A Corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or
deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.
This is a “comprehensive provision of wide impact… (which) establishes a norm of conduct.”
185
It has ﬂourished as the cause of action of choice in almost all commercial disputes in Australia,
nurtured by its supporting provisions in the Act and brought to ﬂower by the judiciary charged to give
effect to its revolutionary nature.
186 For instance, it contains none of the limitations of privity of
183Although one should also bear in mind the potential of Pt IVA, the unconscionable conduct provisions of the Trade Practices
Act, which can also apply to business, but fall outside the scope of this paper.
184For greater detail on this provision and the overall scheme of the Trade Practices Act in its effect speciﬁcally to maritime
contracts, see Lewins K, “Corporate Morality and Commercial Maritime Contracts: Considering the impact of s 52 of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (Australia) on Carriage of Goods by Sea” (2004) LMCLQ (UK) 197; also Lewins K, “The Cruise Ship
Industry – Liabilities to Passengers for Breach of s 52 and s 74 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)” (2004) 18 MLAANZ J 30. Also
see more generally, the various texts on Trade Practices Act and s 52 such as Miller.
185Miller, p 526.
186For example, it was not always clear that s 52 would apply in private business contracts – but it is now entrenched in that
context. See n 1 above.
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137contract; as an alternative to a tort claim, in a cargo claim scenario, there is no requirement that of
ownership or immediate entitlement to possession of goods at the time of the loss or damage;
187 intent
to mislead or deceive is not necessary;
188 and the effect of exemption clauses will depend on the
facts.
189 Nevertheless, it is not without boundaries.
190
The TPA applies to corporations that are Australian trading corporations, or foreign corporations
registered as such in Australia,
191 and will apply to their conduct outside of Australia.
192 However, it
can also apply to a corporation who is not necessarily registered in Australia if it is “carrying on
business in Australia.”
193 If it is carrying on business in Australia, then its conduct outside of Australia
will be caught by the Act
194 and actionable in Australian litigation.
The TPA can also extend to the overseas conduct of corporations, either Australian or foreign
corporations “carrying on business within Australia”.
195 This is known as the extraterritorial
application of the Act. For example, a carrier considered to be “carrying on business in Australia”
might be subject to a breach of s 52 for a clean bill of lading issued overseas but intended for an
Australian consignee, if that bill of lading ought to have been claused.
196 Reliance on extraterritorial
conduct in legal proceedings requires ministerial consent.
197
In addition, an overseas party can be caught by the provisions of s 52 by communications
received in Australia. For example, representations as to the cargoworthiness of a vessel made by a
shipowner to a potential charterer based in Australia could also be caught by s 52 if the representations
were received in Australia, by way of fax, email or telephone.
198 This is not by operation of any
extraterritorial application (even though it might look that way), but rather because the conduct that
triggers the application of the Act has occurred in Australia. Although the cause of action under s 52
is not based in tort,
199 but is rather an entirely separate and statutory cause of action, for the purposes
187Cf Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd, (The Aliakmon) [1986] 2 All ER 145.
188Fox J in Brown v Jam Factory Pty Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 340 at 348, as quoted in Miller at [1.52.5].
189There was a time when exclusions and disclaimers were given no effect, but in 2004 the High Court decided that such clauses
are to be considered as part of the conduct as a whole in order to determine whether the representation was misleading or
deceptive. See Butcher v Lachlan Elder Reality Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592.
190See articles in n 184.
191Section 4 of the Trade Practices Act. Equivalent provisions in State law will apply to individuals: see, for example, Fair
Trading Act of (WA).
192Section 5 of the Trade Practices Act.
193See Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 507, where the judge concluded that
Hyundai was not carrying on business in Australia, despite the fact that vessels it controlled were using Australian ports to load
and discharge cargoes for Australian interests, with whom Hyundai had contracted. Further, the Plaintiff had failed to obtain the
requisite ministerial consent entitling it to rely on extraterritorial conduct pursuant to s 5 of the Trade Practices Act.
194Section 5 of the Trade Practices Act.
195See Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 507, at 521 for a narrow interpretation of
this term in a carriage context and Lewins K, “Corporate Morality and Commercial Maritime Contracts: Considering the impact
of s 52 of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (Australia) on Carriage of Goods by Sea.” n 184, at p 202 for a discussion of this
aspect of the case.
196Roughly, the factual scenario that occurred in the Hyundai case.
197Which is to be given in all but narrow circumstances: see s 5(3). As Nygh and Davies note at [22.13], no such equivalent
requirement exists in the State Fair Trading Acts.
198Assuming the fax or email was sent to Australia, or the phone call was made with one party being present in Australia: see
ACCC v Hughes [2002] FCA 270 as cited in Miller at [1.5.10], Bray v F Hoffman –La Roche Ltd (2002) 190 ALR 1. In a
maritime context, see Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd v The Ship “Comandate” (No 2) [2006] FCA 1112 per Rares J at [101].
The Act can also apply to individuals who breach the Trade Practices Act while using telephonic services: see Smolongov v
O’Brien (1982) 67 FLR 311 and other authorities outlined in Miller at [1.6.30].
199Williams v Society of Lloyd’s [1994] 1 VR 274, as cited in Nygh and Davies (7th ed) at [22.13], p 426.
Lewins
(2008) 36 ABLR 6 30 ©
138of assessing where the “conduct” has taken place the same rules are applied as for foreign torts.
200 As
such, depending on the facts, the conduct may have taken place in Australia or overseas. Therefore,
where the “conduct” is received in Australia, then the law of the place of the wrong is Australia and
the Trade Practices Act applies. If the conduct is entirely overseas but captured by the extraterritorial
provisions of the TPA, then ministerial consent is required to rely upon that conduct as a breach of
s 52.
201 In either case, if the conduct is caught by the localising provisions
202 of the TPA, an
Australian court will apply s 52 even if the parties have chosen English law to apply to their
contract.
203
There is no general express provision that forbids contracting out of s 52 and its related
provisions. This is in contrast to s 74, which is outlined below. However, the attitude of the courts has
been that once the circumstances fall within s 52 because of conduct in Australia, or overseas by a
party caught by the Act, then the Act is triggered.
204 The parties cannot agree for a different law to
apply because this would defeat the purpose of the Act.
205
Section 74 – Exercise Due Care and Skill in Contract for Services
Section 74 is the other provision of the TPA likely to be of relevance in some maritime matters.
Unlike s 52, this section only attaches to contracts. This section reads:
TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 – S 74
Warranties in relation to the supply of services
(1) In every contract for the supply by a corporation in the course of a business of services to a
consumer there is an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with due care and skill
and that any materials supplied in connexion with those services will be reasonably ﬁt for the
purpose for which they are supplied….
(2) … [warranty of ﬁtness for purpose of materials supplied with services]
(3) A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that are, or are to be,
provided, granted or conferred under:
(a) a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the purposes of a
business, trade, profession or occupation carried on or engaged in by the person for whom the
goods are transported or stored;
(b) ….
(emphasis added)
The effect of the warranty in s 74(1) is to impose into a contract for services a warranty that due
care and skill will be taken in carrying out those services. It is less revolutionary than s 52 because it
draws more on common law concepts, and a breach of it is to be contested as a breach of contract
rather than a breach of statute.
206 Due to the fact that any contract for services under the prescribed
amount, currently $40,000, constitutes a contract with a “consumer” to which s 74 applies
207, this
warranty is imposed on many more modest commercial contracts in Australia.
Section 74(3) means that ordinary contracts of carriage, such as charterparties or bill of lading
contracts, will not be caught by the implied warranty. The warranty does apply to the carriage of
200Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 507 at 518-520 per Sheppard J as cited in Nygh
and Davies at [22.13].
201Hunter Grain Pty Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 507 at 520-521.
202An expression coined by Kelly D, n 135.
203Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160.
204Although the cases show that a disclaimer of the truth of representations, if brought to the attention of the other party, may
make it difficult for the requisite reliance on the statement to be made out: see Miller 1.52.75
205Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160, at 164.
206See Miller 1.74.5.
207The deﬁnition of consumer is contained in s 4 of the Trade Practices Act.
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139passengers.
208 The current law seems to be that s 74 will apply to other ancillary maritime contracts
such as towage,
209 and ship repairs,
210 although there have been no cases yet on whether cargo and
ship inspection contracts might fall within s 74(3).
211
This warranty is technically non-excludable as a result of s 68,
212 but liability can be limited so
long as the limitation clause complies with the provisions of 68A of the TPA.
213 Those corporations
who work within the framework of s 68A ﬁnd that they can effectively limit their liability to the
amount of the contract – namely, a relatively insigniﬁcant amount.
214
In contrast to s 52, s 74 does have an express provision dealing with choice of laws:
S 67 Conﬂict of laws
Where:
208Although it is excludable in relation to recreational services – see the discussion of liability of cruise ship operators to
passengers in Lewins K, “The Cruise Ship Industry – Liabilities to Passengers for Breach of s 52 and s 74 Trade Practices Act
1974 (Cth)” n 184.
209Helman J in PNSL Berhad v Dalrymple Marine Services Pty Ltd; PNSL Berhad v The Owners of the Ship “Koumala” [2007]
QSC 101 (19 April 2007), which has recently been upheld on appeal: [2007] QCA 429 (30 November 2007).
210Pondcil Pty Ltd v Tropical Reef Shipyard Pty Ltd (1991) FCA (unreported, Cooper J, 15 July 1994) is distinguishable
because while s 74 was applied to the contract for ship repairs, it concerned a passenger vessel.
211However, see the decision of Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 68. (FCAFC) where
the Court said, as obiter, that it did not consider a contract for pilotage would fall within the s 74(3) exception: at p 118 (as cited
by Helman J in PNSL Berhad v Dalrymple Marine Services Pty Ltd; PNSL Berhad v The Owners of the Ship “Koumala” [2007]
QSC 101, at [49]).
212Section 68
Application of provisions not to be excluded or modiﬁed
(1) Any term of a contract (including a term that is not set out in the contract but is incorporated in the contract by another
term of the contract) that purports to exclude, restrict or modify or has the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying:
(a) the application of all or any of the provisions of this Division;
(b) the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision;
(c) any liability of the corporation for breach of a condition or warranty implied by such a provision; or
(d) the application of s 75A;
is void.
(2) A term of a contract shall not be taken to exclude, restrict or modify the application of a provision of this Division or the
application of s 75A unless the term does so expressly or is inconsistent with that provision or section.
213Section 68A
Limitation of liability for breach of certain conditions or warranties
(1) Subject to this section, a term of a contract for the supply by a corporation of goods or services other than goods or
services of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption is not void under s 68 by
reason only that the term limits the liability of the corporation for a breach of a condition or warranty (other than a
condition or warranty implied by s 69) to:
(a) in the case of goods …
(b) in the case of services:
(i) the supplying of the services again; or
(ii) the payment of the cost of having the services supplied again.
Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a term of a contract if the person to whom the goods or services were supplied
establishes that it is not fair or reasonable for the corporation to rely on that term of the contract.
In the case of an arms length, freely negotiated commercial contract, it would not be difficult to secure compliance with the
requirements of s 68A. Simply incorporating into the contract a clause limiting liability to the cost of the services rendered
should, in most cases be sufficient – the “fair and reasonable” test will be unlikely to pose difficulties in a maritime context. As
a result of Qantas v Aravco (1996) 185 CLR 43; 136 ALR 510 (HC), it is arguable that an indemnity clause will not offend
s 68A although the writer has cautioned elsewhere about placing too much reliance on the case: see Lewins K, “What’s the
Trade Practices Act Got To Do With It? Section 74 and Towage Contracts in Australia” (2006) 13(1) Mur UEJL 58 at 71.
214The biggest risk for a corporation is to fail to take full advantage of s 68A so as to expose oneself to full liability. See
discussion on this point at Lewins K, “What’s the Trade Practices Act Got To Do With It? Section 74 and Towage Contracts in
Australia”, n 213, at 70-72.
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140(a) the proper law of a contract for the supply by a corporation of goods or services to a consumer
would, but for a term that it should be the law of some other country or a term to the like effect, be
the law of any part of Australia; or
(b) a contract for the supply by a corporation of goods or services to a consumer contains a term that
purports to substitute, or has the effect of substituting, provisions of the law of some other country
or of a State or Territory for all or any of the provisions of this Division;
this Division applies to the contract notwithstanding that term.
As a result of s 67, an Australian court will perform an analysis as to the objective proper law –
namely which country has the closest and most real connection. Importantly, s 67 does not apply to
s 52, which is contained in a different Division of the TPA.
215
Disputes about the extraterritorial reach of s 74 are less common in maritime matters. Mostly
these services will be provided by Australian corporations or individuals in Australia’s territory and
therefore litigation in Australia may be a more natural consequence. However, an Australian Court
would hold that it is possible for s 74 to apply to services provided overseas if there is a sufficient
substantial connection with Australia such to render Australian law as the objective proper law of the
contract. In that way, if a contract for towage is entered in Australia between an Australian towage
operator and a vessel owned and managed overseas, proceedings in Australia might allege a breach of
s 74 if the task was undertaken without due care and skill. Once it is established that Australian law
applies, the existence of a choice of law or exclusive jurisdiction clause could be disregarded by an
Australian court under s 67.
216 Perhaps contracts likely to fall within s 74 are less formalised than
their carriage counterparts, such that one might be less likely to ﬁnd the existence of a choice of
law/jurisdiction or arbitration clause in their terms.
217
TPA as mandatory law
The TPA is regarded as public policy of “central importance”… to the regulation of commercial life
and commerce in Australia.
218 Therefore, the TPA provisions join with the ICA and COGSA as
mandatory laws that the Australian courts will enforce over and above any preference as to law
displayed by the parties themselves.
219 As has been stated:
If it were otherwise, the provisions of the statute could easily be circumvented.
220
As Kirby P (as he then was) said in the context of similar
221 provisions in the ICA:
Notions of freedoms of contract and principles of private international law, important though they are,
must give way to a right of Parliament within power to make laws overriding such norms within its
215That seems to be because s 52 is intended to apply even if the proper law is that of a different country: See Gleeson CJ in
Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160, at 164. In the terminology of Mann F
“Statutes and the Conﬂict of Laws” (1972-1973) 46 British Yearbook of International Law 117. It could be said that s 52
operates as a self-limiting or localised provision because it is only triggered in certain circumstances and can only apply once a
conﬂict of laws analysis concludes that the law of Australia applies (at 123).
216This is an example of how an overseas shipowner might beneﬁt from a Trade Practices Act cause of action.
217If there were such a clause, then the party seeking to uphold the contract could itself call upon the contractual forum court
to issue an anti-suit against the party seeking to sue in Australia. As the party wishing to rely on the Trade Practices Act in a
maritime services case is likely to be the shipowner, in this situation the usual position of the parties would be reversed: the
Australian towage company would be seeking the assistance of the English court to enforce the contract, and the shipowner
would be seeking to rely on the Trade Practices Act to keep proceedings in Australia.
218Allsop J in Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; at [195].
219See Tilbury, Davis & Opeskin p 866, 869; Mortensen at 15.46–15.49, ALRC Report on Choice of Law at 8.14, 8.27.
220Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160, at 164 per Gleeson CJ. At that point
Gleeson CJ was the Chief Justice of the NSWSC; in 1998 he was appointed Chief Justice of the HCA.
221The provisions are of a similar intent but perhaps less clearly worded. Section 8 provides as follows:
(1) Subject to s 9, the application of this Act extends to contracts of insurance and proposed contracts of insurance the proper
law of which is or would be the law of a State or the law of a Territory in which this Act applies or to which this Act
extends.
(2) For the purposes of subs (1), where the proper law of a contract or proposed contract would, but for an express provision
to the contrary included or to be included in the contract or in some other contract, be the law of a State or of a Territory
in which this Act applies or to which this Act extends, then, notwithstanding that provision, the proper law of the contract
is the law of that State or Territory.
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141jurisdiction. Contract law has often been the subject of regulation by the legislature. When a statute
exists with a clear policy to prevent circumventory expedients, the common law principles of contract
or conﬂict of laws must be modiﬁed.
222
(emphasis added)
Similar statements have been made in the context of s 11(2) of COGSA, which renders of “no
effect” agreements that purport to preclude or limit the jurisdiction of an Australian court in relation to
inward or outward shipments.
223 However, as we shall see, even within Australia and at the highest
level,
224 there is dissent and disquiet about taking such a robust attitude toward Australian mandatory
laws. It is at least arguable that such statutes are only intended to have domestic mandatory effect,
225
and that it was not intended to be applied in a foreign court unless Australian law is the proper law of
the contract.
So to sum up, the main provisions of the TPA that have something to say about applicability of
the Act are s 67 and 68; but the substantive provisions of s 51 and 74 are the ones that the parties will
be seeking to impose or deﬂect, as the case may be. Certainly the courts’ interpretations of the
provisions in a broad fashion, as is appropriate for a remedial statute, have contributed to its reach.
226
The Australian statute is drafted in such a way that it expects to have some impact, some relevance,
even when there is an overseas connection – an extraterritorial element. However, the method or
process by which the application of the Act is determined will be different depending on which
provision is relied upon. Section 52, for instance, is unaccompanied by a statutory provision making
clear its mandatory nature. The courts have concluded that it will apply regardless of the proper law of
the contract – it will not oust the proper law, but will override it where inconsistent.
227 But s 74 does
have the beneﬁt of an accompanying provision – s 67 – which ensures it will only apply if the
objective proper law is found to be that of Australia.
The Attitude of the Courts to Party Autonomy vs Mandatory Rules During the
Skirmish for Jurisdiction – Cases
Contemporary practice respecting transnational litigation suggests that choice of law questions tend to
be decided in the course of interlocutory processes before trial…Such interlocutory applications may
consume what appears to be excessive time and expense but they are a consequence of the reach of the
“long arm” jurisdiction enjoyed by Australian courts. This renders inevitable disputes as to where to
litigate.
228
More than ever in trans-national litigation there is a process whereby the parties “litigate in order
to determine where they shall litigate”.
229 While usually the parties seek a particular procedural
This section was the subject of High Court analysis in Akai v People’s Insurance Company which is discussed in “Domestic
Legislation as Mandatory Rules of the Forum Court in Face of Foreign Jurisdiction Clause – Strong Reasons Against a Stay?”
in Pt II of this paper.
222Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1995) 126 FLR 204 at 212 per Kirby J (NSWCA). Kirby J acknowledges, as
the emphasised words show, that there are inherent territorial limits to the power of any Parliament. The extent to which those
laws can be held to affect the outcomes of cases outside the Australian jurisdiction is to be explored in this paper.
223See “International Conventions with ‘Force of Law’ as Mandatory Laws of the Forum Court – A Strong Reason Militating
Against a Stay in Favour of Contractual Forum.” in Pt II of this paper.
224See discussion of the minority of Akai in the High Court at “Domestic Legislation as Mandatory Rules of the Forum Court
in Face of Foreign Jurisdiction Clause – Strong Reasons Against a Stay?” in Pt II of this paper.
225See Whincop and Keyes at 65.
226See cases referred to in n 1.
227Nygh and Davies at [19.6].
228Regie National Des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 187 ALR 1 at 20 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne JJ). This quotation applies equally to English courts, from which Australia inherited its long arm jurisdiction. In our
context, it could be said to apply equally to jurisdiction clauses.
229Templeman J in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Consulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460, at 464.
Lewins
(2008) 36 ABLR 6 34 ©
142advantage that one forum offers,
230 in other cases it is the substantive law of one place that attracts the
parties. Where one party seeks to rely on a particular domestic statute, clearly the best bet is for
litigation to take place in that territory. A party wishing to rely on the TPA would much prefer to have
litigation proceed in Australia, where the courts have no choice but to impose the Act.
Australian courts will be faced with the need to assess the impact of the TPA in an international
dispute against a foreign defendant in several instances.
231 First, when initially asked for leave to
serve out of the jurisdiction. Secondly, there can be a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction by the
defendant who seeks a stay of the Australian proceedings, particularly in the face of a contractual
clause that has something to say on arbitration/choice of law/jurisdiction. Thirdly, the Australian court
can be asked to issue an anti-anti-suit injunction against a foreign defendant on the basis that
proceedings ought to be commenced in Australia.
English courts will come across an Australian mandatory statute in a slightly different context.
The foreign party may have commenced proceedings in England seeking a declaration that it is not
liable and seeking an anti-suit injunction against the Australian party to prevent it commencing, or
continuing, proceedings in Australia. Of relevance is whether there is a contractual clause, such as a
submission to arbitration, choice of law or jurisdiction clause that stipulates England. The Australian
party then needs to seek a stay of the English proceedings and/or defend the anti-suit application in the
English court, relying on the importance of the TPA to the dispute. Alternatively, if the Australian
action proceeds, the English court might be asked to refuse to enforce the Australian judgment.
232
We have seen that whether in Australia or England, Brandon J’s judgment in The Eleftheria
233 has
become the cornerstone of these types of applications.
234 Where there is an exclusive jurisdiction
clause in the contract that favours a foreign court, then the test is whether there are “strong reasons” to
refuse the stay despite the parties’ agreement to litigate elsewhere. (As we shall see, one of the factors
in the Eleftheria analysis, the loss of juridical advantage, has become particularly signiﬁcant when
assessing the impact of local mandatory laws.) Although in theory the test applied by English and
Australian courts may well be the same, there does seem to be a difference in the extent of factors and
evidence needed to “tip the balance” in favour of a stay: Garnett suggests that the attitude of the
Australian courts in stay applications is pro-Australian in any event.
235 To do so is in the interests of
the local litigants. England’s comparative strictness is similarly in its own interests, because it is more
likely to be the beneﬁciary of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, and one commentator has pointed out
that the strictness does not extend to staying its own proceedings in favour of a clause favouring a
foreign court.
236
This paper will now look at the position in each of the countries as regards mandatory rules and
a clashing provision in the contract. Assistance can be gathered by the attitude of the courts, both
Australian and overseas, to other so-called “mandatory” Australian statutes – the ICA and Australian
COGSA. While these Acts contain slightly different wording to that of the TPA, they each seek to oust
230McLachlan C, “The New Hague Sales Convention and the Limits of Choice of Law Process” (1986) 102 LQR 591 at 592.
231If a foreign plaintiff wishes to assert a Trade Practices Act breach against an Australian defendant and commences in
Australia, there is little the Australian defendant can do as the court has jurisdiction over it: unless of course there is a foreign
arbitration clause (see “International Convention Upholding Party Autonomy – What Effect Domestic Mandatory Law? The
Exceptional Case of Arbitration Clauses.” in Pt II of this paper). Otherwise the Australian courts will ignore the choice of
law/jurisdiction clauses and impose the Trade Practices Act. However, the Australian defendant could call on the aid of the UK
court to enforce that clause with an anti-suit injunction.
232See s 32(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (UK), which provides for non-recognition of an arbitration
award or judgment obtained in breach of an agreement.
233The Eleftheria [1970] p 94; [1969] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 237, discussed at “Litigation Contrary to Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause” in
Pt I of this paper.
234Adopted by the High Court in Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418, at 445 (Toohey, Gaudron
and Gummow JJ) and 427-428 (Dawson and McHugh JJ).
235Garnett R, n 31 at 9-21.
236Peel E, n 58, at 200.
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143any attempt to exclude the proper applicability of their provisions and the attitudes of the Australian
and English courts to those provisions are illuminating.
International Conventions with “Force of Law” as Mandatory Laws of the Forum
Court – A Strong Reason Militating Against A Stay in Favour of Contractual Forum
In several cases both the English and Australian courts have held that the mandatory rules of the
forum may constitute “strong reasons” to decline to stay proceedings despite an exclusive jurisdiction
clause favouring a foreign country, where the plaintiffs would lose a juridical advantage if a stay was
granted. Relevantly for maritime lawyers, they include carriage of goods cases, both in England and
Australia.
In England, a leading example is the Hollandia decision,
237 in which granting a stay in favour of
an exclusive jurisdiction clause favouring Amsterdam would have led to a lower compensation
package against the carrier for the plaintiff than that available under the overriding law of England
pursuant to the Hague Visby Rules enacted by Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1971 (UK) (UK
COGSA). UK COGSA was triggered because the shipment was from a Scottish port – a port of a
Contracting State. Australia, in cases of carriage that fall within Australian COGSA, and its
predecessors, has regularly disregarded the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in bills of lading where they
can be seen to have offended s 11 of Australian COGSA. In effect, then, where a carriage dispute
comes before the courts and the relevant COGSA applies by virtue of the shipment from a Contracting
State, then the courts will apply the Hague Visby Rules “by the force of law”.
238
Nevertheless, there is still scope for a clash between mandatory laws of England and Australia on
this front. Australia has modiﬁed the Hague Visby Rules applicable in the Australian COGSA, which,
as Davies and Dickey predict, will create an interesting issue once a dispute concerning an Australian
– England shipment comes before the English court.
239 Davies and Dickey argue that an English Court
may well use its own mandatory law, UK COGSA, to justify application of the original Hague Visby
Rules rather than applying the Australian version of the Rules, relying on the Hollandia case to do
so.
240 It could be argued that the Australian modiﬁcations are not caught by the Hollandia, as they do
not offend Art III Rule 8 – the Australian modiﬁcations increase the protection offered to shippers
rather than derogate from the original Rules.
241 However, if the English courts do apply Hollandia and
hold that the Australian laws are inconsistent, then the Australian reforms will be muzzled. In that
case, an English consignee would be well advised to consider the advantages posed by the Australian
reforms before commencing proceedings as it may prefer to do so in Australia, which would be
entitled to hear them due to s 11 of Australian COGSA. That may lead the carrier to seek out the
jurisdiction of the English court, and if there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the bill that
nominates England, its case for an anti-suit injunction would be signiﬁcant. Although related to our
discussion on TPA, this interesting point is somewhat of a diversion and will not be considered further
by this paper.
Despite the interesting issues that might arise, the carriage of goods regimes, such as Hague Visby
Rules are distinguishable as they have accepted mandatory status “built in” by virtue of being an
accepted international convention that each contracting state is bound to apply. One commentator
terms this a “closed system” that reduces or extinguishes party autonomy.
242 As such, this can be
distinguished from the situation where purely local or domestic legislation, such as consumer
237The Hollandia [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 as outlined at “Mandatory Rules of the Forum” in Pt I of this paper.
238See s 8 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Cth) and s 1(2) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (UK).
239Davies and Dickey, p 172.
240An English Court would also be supported by the decision of Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC
277 (see “Domestic Mandatory Laws of a Foreign Country with Close Connection to the Contract vs Party Choice for Forum
Court?” in Pt II of this paper).
241This point arose from a comment made by Paul Myburgh of University of Auckland on an earlier draft of this article.
242Nicoll C, “Comity and Closed Systems – the Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause and Anti Suit Injunctions” July/August 2005
Vol 5 No 6 Shipping and Trade Law 1.
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144protection legislation, is relied upon as providing a “juridical advantage”.
243 In Australia, the existence
of causes of action under both Australian COGSA and TPA does appear to strengthen the claim that
there are “strong reasons” in militating against a stay of proceedings to enforce an exclusive
jurisdiction clause.
Domestic legislation as mandatory rules of the forum court in face of foreign
jurisdiction clause – strong reasons against a stay?
In England and Australia it is accepted that mandatory rules of the forum, in the nature of domestic
legislation, may constitute strong reasons for a stay. Perhaps the major difference between the two
jurisdictions on this point is not therefore the general principle, but the statutory implementation of
public policy. UK Parliament, at least at the time of writing
244 has interfered very little with the
ordinary commercial workings of business, preferring to regulate only consumer transactions. On the
other hand, the Australian statute books contain more examples of the willingness of Parliament to
reform commercial practices, both generally (in the case of the TPA) and speciﬁcally (in the case of
the ICA, and to an extent, the Australian COGSA).
The leading authority in Australia for the proposition that mandatory rules of the forum may
constitute strong reasons to decline a stay in the face of an exclusive jurisdiction clause is the Akai
decision. In that case the parties, both large corporations, had freely negotiated for the law of England
to apply to their insurance contract, and for the English courts to have exclusive jurisdiction. However,
when the Australian insured sought to enforce the policy, it sued the insurer in Australia. It wanted the
beneﬁt of the Australian ICA, the provisions of which would have given the insured a far greater
chance of recovering against the insurer. The insurer sought a stay of proceedings relying on the
contractual terms. Both at ﬁrst instance, and on appeal, the stay was granted. The insured appealed to
the High Court. The insured argued that the provisions of the ICA rendered those terms of no effect,
because the Act applied where the objective proper law of the contract was Australian law, and s 8 of
the ICA provided that express provisions to the contrary were to be disregarded.
245 The High Court,
by majority, granted a stay, concluding that as a matter of objective proper law
246 that the law of the
contract was Australia. Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ gave a wide reading to the ICA provisions
in keeping with their remedial status and held that the exclusive jurisdiction clause was an “express
243While England does have mandatory consumer protection provisions, they are tightly drafted so that purely commercial
transactions do not trigger them: see Unfair Contracts Act 1977 (UK).
244The United Kingdom Law Commission is currently reviewing the law of insurance and there have been submissions made
that it ought to consider reform along the lines of Australian law. Whether it does so, or includes provisions to avoid contracting
out like the Australian legislation, remains to be seen.
245See s 8 of the Insurance Contracts Act:
8 Application of Act
(1) Subject to s 9, the application of this Act extends to contracts of insurance and proposed contracts of insurance
the proper law of which is or would be the law of a State or the law of a Territory in which this Act applies or
to which this Act extends.
(2) For the purposes of subs (1), where the proper law of a contract or proposed contract would, but for an express
provision to the contrary included or to be included in the contract or in some other contract, be the law of a
State or of a Territory in which this Act applies or to which this Act extends, then, notwithstanding that
provision, the proper law of the contract is the law of that State or Territory.
Also relevant is s 52, which provides:
52 “Contracting out” prohibited
(1) Where a provision of a contract of insurance (including a provision that is not set out in the contract but is
incorporated in the contract by another provision of the contract) purports to exclude, restrict or modify, or
would, but for this subsection, have the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying, to the prejudice of a
person other than the insurer, the operation of this Act, the provision is void.
246In doing so the High Court rejected a tripartite analysis to determine the proper law of the contract, instead preferring to see
it as a two-stage process: ﬁrst, was there an express choice, and secondly, what is the objective proper law, being the place with
the closest and most real connection with the contract: see 390-391. Viewed in this way, the exclusive jurisdiction clause was to
be taken to be an “express choice”, which was then to be disregarded under s 8 of the Insurance Contracts Act when
determining the proper law of the contract. In the Court of Appeal, the exclusive jurisdiction clause was held not to be an
“express” clause, and as such could lead to an inferred choice of law that was not affected by s 8 of the Insurance Contracts Act.
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145provision to the contrary” and as such was to be disregarded under s 8. The objective proper law was
that of Australia. In considering whether there were “strong reasons” militating against a stay, they
assumed
247 that an English court was likely to apply English and not Australian law that would
deprive the plaintiff of the legitimate juridical advantage and would be inconsistent with the court’s
obligation to give effect to the ICA and the policy it manifested. As such, there were strong reasons for
giving a stay due to the public policy of the forum.
The minority, Dawson and McHugh JJ, were unwilling to read the provision so widely. Their
Honours found that the ICA only dealt with choice of law clauses and as such did not preclude
enforcement of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Nor did it preclude the foreign court from applying its
own law as to the proper law of the contract. They found that no “strong reasons” were apparent
which would justify refusal of a stay.
248 The reasoning of the minority was consistent with a ﬁnding
that the ICA was only a domestically mandatory statute.
The response to the Akai decision in Australia has been mixed. It would appear to have been
welcomed by Australian insurance lawyers and academics
249 and treated sympathetically by some
commentators
250 but it has received a cooler reception from the leading academic commentators on
private international law in Australia.
251 Certainly the minority approach is less intrusive for
international litigation and would create a more seamless knit with the attitudes of English courts.
However, it has to be said that the majority decision ensures that, at least so far as the Australian
courts can control it, the apparent intent of the legislation is not thwarted by such a clause.
252 The
outcome of the parallel English proceedings shows that the Australian courts’ view is hardly the end
of the story. That sequel is best dealt with under the next heading.
Based on the High Court decision in Akai, Australian plaintiffs have relied on the existence of a
TPA cause of action to defend their decision to commence proceedings in Australia. The plaintiff can
allege that the granting of a stay will deprive it of a “juridical advantage”, namely the ability to assert
its TPA cause of action. The test has been stated in Australia as being “whether a protective Australian
Statute would be avoided by forcing the plaintiff to sue in the courts of the nominated jurisdiction.”
253
This is not always a guaranteed home run – in some Australian cases (admittedly not maritime cases),
the courts have considered whether similar relief to s 52 might be possible in the alternative forum.
254
In addition, it might be possible on the facts of a given case for the defendant to the Australian
litigation to establish that the TPA cause of action in fact adds little to the plaintiff’s case. However,
there are some dicta to suggest that a court should not place so much weight on an exclusive
jurisdiction clause in determining a stay application where there is a consumer situation and one party
247See Davies M, n 28, at 220 where he criticises the majority’s reasoning in this regard.
248Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 374 at 381.
249Sutton K, “Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd” (1997) 25 ABLR 221.
250See Greene J, n 139, for a feisty defence of the majority position.
251Garnett R, n 31, at 21-22; Davies M, n 28; Whincop M and Keyes M, Policy and Pragmatism in the Conﬂict of Laws
(Ashgate, 2001) at 66. Whincop and Keyes say that the Akai decision goes a long way towards permitting a party to defect
opportunistically from express promises where the party can identify a mandatory rule in his or her interest in a forum: see
“Putting ‘Private’ Back into Private International Law: Default Rules and the Proper Law of the Contract” (1997) 21
Melb Univ L Rev 515 at 529.
252Although note the argument that if the legislature intends to negate exclusive jurisdiction clauses it could do so through the
use of express language, and that it would be preferable for such statutory provisions to be given a narrow rather than broad
meaning: Whincop and Keyes, n 251, pp 65-68.
253Nicholson J in Quinlan v Safe International Forsakrings AB (unreported, FCA WAD 282 of 2005)
254See Garnett R, n 32, at 46-47, citing DA Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Discreet Logic Inc (unreported, Gummow J, FCA,
10 March 1994), Laminex (Australia) Pty Ltd v Coe Manufacturing Co (unreported, James J, NSWSC, 19 December 1997).
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146had to “take it or leave it”,
255 although it is not clear to what extent that same approach applies as
regards boilerplate provisions in international commercial contracts.
Domestic mandatory laws of a foreign country with close connection to the contract
vs party choice for forum court?
When the exclusive jurisdiction clause nominates England, the position of the English courts as
regards the foreign mandatory law can be found in the parallel proceedings on foot in England in the
Akai litigation. As it happened, the proceedings that Akai had commenced in England out of “an
abundance of caution”
256 continued before the English courts after the decision of the High Court of
Australia,
257 as did proceedings in Singapore brought by the insurer to deﬂect any attempt to enforce
a judgment against it in that country.
258 In any event, Thomas J held that (contrary to the High Court’s
conclusion)
259 the defendant had not in fact submitted to the jurisdiction of the Australian courts. As
such the English court could refuse to recognise the High Court’s decision that the English law and
jurisdiction clause were void.
260 According to Thomas J, the proper law of the contract was, as the
parties had agreed, English law. Akai alleged that the Australian court had done nothing more than
apply the reasoning of the decision of The Hollandia: therefore the Australian decision ought to be
given effect because the legal reasoning was the same as that which an English court would use in the
same circumstances.
261 The judge dismissed this as a relevant factor. While the consideration of issues
on jurisdiction that has taken place in a foreign court might be respected as a matter of comity, here:
… the basis of the High Court’s decision was not the exercise of a discretion on principles familiar to
this Court, but the application of Australian public policy set out in an Australian statute regulating
insurance contracts…. The real question for the Court is whether it should give effect to that public
policy as set out in the Australian statute as determined by the High Court of Australia.
262
Thomas J then reviewed the applicable principles, which had been set out in two leading clauses
concerning clauses exempting the shipowner from liability for negligence. In the ﬁrst case, Re
Missouri Steamship Co (1889) 42 ChD 321 the bill of lading incorporated English law but contained
an exemption clause that was void in the country of shipment, being the United States. The judge
relied on Lord Halsbury’s statement that:
It is enough for me to say that whatever be the American law … the law which the parties have elected
as the law of their contract makes this stipulation [the exemption clause] valid.
263
The only exception seemed to be where the contract itself was void in the country where it was
made, in which case it would not be enforced in England.
Thomas J moved on to consider the decision in Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd
(Vita Foods) (1938) 63 Ll. L. Rep 21. In that case a bill of lading was issued in Newfoundland for a
255Quinlan v Safe International Forsakings AB (2005) WAD 282 (unreported, Nicholson J, FCA) quoting Ohio Supply Co v
Gatoil (USA) Inc [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 588 at 591-592, and Incitec Ltd v Aliakmos Shipping (2004) 206 ALR 558 at [50] where
Allsop J appeared to take into account the fact that the clause was negotiated between the parties rather than “in standard form”.
256Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 101-102 issued in England in case their Australian
proceedings were stayed in favour of England. Indeed, Akai probably wished that they had thrown caution to the wind and not
issued these proceedings at all. The insurer did not seek an anti-suit injunction in England against Akai in the earlier stages of
this case. Without the English proceedings on foot, the Australian proceedings might have been left to run their course. As the
judge pointed out in defending the insurer’s failure to obtain an anti-suit injunction earlier, the state of the law regarding
anti-suit injunctions was still nascent at that time: Thomas J at 107. It is unlikely that such a scenario would be replayed
nowadays.
257Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90.
258Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 92.
259Which the English courts were entitled to ignore due to s 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982; discussed
above at n 232.
260Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 98.
261Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 98-99.
262Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 99.
263As quoted in Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 99.
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147shipment from Newfoundland to New York. The bill was subject to English law. It contained a
provision that would have been void in Newfoundland. However, the suit was brought in the state of
Nova Scotia, where the cargo had been discharged. The issue as to the weight to be given to the
Newfoundland provision went before the Privy Council, which held that while the Newfoundland
courts would be obliged to refuse to give effect to the contractual provision:
… it does not follow that any other court could properly act the same way. If it has before it a contract
good by its own law or by the proper law of the contract, it will in proper cases give effect to the
contract and ignore the proper law…
264
Thomas J then stated:
Lord Wright went on to say that the fundamental principle of English conﬂict of laws was that intention
was to be the general test of what law to apply; a court should ascertain what was the bargain of the
parties and give effect to the bargain unless debarred by a provision of foreign law that bound the court.
In general legislative provisions of the type being considered did not have extraterritorial effect and did
not debar the court from giving effect to the bargain of the parties.
265
Thomas J then applied those cases to the facts before him:
It is clear that the parties to the insurance policy bargained for English law. This court should therefore
give effect to that intention, unless it would be contrary to English public policy (which includes
international public policy) to give effect to the enforcement of the jurisdiction clause which is
otherwise valid. That is not to say that in an appropriate case the court will not take into account…the
public policy of a jurisdiction with which the insurance has a close connection. …in this case however,
the court is concerned with the enforceability of the parties freely chosen choice of law and jurisdiction
in a credit insurance policy. In contracts of this kind between commercial enterprises, there is no
equivalent restriction in English law on the choice of law… In my judgment this Court should give
effect to the bargain of the parties and their freely negotiated choice of law and jurisdiction. It should
not, as a matter of comity, give effect to the decision of the High Court that overrode that bargain and
that choice.
266
Thomas J granted an anti-suit injunction to prevent Akai from continuing with the proceedings in
the Supreme Court of New South Wales, although he also dismissed the insurer’s application for
summary judgment based on a time bar.
267 The matter settled thereafter. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales, speaking extra-curially has recently pointed to the decision as an
example of the futility of arguing about jurisdiction.
268
An awkward trans-national squabble between England and Canada of even greater magnitude,
and in a maritime context, has only recently come to an end. In the now infamous case of Magic
Sportswear Corp v OT Africa Line (OT Africa) proceedings took place on both sides of the Atlantic,
despite the modest quantum of CAD$30,000. The proceedings concerned short delivery of a shipment
of goods from a consignor based in the USA to the consignee in Liberia. OT Africa had issued a bill
of lading in Toronto, Canada, where it maintained business offices. The bill of lading contained an
exclusive jurisdiction/law clause in favour of England. Cargo interests nonetheless commenced
proceedings in the Canadian Federal Court, relying upon s 46 of the Canadian Marine Liability Act
(2001). That section provides:
46.(1) If a contract for the carriage of goods by water to which the Hamburg Rules do not apply
provides for the adjudication or arbitration of claims arising under the contract in a place other
than Canada, a claimant may institute judicial or arbitral proceedings in a court or arbitral tribunal
in Canada that would be competent to determine the claim if the contract had referred the claim to
Canada, where
264At p 30, as quoted by Thomas J at Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 100.
265Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 100.
266Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 at 100. Other issues were raised by the parties, but
the judge dismissed PIC’s application for summary judgment based on the time bar contained within the contract.
267The judge ruled that the time bar issue should be argued as a preliminary issue.
268Spigelman CJ, n 24, at 325.
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148(a) the actual port of loading or discharge, or the intended port of loading or discharge under the
contract, is in Canada;
(b) the person against whom the claim is made resides or has a place of business, branch or
agency in Canada; or
(c) the contract was made in Canada.
[emphasis added]
This section took its inspiration from the Hamburg Rules,
269 and had been introduced to make it
easier for Canadian traders to bring proceedings in their own courts rather than being subject to
litigation in foreign countries where it was perceived the cost and procedures would favour the
shipping lines rather than cargo interests.
270 In the Canadian Parliament, much had been made of the
fact that similar provisions already existed in Australia and New Zealand.
271
Within one month of the commencement of Canadian proceedings, OT Africa commenced
proceedings in England obtaining an anti-suit injunction against the plaintiffs, relying on the exclusive
jurisdiction clause. OT Africa then sought a stay of the Canadian proceedings based on the exclusive
jurisdiction clause and on the basis of forum non conveniens.
While our focus here is on the English response to the facts, for completeness one should note
that the Canadian courts, at ﬁrst instance
272 and on the initial appeal,
273 found that s 46 grants
jurisdiction to the Canadian courts where its conditions are met, despite a forum selection clause that
states otherwise,
274 but that the Canadian court still needs to determine if it is the most convenient
forum. At ﬁrst instance and on appeal the Canadian Federal Court held that, on reviewing the various
factors, Canada was the most convenient and appropriate forum for the claim. OT Africa appealed that
decision to the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal.
Before that ﬁnal appeal in Canada could be heard, OT Africa sought to join and restrain the
insurers of the cargo interests in the English proceedings. As well as defending that application, the
cargo interests sought a stay of the English proceedings and discharge of the anti-suit injunction
against them.
On the cargo interests’ application for a stay,
275 Langley J outlined the general approach in favour
of enforcing jurisdiction clauses unless there were strong reasons not to do so. He then stated:
It requires, therefore, some exceptional justiﬁcation for an English Court to stay proceedings in their
country when England is the exclusive jurisdiction chosen by the parties to resolve the very dispute
between them. I see nothing in the present circumstances which could begin to justify such an
exceptional course unless it is to be found in the very fact that Canadian legislation seeks to override the
agreement of the parties.
276
Leaving aside the Canadian legislation, Langley J could ﬁnd no reason “which would begin to
justify” a non-enforcement of the jurisdiction clause.
277 His Honour then turned to the overriding issue
of the Canadian legislation, and said that the only basis upon which the cargo interests could justify
their relief was that:
269United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea at Hamburg, 31 March 1978 (Hamburg Rules). The Hamburg
Rules are in force, but have not been accepted by the major shipping nations.
270Judgments of both the Canadian and English courts quoted from the debates in Canadian parliament concerning the proposed
s 46. See, for example, Magic Sportswear Corp v Mathilde Maersk [2004] FC 1165 at [19]-[21] (O’Keefe J, Federal Court of
Canada.)
271See Magic Sportswear Corp v Mathilde Maersk [2004] FC 1165 at [20].
272Magic Sportswear Corp v OT Africa Line Ltd [2003] FC 1513, Prothonotary Milczynski (FCC, 22 December 2003).
273Magic Sportswear Corp v Mathilde Maersk [2004] FC 1165 (O’Keefe J, 23 August 2004).
274O’Keefe J at [19].
275OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 252 (QBD (Comm))
276OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 252 at 258.
277OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 252 at 258.
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149… if this Court does not follow that course then there will be a clash of jurisdictions, with the appalling
prospect of an apparent challenge from this Court to Canadian legislation and the cost and disruption of
the same claims proceeding in two jurisdictions with the added risk of different outcomes. Moreover
those prospects have already resulted in expense out of all proportion to the amount involved in the
cargo claim.
278
While admitting that the answer was not so easy, the Judge concluded that there is “insufficient
logic” in treating s 46 in giving rise to some exceptional circumstance beyond the usual case, and that
as English law has established at the highest level that anti-suit injunctions should be granted to ensure
that parties abide by their agreement. As such, he found for OT Africa.
The cargo insurers appealed that decision to the English Court of Appeal, who handed down their
decision two days before the Canadian Court of Appeal was due to hear the matter.
279 In a judgment
at pains to explain why the decision was not an attack on the legislature or Courts of Canada, the
English Court of Appeal held that as the parties had chosen English law and the English courts, that
English conﬂict principles meant that the choice of the parties had to be upheld unless there were
strong reasons to persuade the court to the contrary. The only possible reason was the existence of s 46
and the decisions of the Canadian courts in refusing to stay the proceedings.
280 Despite the argument
that the Canadian legislation was simply a domestic manifestation of an international Convention (the
Hamburg Rules), the court pointed out that England has not enacted that provision, and as such there
was no “closed system” in which it can be assumed that every contracting state will come to the same
decision. Without that closed system, English private international law provides that “the autonomy of
the parties is more important” than the domestic law of Canada.
281 Where two courts each had
apparent legitimate jurisdiction according to their own law, the answer was to be found by application
of the proper or applicable law of the contract. The proper law of the contract was to be determined by
the parties’ express choice – here, English law. Citing Vita Foods and Akai, Longmore LJ held that:
There is no doubt that the Canadian courts have jurisdiction; the only question is whether a party is to
be allowed to invoke that undoubted jurisdiction. If he has agreed not to do so, there is no impropriety
in his being restrained from so doing.
Rix LJ made it clear that the fact the clause in question was a standard form document into which
individual shippers have little input
282 did not alter its effectiveness, and dismissed arguments based
on the view that the clause was a “mere contract of adhesion” as “weak”.
283 The court upheld the
anti-suit injunction against the cargo interests, and refused to stay the English proceedings. Leave to
appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
284
Faced with this insurmountable barrier, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal dealt with the
appeal of OT Africa. OT Africa alleged that the court ought to stay proceedings on forum non
conveniens grounds, bearing in mind principles of freedom of contract, commercial certainty and
desirability of avoiding parallel proceedings in Canada and England.
285 Cargo interests alleged that
s 46 removed that discretion, or alternatively no weight should be given to the exclusive jurisdiction
clause or the English judgments because to do so would be to defeat the purpose of s 46(1).
Evans J, with whom Decary and Sharlow JJ agreed, was of the view that s 46(1) did not remove
the discretion of the court to stay proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds. He considered that
the lower courts ought to have considered the fact that the cargo interests had not contested
278OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 252 at 258.
279As it happened, the Canadian Court of Appeal hearing was adjourned pending the outcome of the application for leave to
appeal to the House of Lords. It ﬁnally took place in mid 2006: OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2007] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 85 (CA Civ Div) at 87.
280OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp & Ors [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 170 (English CA) at 175.
281OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp & Ors [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 170 at 177, 180.
282OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp & Ors [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 170 at 181.
283OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp & Ors [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 170 at 185.
284OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 85, (headnote).
285OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 85 at 88 (per Evans JA).
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150jurisdiction in England.
286 Evans J also considered that the English judgments were relevant and ought
to be considered in the forum non conveniens analysis.
287 Further, he noted that s 46(1) did not
neutralise the choice of law provision in the contract, which was still effective. Nor did s 46(1) render
foreign exclusive jurisdiction clauses as null and void, which distinguished it from the Australian and
New Zealand provisions. In fact, s 46(1) gives the option of instituting proceedings in Canada, but
does not require them do to so.
288
Evans J proceeded to consider the factors relevant to the forum non conveniens enquiry.
289 In that
analysis, factors in favour of England were that its law was the proper law of the contract, the carrier
had commenced proceedings in that forum as it was entitled to do under the contract, that there were
parallel proceedings there and any judgment against OT Africa would need to be enforced in England.
In favour of Canada was that the contract was made and freight paid in Canada, and the Toronto-based
cargo insurer had some advantage in its chosen forum of Canada due to the saving of expense. There
were other factors that favoured neither Canada nor England. Evans J concluded that the factors
connecting the dispute with Canada were minor, and those connecting it with England were
cumulatively more signiﬁcant. As such, he was persuaded that the Federal Court of Canada was a less
convenient forum than the High Court in London, and stayed proceedings in Canada. The impasse
over which country should hear the $30,000 cargo claim was resolved.
Although the OT Africa case concerned Canadian carriage of goods law, (and a provision more
equivocal than the Australian equivalent at that)
290 it conﬁrms and solidiﬁes the English position
concerning foreign laws that seek to interfere with exclusive jurisdiction clauses favouring English
courts. Such foreign laws will not, of themselves, constitute “strong reasons” sufficient to entice the
courts to ignore the exclusive jurisdiction clause. Party autonomy is to be almost universally upheld,
even recognising that there may in fact be no “choice” in the contractual provision for one of the
parties to the contract. As these clauses are usually accompanied by a choice of law clause, the
English principles of conﬂict of laws will be applied – incorporating as they do, not only the primary
factor of party choice, but also respecting that choice of a neutral venue even if there are few other
connecting factors with England.
291
There is no reason to consider that the analysis of the English courts would be any different
should the foreign statute be the Australian TPA. In fact, if anything, the position of the English courts
could be stronger where the case concerns s 52
292 because there is nothing in the TPA itself that
expressly voids contracting out of that provision.
293
This then begs the question: how will these cases and courts in conﬂict be able to be reconciled?
The English courts will apply English law, being the proper law of the contract. The Australian courts
will either view the TPA as overriding the proper law to the extent its provisions apply (in the case of
s 52)
294 or disregard the choice of law altogether (if s 74, and thereby s 67, apply). In either case, both
courts will consider that they are the correct forum. It is submitted that on the current state of the law
in both countries, the result may well depend on which party has got the ﬁrst injunction against the
other. This would be a regrettable state of affairs, because the result will be uncertain and costly for
286OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 85 at 90-91.
287OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 85 at 94.
288OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 85 at 93.
289OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 85 at 96-97.
290Section 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, as noted by the Canadian Court of Appeal; OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic
Sportswear Corp [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 85 at 93.
291And several strong connecting factors with Australia, as was the case in Akai litigation.
292Or indeed the unconscionability provisions of s 51AA – s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act.
293Although the Australian courts have interpreted it as having that effect, by reason of the purpose and public policy of the Act:
Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160 at 164: but the court went on to ﬁnd that
the Trade Practices Act claims were arbitrable: see discussion under the next heading.
294Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160.
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151the parties, and would encourage an unseemly and possibly ill-considered rush to the court doors. In
the ﬁnal part of this paper various possible solutions are posed to this dilemma.
Prior to moving on to that ﬁnal part, for the sake of completeness, this paper will consider the one
area where the international legal community appears united in its quest for uniform treatment of cases
– or at least, more united. Nevertheless, even in this area, the treatment of the TPA has posed
difficulties.
International Convention upholding party autonomy – what effect domestic
mandatory law? The exceptional case of arbitration clauses.
Subject to one proviso, a foreign defendant will be more likely to obtain a stay of Australian
proceedings, even if those proceedings rely on the TPA, if there is an arbitration clause in the contract
between the parties. That is because Australia is a party to the New York Convention 1958
295, which is
enacted for Australia in the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). As we have seen above, s 7 of
the IAA requires a court to stay proceedings that are in court if they have been subject of an
agreement to arbitrate.
296 Once there is a dispute that falls within an arbitration clause and is capable
of settlement by arbitration, a court of a Convention country is bound to stay any legal proceedings
brought in breach of the clause. Importantly, the court may impose conditions on the stay “as it sees
ﬁt”.
297 However, once it has been determined that the dispute falls within the arbitration clause, and
s 7 applies, then there are no further enquiries to be made or discretion left to be exercised. As we
shall see, this differentiates the treatment of arbitration clauses by the courts from other clauses – there
is no forum non conveniens issue or “strong reasons” analysis to be done.
The New York Convention is the high water mark of co-operation and uniformity between
countries as regards matters of civil dispute resolution; and also the high water mark of upholding
party choice. Nevertheless, the TPA as a mandatory statute poses some challenges for the operation of
the New York Convention via the IAA. The particular issues that have arisen concerning TPA claims
and s 7 of the IAA fall into several broad categories:
• The scope of the agreement clause has proven important in Australia in the context of TPA
claims, the question being whether the arbitration clause can cover TPA allegations.
• Whether a TPA claim is “arbitrable” within s 7(2).
• Whether and what terms can be imposed on any stay under s 7.
• Whether the effect of domestic mandatory law can lead to a conclusion that the agreement to
arbitrate is null and void, or incapable of being performed under s 7(5).
It will become clear that the Australian and English courts, are generally becoming more liberal in
their interpretation of the New York Convention and their respective Acts
298 with the aim of increasing,
not decreasing, the effectiveness of a nomination to arbitrate despite the existence of TPA causes of
action.
Are TPA claims “capable of settlement” under IAA?
This is often called the “arbitrability” issue. In the early days of both the IAA and the TPA, it was
not clear whether an arbitrator was able to exercise the wide powers of a court in matters concerning
the TPA. If not, then, so the argument went, a TPA allegation could not be “capable of settlement by
arbitration” within s 7(2) and therefore would have to be the subject of separate litigation. It was
295Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted in 1958 by the United Nations
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration.
296See “Litigation Despite Agreement to Arbitrate” in Pt II of this paper.
297See “Litigation Despite Agreement to Arbitrate” in Pt II of this paper.
298And this same trend can be witnessed in England: see the recent House of Lords judgment in the case of Premium NAFTA
Products Limited v Fili Shipping Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 40 (17 October 2007) in which the Law Lords, affirming the decision of
the Court of Appeal, said it was time to draw a line under the authorities that distinguished between different wordings of
arbitration clauses. If the parties agreed to arbitration, then it is to be assumed that they expected all the issues between them to
be resolved by arbitration, unless there are clear words to the contrary. In this regard, Lord Hoffman cited the Comandate
Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457 as Australian authority for that
approach.
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152decided in 1991 in the case of IBM Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd that TPA
allegations could be heard, and relief granted, by an arbitrator.
299 In that case, the arbitration was to
take place in Australia. The IBM case was followed in Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin
Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160, which held that TPA claims were “capable of
settlement” by an arbitrator, albeit an English arbitrator sitting in London. By submission to
arbitration, the parties clothed the arbitrator with the ability to grant relief available in a court of law,
including relief pursuant to s 87 of the TPA. The court accepted that the arbitrator would have to
decide, based on principles of conﬂict of laws, the role to be played by the TPA in the arbitration – it
was not for the court to interfere. But there was no reason in principle why the TPA claims were not
arbitrable.
300
In more recent times the Federal Court seemed out of sync with approach of the State courts in
this regard. In Kiukiang Career [1998] 159 ALR 142, the Full Court discussed arbitrability in obiter.
Emmett J
301 would have been prepared to rule that if a party wished to rely on TPA allegations in the
courts, then it could not be compelled to arbitrate in accordance with its arbitration clause, if the effect
of that would be to exclude the jurisdiction of the court. If it had the effect of allowing contracting out
of the TPA then that provision would be void.
302 This represented the high water mark of protection of
the statutory rights created by the TPA. However, the Full Court has more recently swung into line
with State authority in Pan, in which Allsop J was at pains to point out:
There is nothing inimical to Australian public policy or to the terms of the TPA in commercial parties
agreeing to commercial arbitration in London under English law….The TPA is not being undermined;
rather another law of the Parliament is in operation [being the IAA].
303
In the Pan case, the IBM and Francis Marketing cases were reviewed and cited with approval by
the Full Court of Federal Court. It is clear that the obiter of Emmett J in the Kiukiang Career is now
to be disregarded.
One of the factors inﬂuencing the subservience of the TPA to the public policy of the IAA is the
distinction between the Parliament’s treatment of the TPA when compared with COGSA. As Allsop J
pointed out in the Pan case,
304 the Parliament chose to excise the operation of COGSA from the
sphere of operation of the IAA. By reason of s 11 of the COGSA, an arbitration clause may be
regarded as being of “no effect”, at least to the extent it deals with issues of carriage of goods by sea
to which COGSA applies. However, such an exception was not made for the TPA. Further, there is no
provision in the TPA akin to the express words of s 52 of the ICA.
305 One must take from that, then,
an intention that TPA matters are to fall within the IAA; that, in effect, the public policy of the IAA is
more important than the TPA.
There is one crucial difference between TPA and COGSA as mandatory laws of Australia. The
IAA speciﬁcally defers to COGSA.
306 Therefore, foreign arbitration clauses, which would in other
299IBM Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 466, 100 ALR 361 (NSWCA). That same case
was also notable for its criticism of narrow interpretations of arbitration clauses: See Kirby P (as he then was) at 366.
300Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160.at 167, per Gleeson CJ (with whom
Meagher and Sheller JJ agreed). Indeed, in Transﬁeld Philippines Inc v Paciﬁc Hydro Ltd [2006] VSC 175, it was held that
Trade Practices Act claims raised in legal proceedings in Australia after the granting of an award by a Singaporean arbitral
tribunal were arbitrable, even though the tribunal had already given its award in which it concluded that the Trade Practices Act
was not applicable to the contract. Had Justice Hollingworth not already concluded that service ought to be set aside on other
grounds, he would have been inclined to stay the proceedings pursuant to s 7 of the International Arbitration Act (Cth) at [79].
301With whom Branson J agreed. Beaumont J issued short reasons in general agreement with those of Emmett J.
302Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142 (FCAFC) at 23-24.
303Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457 at 515.
304Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457 at 504 and 515
([196]-[240]).
305Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457 at 515 ([240]).
306See s 2C.
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153contexts entitle the parties to a stay of proceedings commenced in Australia,
307 will be caught by s 11
COGSA and will be considered “of no effect”.
308 Once that is the case, s 11 applies to give the
Australian courts jurisdiction within the terms of s 11. Sea carriage document disputes will be covered
by COGSA (and therefore immune to IAA stays) Where the same case contains allegations of
breaches of the TPA, these will be sheltered from a stay as a result of s 7 by the skirts of COGSA.
Charterparty disputes
309 and other maritime disputes fall outside COGSA and are therefore subject to
s 7 of the IAA.
310
Does the scope of the arbitration agreement extend to TPA causes of action?
An important precursor to a stay is whether the agreement to arbitrate properly covers the dispute
in question. The tendency of the courts, at least in more recent times, is to attempt to construe
arbitration clauses broadly, so as to discourage the fragmentation of disputes.
311 An arbitration clause
anticipates contractual claims between the parties. However, claims such as those arising under s 52 of
the TPA are more troublesome. They are not contractual but statutory claims, and often the conduct
relied upon may have taken place during negotiation of the contract but prior to its entry.
312 Broad
language in an arbitration clause will see them caught by its scope, however the Australian courts will
not artiﬁcially elasticate the clause to ﬁt.
313
Early cases, largely in the State Supreme Courts, tended to emphasise the importance of a broad
reading of the arbitration clause (and, as we shall see, the arbitrability of TPA issues). In IBM
Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd [1991] 22 NSWLR 466, the New South Wales
Court of Appeal held that the words “any controversy or claim arising out of or related to the
agreement or the breach thereof” were sufficiently wide to include TPA claims. Clarke JA said:
There are no indications in the contract that the words should be construed narrowly. Nor in my opinion
are there any compelling reasons in favour of reading down the meaning of the phrase. On the contrary
there are powerful considerations in favour of the contrary view … it is likely … the parties intended
that all the disputes between them concerning the terms of the contract, the performance … and matters
connected … should be referred to the one tribunal for determination … I would ﬁnd it difficult to
ascribe to the parties to a contract an intention to submit only part of a dispute to an arbitral tribunal
reserving the reminder for consideration by the court as this would, on any view, be inefficient and
costly.
314
This was affirmed in 1996 by a differently constituted Court of Appeal in Francis Travel v Virgin
Atlantic Airways (1996) 39 NSWLR 160.
However, in the Federal Court, the intersection of arbitration clauses, maritime matters and TPA
allegations led to a difference of approach by the Full Court in Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime
Carriers Inc (Kiukiang Career) (1998) 90 FCR 1; (1998) 159 ALR 142 at 163. The case concerned the
contamination of fertiliser as a result of unclean holds, leading to its rejection by quarantine authorities
upon arrival in Australia. The cargo interests alleged a breach of the contract of carriage and a breach
of s 52 concerning representations about the previous cargoes carried by the vessel. The Defendants
sought a stay of proceedings based upon an arbitration clause in the relevant charterparty.
307Pursuant to s 7 of the International Arbitration Act (Cth)
308Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (1996) 71 FCR 172; [1996] 150 ALR 54, also Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v United
Shipping Adriatic Inc (1998) 89 FCR 166; (1999) 165 ALR 265. Tamberlin J’s narrower view of the effect of s 11 of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in Kiukiang Career was overturned on appeal.
309Although possibly voyage charters will fall within the sea carriage docs category – see Davies and Dickey at 280-281.
310This leads to some “unfortunate” fragmentation of disputes – such as the Hi-Fert litigation saga.
311See Court of Appeal in Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160 at 165 per
Gleeson CJ, approving the judgment of Hirst J in of Ethiopian Oilseeds & Pulses Export Corp v Rio del Mar Foods Inc [1990]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 86.
312Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142 (FCAFC).
313Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142 per Emmett J at 160.
314IBM Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 466 at 483.
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154At ﬁrst instance, Tamberlin J had relied upon the IBM and Francis Travel decisions, and found
that the arbitration clause was sufficiently wide to cover all the matters raised by the plaintiffs,
including the TPA claim.
315 As such, he ordered the stay of proceedings in favour of London
arbitration as agreed by the parties in the various contracts.
316 Tamberlin J proved unconcerned that in
this case at least, it would be arbitrators based in London who would be interpreting and applying the
TPA.
317
On appeal however, the Full Court of the Federal Court seemed keen to protect the plaintiff’s
right to prosecute the TPA claim. The Court took the view that the reference in the charterparty to
English law would not exclude the operation of the TPA, though it might be an indication that the
parties did not intend TPA claims to be resolved by arbitration.
318 It would of course be open to the
parties to agree on arbitration of the question as to whether a TPA claim arose, or to refer such a claim
to arbitration when it did arise.
The proviso is that if such a dispute did arise, and one party wished to have the dispute resolved by a court
with appropriate jurisdiction, that party could not be compelled to have the matter resolved by arbitration if
the effect would be a contract excluding the application of the Trade Practices Act. If the effect of the
agreement would be to exclude a claim under the Trade Practices Act and to deprive the parties of the
remedies which a court may grant under the Trade Practices Act, in favour of a determination by an
arbitrator, the provision may be void by the operation of the Trade Practices Act. If the effect of such a
provision would be to exclude the jurisdiction of the court and enable the parties to contract out of the
remedies conferred by the Trade Practices Act, the provision may be void.
319
The Full Court of the Federal Court held that as the non-contractual claims (including a TPA claim)
were not generated by the carriage contract, an arbitration clause in that contract that provided for
arbitration of claims “arising out of” the agreement was not broad enough to cover the non-contractual
claims.
320 The Full Court went on to doubt that the existence of the arbitration clause could be a factor
in the court’s determination of whether to stay the litigation on forum non conveniens grounds
because it had been found to have no effect due to the operation of COGSA.
321 In any event, the Court
concluded that there was a signiﬁcant connection with Australia such that Australia was not forum non
conveniens.
322 Nor was it vexatious and oppressive for proceedings to continue in Australia when
signiﬁcant parts of the dispute were referred to arbitration in London. The defendants submitted that
315Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (1996) 71 FCR 172; [1996] 150 ALR 54.
316Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (1996) 71 FCR 172; [1996] 150 ALR 54 at 62. Tamberlin J went on to
decide that the proceedings against the other defendant, the shipowner who issued the bill, would also be stayed in favour of
London, which was the forum stipulated in the contract. This was to avoid the fragmentation of disputes, and despite the
provisions of s 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, which he held did not force him to take jurisdiction nor removed his
discretion to decide whether proceedings in Australia were clearly inappropriate. His ﬁndings as to the effect of s 11 of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act were overturned on appeal: Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] 159 ALR
142. Prior to that appeal, the plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge to the effectiveness of s 7 to the extent it ousts the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court sitting in Admiralty and purported to give judicial power to London arbitrators, which
challenge was rejected by Tamberlin J: [1997] 575 FCA (unreported). The appeal on these issues was dismissed: see Hi-Fert Pty
Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142. The appeal decision is discussed further below.
317Hi-Fert Pty Ltd, Cargill Fertilizer Inc v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers & Western Bulk Carriers (Australia) Ltd [1997] 75
FCR 583; 145 ALR 500 at 509.
318Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142 at 163.
319Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (No 5) (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142 at 163.
320In doing so they allowed an appeal on that point from the primary judge, Tamberlin J who, mindful of courts “favour[ing] a
one-stop adjudication of all disputes if this can be accommodated consistently with the language of the clause” and that the
current thrust of authority favours the adoption of a broad interpretation of arbitration clauses. Tamberlin J had held, following
Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160, that the clause was sufficiently broad
to encompass pre-contractual Trade Practices Act claims, being equivalent to “arising out of” or “arising in connection with”.
The parties had “clothed the arbitrator, by agreement, with jurisdiction to deal with Australian trade practices allegations” at
[1996] 150 ALR 54 at 62. The Full Court decision in the Pan case has vindicated the position of Tamberlin J in this regard.
321Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] 159 ALR 142 at 165 per Emmett J, referring to s 11(3) of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. In this respect, the Court disagreed with Tamberlin J.
322Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] 159 ALR 142 at 165 per Emmett J.
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155fragmentation of the dispute could be avoided if the court exercised its discretion to stay the
Australian litigation so that it could be sent to arbitration in London. Emmett J conceded
fragmentation was undesirable, but was unrepentant as he ﬁred a broadside across the bows of the
foreign litigants –
… it would always be open to WBC to submit to the proceedings in the Federal Court. Section 7(2) is
only invoked upon the application of a party. It is open to a party not to invoke s 7(2) or the
discretionary inherent jurisdiction of the court. If a party chooses to make no application … The Federal
Court could then provide “one stop adjudication”.
323
The arbitration clause was valid for contractual claims not caught by COGSA, but not wide
enough to catch non-contractual claims such as those relying on the TPA. As a result, part of the claim
was sent to arbitration in London, and part remained in Australia before the Federal Court.
324 Given
that conclusion, the Full Court did not need to decide whether and to what extent an arbitrator in
London would have been able to determine TPA type claims. Ultimately the Trade Practices Act
claims were unsuccessful.
In Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v United Shipping Adriatic Inc (United Shipping) (1998) 89 FCR 166; 165
ALR 265, the same arbitration clause came up for further discussion in related proceedings, again
before Emmett J. The carrier argued that s 11 of COGSA only had effect where the governing law of
the agreement was Australian. Emmett J rejected that view
325 saying that s 11 has effect “irrespective
of whether the governing law of the agreement is Australian or the law of some other jurisdiction”
326
citing the reasons for the enactment of s 11 and its predecessors in earlier carriage legislation.
If it were possible to avoid the operation of s 11(2) by the simple expedient of providing that the contract
was to be governed by the law of a jurisdiction other than Australia, those objectives and reasons would be
easily put at nought.
327
Emmett applied the Kiukiang Career case, holding that the TPA claims did not fall within the
particular wording of the arbitration clause, and the arbitration clause was of no effect as regards those
claims to which COGSA applied. The remainder of the claims, being charterparty issues, were
properly the subject of the arbitration clause and a stay was granted in relation to those matters.
328
In both United Shipping and Kiukiang Career, the allegations included TPA but also were claims
to which, at least in part, COGSA applied; as such they were sheltered from a stay under s 7 of the
IAA.
The Kiukiang Career and United Shipping decisions allowed Australian mandatory statutes to
dominate. Insofar as COGSA applied, there could be little argument about its effect given the terms of
the IAA. However, the relatively narrow construction given to the arbitration clause, leading to
fragmentation of the dispute between arbitration in London and courts in Australia, caused rumblings
from at least one judge involved in maritime matters in the Federal Court. In Walter Rau Neusser Oel
323Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] 159 ALR 142 at 618.
324The Court held that although the representations were made, by the relevant time they were no longer being relied upon by
the plaintiff: see Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [2000] 173 ALR 263 at 278.
325Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v United Shipping Adriatic Inc (1998) 89 FCR 166; (1999) 165 ALR 265 at 278.
326Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v United Shipping Adriatic Inc (1998) 89 FCR 166; (1999) 165 ALR 265.
327Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v United Shipping Adriatic Inc (1998) 89 FCR 166; (1999) 165 ALR 265 at 278. Emmett J went on to
consider whether, as a question of fact, the London solicitors for Hi-Fert had in fact made an ad hoc submission to London
arbitrators of the bill of lading issue, despite s 11. He concluded that there had not been, and concluded (with what appears to
be some relief) “in those circumstances it is not necessary for me to consider the question of whether s 11 applies to an ad hoc
submission to arbitration. That appears to me to be a matter that is not without some difficulty and since it is not necessary for
me to resolve it, I do not propose to attempt to do so.” (at 293)
328A month earlier, Emmett J had issued an anti-suit injunction against United Shipping pending the determination of these
issues: Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v United Shipping Adriatic Inc [1998] FCA 1426
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156Und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd, Allsop J made no secret of his view that although he was
bound to follow Kiukiang Career it gave him no pleasure to do so.
329 His Honour only had to wait a
year before correcting the ledger.
An appropriate vehicle for reconsidering the United Shipping and Kiukiang Career cases
presented itself in 2006 in the case of Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd
(Pan) (2006) 238 ALR 457 (FCAFC). While the entirety of that complicated dispute need not be
canvassed,
330 one issue was whether the arbitration clause would give the arbitrators power to
determine the TPA claims and whether the litigation in Australia ought to be stayed pursuant to s 7(2)
of the IAA. After an extensive review of the authorities, Rares J held that the words “arising out of
this contract” did not extend to the TPA claims because the contract was not the source of the
claim.
331 His Honour was bound by the views of the Full Court in Kiukiang Career, but unlike
Allsop J, was of the opinion that the Kiukiang Career was correct in any event. The defendant
appealed.
On appeal, Allsop J (with whom Finkelstein J agreed),
332 considered that the TPA claim
concerning pre-contractual representations did in fact “arise out of” the formation of the contract,
because without the charterparty there would have been no act of reliance with which to found a cause
of action under the TPA. As to submissions that the Court was not able to so decide, based on
Kiukiang Career, Allsop J held that the Kiukiang Career was distinguishable because that case had
considered the words “arising from” rather than “arising out of”. In any event, the judge concluded
that giving a narrow interpretation to the words of the arbitration clause was wrong:
I am persuaded that [Kiukiang Career] is wrong and inconsistent with the approach of modern authority
to which I have referred. Because of the importance of the issue to commerce in this country, my view
is that I should not merely expose my disagreement but should take the step… to bring the views of this
court into conformity… concerning the approach to the construction of arbitration clauses. So, to the
extent that the reasoning in The “Kiukiang Career” is inconsistent with that set out above, I am
persuaded that it is wrong and should be departed from.
His Honour concluded that the pre-contractual TPA claims were encompassed by the scope of the
arbitration clause.
333
Imposing terms on the stay pursuant to s 7(2) of the IAA
In both Walter Rau and Pan, the Federal Court was alive to the concern of Australian parties that
an overseas arbitrator may choose to disregard the TPA in considering the dispute. In Walter Rau,
Allsop J acknowledged that the fact an arbitrator in London might see the TPA as being “irrelevant as
a statute of a [foreign] legal system”
334 would not be relevant to the operation of s 7(2) for a stay.
However, he was prepared to ﬁnd that likelihood could be relevant to the terms of such a stay. That led
to the judge’s solution, in Walter Rau, to impose a condition on the stay of proceedings. In Walter
Rau, the condition was expressed as:
… to consent to all aspects of the TP Act claims which would have been justiciable in this court, being
litigated in the arbitration irrespective as to any conclusion as to proper law. Such a condition would
solve the potential conﬂict of Australian domestic statutory policy and the operation by a foreign
329Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 (unreported, Allsop J) at [68]–[69].
330But see Luttrell S, “[2006] FCA 881” (2007) 21 ANZ Mar LJ 92.
331Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd v The Ship “Comandate” (No 2) [2006] FCA 1112 per Rares J at [113].
332Finn J disposed of the matter on narrower grounds.
333A recent ﬁrst instance decision on an interlocutory ex parte application for service outside the jurisdiction followed Hi-Fert
Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc [1998] 159 ALR 142 without reference to Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia
Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457: see Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd
[2007] FCA 881 (unreported, Gilmour J).
334Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 (unreported, Allsop J) at [73].
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157arbitrator of the rules of conﬂicts of law to set at nought governing Australian law. The arbitration
agreement is a contract about submission. Its enforcement should not undermine the operation of a
statute such as the TP Act.
335
This condition to allow the raising of TPA issues was apparently imposed on the parties,
ostensibly in exercise of the discretion permitted to the court by s 7(2) of the IAA to impose
“conditions, if any, as it thinks ﬁt”. In the Walter Rau case, leave to appeal was granted to both
parties
336 but never heard, and the matter appears to have settled. Whether the imposition of the
condition was a ground of the appeal cannot be gauged.
In Pan, the facts were different. The party seeking the stay gave an undertaking that it would
allow the arbitration to determine “all issues between the parties arising under the TPA”.
337 As such,
Allsop J did not have to consider making such an order, although His Honour appeared more
circumspect about the wisdom of such an order. Allsop J said, in his view on the facts of that case, and
with the beneﬁt of argument
338 he thought he would not have made such an order as it may pre-empt
the decision of the arbitrator and the operation of the arbitration clause.
Some circumspection in this regard is warranted, with respect. Whether the court’s discretion
extends to requiring the arbitrator to consider the mandatory law of a country different to the chosen
law remains hazy. Clearly the parties can agree to such a thing, as was done in Pan.
339 However,
whether imposed upon or agreed between the parties, one wonders how an arbitrator is to deal with
such an order. In Pan, the relevant charterparty contained an English choice of law provision. We have
already seen that English courts will dismiss a plea based on a foreign statute when English law
applies. Would an English arbitrator be within his discretion to apply the same approach?
340 Could the
arbitral panel technically comply with the Federal Court order by allowing the parties to deal with the
TPA claim, but ultimately concluding it is irrelevant because of the choice of English law? Would the
party who had given such an undertaking to the Australian court, still be entitled to make that
argument, or would it be constrained from doing so by the form of the undertaking?
341 Certainly,
given the attitude of the English courts to foreign law where the parties have chosen English law, it
would be fairly safe to conclude that any appeal from the arbitrator’s decision on that basis would fall
on deaf ears.
Also worthy of note is that, in any event, this pragmatic solution of the Federal Court is made
possible by the wording of s 7(2) is only a clear option when the matter is bound for arbitration.
Different considerations arise if conditions were imposed on matters headed to a foreign court. Would
it offend judicial comity for one court (Australian) to make such an order directly affecting the other
court? There is some initial attraction to the view that an order could be made to bind the party not the
court (by way of analogy with the arguments made as to the operation of anti-suit injunctions). That
option will be explored further in Pt III below.
Does the TPA render an agreement to arbitrate “null and void” under s 7(5)?
Another signiﬁcant question is whether or in what circumstances s 7(5) IAA might be invoked.
That subsection reads:
335Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 at [110].
336See Walter Rau Neusser Oel und Fett ADG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1183. (unreported, Allsop J, 22 August
2005). See also Walter Rau Neusser Oel und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1327 (unreported, Allsop J,
19 September 2005).
337Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457 at [241]-[245].
338Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457 at [245].
339The concession probably doesn’t go so far as to be an agreement to change the applicable law, despite the fact that this is
possible, at least in theory: Nygh at 120.
340Depending on the arbitration agreement, there may be an entitlement to appoint an arbitrator fromAustralia to sit on the panel
in England, or perhaps an English Arbitrator with some Australian experience.
341One would expect that it would be open to the party giving the undertaking to nevertheless argue that, on the facts, the
provisions of the Trade Practices Act do not apply because, for instance, there was no conduct in Australia, or conduct overseas
caught by the extraterritorial provisions of the Trade Practices Act.
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158A court shall not make an order under subsection (2) if the court ﬁnds that the arbitration agreement is
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
It is clear that any hopes of Australian litigants being able to use the TPA to trigger this section
are false. It is now settled that arbitration clauses are separate and severable contracts which survive
any vitiating factors affecting the contract at large. A mere allegation of fraud affecting formation of
the contract, without evidence, will not be permitted to “undermine the intent of the operation of the
New York Convention”.
342 With the bar set so high, it is difficult to imagine that a mere breach of a
statute representing domestic policy would be permitted to void an agreement to arbitrate, unless of
course the statute has that express effect.
343 The TPA is not such a statute.
Conclusion on TPA claims and arbitration
The position regarding TPA claims and arbitration clauses in Australia ﬁnally seems reasonably
settled, although it does await the imprimatur of the High Court. Such claims are arbitrable, subject to
the arbitration clause wording not being too narrow, and such clauses are to be construed broadly
given the parties’ likely intention to resolve all their disputes in one forum. This means that claims
with TPA issues can and will be arbitrated on foreign soil where the arbitration clause so provides.
Therefore when a TPA cause of action is alleged, an arbitration clause will have the effect in Australia
that a foreign jurisdiction clause will not have – an Australian court will order that the dispute be
heard, and resolved, overseas.
How exactly TPA allegations might fare in that foreign arbitration is something that is not clear,
and unlikely to become so given that most arbitrations are private. One might imagine that, unless the
parties have agreed to raise TPA issues in the arbitration, it might be a ground to appeal a ﬁnding if
liability was found to exist under an Australian statute when the proper law of the contract was
otherwise. If in fact the Australian courts have ordered the parties to allow the airing of TPA claims,
and the arbitrator makes a positive ﬁnding of liability on TPA grounds, then there may be an
unfortunate result. The matter may come before an English court on appeal, which may then ﬁnd itself
critiquing the original condition imposed by Australian courts allowing the TPA claims to be aired in
the ﬁrst place.
Conclusion – Clash between Australian mandatory laws and party autonomy
In summary, the Australian position as regards international litigation of maritime matters in which a
breach of the TPA is alleged is as follows:
• If COGSA applies to the claim, happily for the Australian party, proceedings commenced here can
remain in Australia, even if the litigation is in breach of exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration
clause. Any accompanying claim under TPA will be allowed full ﬂight.
• Where a TPA cause of action exists in a maritime claim concerning a contract with an arbitration
clause, then the opposite seems true, (subject to the High Court ruling otherwise) – the case must
go overseas. The TPA claim is arbitrable, and unless the arbitration clause is clearly worded in a
manner that displays a contrary intent, the TPA claim will fall within it. The court may impose
“conditions”, although whether those conditions can extend to a requirement permitting the airing
of the TPA claims is not yet clear. The court will prefer parties to agree to such a condition.
• When a TPA cause of action exists in a maritime claim to which COGSA does not apply and
where the contract contains no arbitration clause but does contain an exclusive jurisdiction clause,
then an Australian court is likely to ignore that contractual provision as being contrary to the
mandatory law of Australia, being the TPA.
344 The TPA will apply and the court will maintain
jurisdiction. Whether a court might accept concessions from the defendant that it will allow TPA
to be raised in a foreign court will be dealt with in the next part.
342Allsop J in Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett AG v Cross Paciﬁc Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102 at [91].
343Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 is possibly the only Australian example of such a provision. See Nygh, Autonomy in
International Contracts, p 229.
344Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418.
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159• In the same situation as immediately above, but containing a choice of law clause rather than an
exclusive jurisdiction clause, the Australian courts will nevertheless apply the TPA as an
overriding law, as it does not interfere with the proper law of the contract.
345
In England, the position can be more shortly stated:
• Aside from some narrow exceptions not applicable to maritime claims, the English courts will
uphold the parties’ agreement in all circumstances, unless it will cause fragmentation of claims
due to the involvement of parties not bound by the jurisdiction clause.
• The English courts are bound to enforce the mandatory laws of their own forum but will not take
cognisance of the mandatory laws of another State unless that is the proper law of the contract.
• The court is more than willing to issue anti-suit injunctions in defence of party autonomy, which,
in the context of the TPA, will have the effect of disregarding the mandatory rules of Australia.
346
The extent of the potential clash is clear. Both the Australian and the English courts are willing to
enforce the contract by either staying proceedings brought in breach, or issuing anti-suit injunctions
against a party threatening to act in breach of their contract. However, Australian courts will also issue
anti-suit injunctions to prevent parties litigating in the contracted forum where that would be in breach
of the mandatory laws of Australia.
347 Therefore it is easy to envisage a situation where both parties
are entitled to anti-suit injunctions against the other, from the courts of different countries. In that case,
it may well come down to which party “strikes” ﬁrst. However, an Australian party would be well
advised to have an eye on the “end game” being enforcement of any eventual judgment. If such a
judgment is likely to be enforced in England, there may be an issue with registering and enforcing it
there, if the judgment was obtained in a court in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause. If that is the
case, then the battle will have been fought for nothing.
The next part of this paper considers what can be done to minimise the clashes between courts in
the context of jurisdictional battles.
348
PART III
The case is not itself a case about peanuts. It is about who shall decide a case about peanuts.
349
I have before me ingredients for a procedural stew which looks to be unpalatable wherever it is eaten
…
350
The way forward: A more digestible stew?
The conﬂict of laws cannot afford to continue to fudge the issue as to the international ramiﬁcations of
the growth in the mandatory control of contracting. This is an issue which … standard proper law
techniques do not resolve … The Rome Convention Art 7(1) is only a beginning. What is urgently needed
is some more speciﬁc formulation as to what types of mandatory rule are to be recognised, or rather, how
mandatory rule problems are to be resolved.
351
The tussle between the two clashing notions of mandatory law and party autonomy has been slowly
developing over much of the last century. Throughout the 20
th century, the notion of party autonomy
has been on the rise; ﬁrst in England and then spreading to other legal systems. Mandatory statutes
may have existed in a maritime sense for some time, this was as a product of the adoption of the
carriage conventions, particularly the Hague Visby Rules in 1968. Australia’s earliest dalliances
345Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 160.
346In fairness it should be noted that the Australian courts would probably take exactly the same view of a third party country
seeking to impose its law on a contract which has stipulated that Australian law applies.
347Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd v The Ship “Comandate” [2006] FCA 881 at ﬁrst instance is an example of this occurring,
albeit that it was eventually discharged because the existence of an effective arbitration clause required a stay under s 7 of the
International Arbitration Act.
348Leaving aside arbitration, which as we have seen is reasonably settled.
349Tracomin SA v Sudan Oil Seeds Co Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 662 at 664, as quoted in Males S, n 60, at 543.
350Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v United Shipping Adriatic Inc [1998] FCA 1426 per Emmett J.
351McLachlan C, n 230, at 626-627,as cited in ALRC report at [8.32].
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160include the Sea Carriage of Goods Act 1924 (Cth), which contained a precursor to COGSA’s s 11. In
a more general commercial context however, mandatory statutes did not really surface until the latter
part of the last century. In Australia, the mid-1970s saw the introduction of the TPA, and the ICA
came about in the mid-1980s. It has taken time for those statutes to reach their ascendency via case
law, at around the same time that party autonomy has reached its zenith as an accepted universal
principle in the interpretation of contracts.
What has fuelled the ﬁre in the last 20 or so years is the development of the anti-suit injunction
and the increasing willingness of the courts to use that as a means of imposing their own view as to
the “correct” forum for the dispute to be heard.
The home truth for Australian litigants is that in all but very limited circumstances, the English
courts will uphold contractual clauses as to jurisdiction, choice of law or arbitration above all else,
even an Australian statute that nulliﬁes such a clause which would apply if the matter was before
Australian courts. English courts will uphold their own mandatory laws (hence the decision in The
Hollandia), but this will have little effect on commercial matters (save perhaps that it is arguable,
although by no means settled, that the UK COGSA may “trump” the Australian version
352). Apart
from COGSA, the English laws are much more “hands off” business than Australian laws, and there is
no corporate equivalent of the TPA in their statute books. The English courts do not and will not
recognise the mandatory rules of another State.
353
Other countries such as Australia, and their litigants, may see this as the stronger contractual party
ﬂouting the will of their Parliament, supported by the courts of England. While it might seem logical
to Australians for an English court to take into account the laws of Australia such as COGSA, ICA and
TPA, particularly when the contract has its most real and substantial connection with Australia, this is
clearly not how the English courts perceive it. They consider it all-important to keep parties to their
bargain. Scholars generally agree that, in the complicated ﬁeld of international litigation, the simplest
and most economic system for establishing the law applicable to a contract is to let the parties choose
both the law and the court they wish to hear the dispute.
354 But for the English courts there is a
common-sense reason too. As commercial litigation alone represents over £800 million of invisible
export value to the UK each year
355 “judges are expected to play their part in ensuring that the
economic beneﬁts are at least retained if not improved”.
356 In turn, the commercial community will
continue to choose England to resolve its disputes while this certainty remains the cornerstone of that
jurisdiction. Indeed, certainty is the commodity in which the English Courts trade, and they are at
pains to protect it.
As it happens, the Australian courts also value party autonomy highly, but the public policy of the
Australian legislature requires contractual certainty to give way to enacted public policy in certain
circumstances. Where proceedings are before Australian courts, then, there will be no choice but to
apply the mandatory laws of Australia. Although it was open to the courts to interpret the reach of
extraterritorial provisions in a more circumspect fashion, that door slammed shut after Akai and can
only be levered open by the High Court. It is extremely unlikely that a narrow interpretation of the
reach of Australia’s mandatory statutes is going to be initiated anytime soon. In a sense, the
commercial courts in Australia are between a rock and a hard place – the importance of Australia’s
mandatory laws in Australia cannot be questioned, but the application of laws such as the ICA and the
TPA to purely commercial transactions means that the courts are prevented from giving full effect to
the parties’ own agreement.
352See discussion at n 156.
353For instance, if the contract to be enforced would be illegal in the country in which it is to be performed: Regazzoni v Sethia
[1958] AC 301 as cited by Hartley T, “Mandatory Rules in International Contracts – the Common Law Approach” (1998)
Recueil des Cours, Academie de Droit International de la Haye; 266 at 353, and discussed by Chong A, n 139, at 33-34, 41-42.
354Nygh at 11 and authorities cited there; Whincop and Keyes at 29.
355Steel J, n 67, at 7.
356Steel J, n 67, at 7.
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161In the end result, an English Court will therefore hand down a different decision on jurisdiction as
an Australian court on the same matter. Of signiﬁcance is the practical consequence of the discordance
between the supremacy of party autonomy on the one hand and the insistence on broadly drafted
“consumer” protection laws on the other. That consequence is played out in the very early stages of
the dispute, at which point the forum for the dispute is itself disputed. The tendency is for one party to
“shoot ﬁrst” and obtain a hearing, and an order, in their preferred court before the other party has the
chance to do the same in their own preferred court. The Australian court will be required to claim
jurisdiction by reason of the mandatory statute, which is “strong cause” to ignore an exclusive
jurisdiction clause in favour of England. The English court will ignore the Australian statute, and
enforce party autonomy saying there was not “strong cause” to ignore the exclusive jurisdiction
clause. Both courts will consider themselves entitled to issue an anti-suit injunction to prevent the
opposite party from continuing with the parallel proceedings in the other court.
This discordance ensures that the “duelling anti-suits”
357 will continue because there is potentially
so much at stake, even despite the warnings of the judges, speaking extra-judicially, of the “futility” of
such an exercise.
358 Those stakes have been raised by the “budding species” of claims in the English
courts for damages sustained as a result of litigation being pursued in a different forum in breach of
contract.
359 Such proceedings, together with the possibility of English courts refusing to enforce a
court order obtained in Australia ﬂouting an exclusive jurisdiction clause choosing England, should
send a warning to Australian litigants that they start upon a rocky road when they decide to hitch their
wagon to Australian mandatory laws in an attempt to avoid the contracted forum.
So what then can be done to smooth the path? There are things that can be done – practically, by
parties, undoubtedly; and certainly, unilaterally, by Australia. Of course, by far the most attractive is a
broadly acceptable international solution – tantalisingly unattainable as it may be. McLachlan points
out
360 that the practical problems of private international law “may potentially be solved either by
unilateral solutions which bring the courts of one state into conﬂict with others; or by cooperation”. In
other words, countries have a choice between “conﬂict or coordination.” Perhaps, so too do the courts.
Solution by Convention?
A convention recognising foreign mandatory laws with close connection to the contract?
For Australia and other countries with mandatory laws, the ideal solution would be a convention or a
treaty that recognises mandatory laws of a country closely connected with the contract. However, such
a concept has been shown to be deeply unattractive as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. The
stance of the UK is shown by its steadfast refusal to participate in any Convention that requires such
recognition. In relation to the Rome Convention, it nailed its colours to the mast when it opted out of
Art 7; it is not interested in recognising mandatory laws of other countries. That same insistence
continues through the negotiations to Rome Regulation and Brussels Regulation.
361 It is also afflicting
transport law in the context of the UNCITRAL Draft Instrument on Transport Law insofar as the
Convention would specify where the plaintiff may commence proceedings with only one option being
the jurisdiction stipulated in the contract.
362 Given that the English have been intransigent in the face
357Hawke F, n 93.
358Spigelman J, n 24, at 325; also see Steel J, n 67, at 7.
359Blobel F and Spath P, n 89, at 545.
360McLachlan C, n 230, at 613.
361See Letter to House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny from Baroness Ashton of Upholland concerning
the Brussels Regulation proposed Art 8(3) (application of the mandatory rules of third countries) where she states:
“The legal uncertainty that would be created by the proposal in paragraph (3) has been much criticised by commercial operators.
The potentially signiﬁcant adverse economic consequences of this constituted the greatest single reason behind the
Government’s decision not to opt-in under our Protocol. The deletion of this paragraph is clearly a major negotiating objective.”
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmeuleg/34-xxxvii/34x04.htm viewed 30 October 2007.
362See Sturley M, “Overruling Sky Reefer in the International Arena: A Preliminary Assessment of Forum Selection and
Arbitration Clauses in the New UNCITRAL Transport Law Convention” (2006) 37(1) J Mar L & Com 1. The most recent draft
of that Convention at the time of writing deals with jurisdiction of claims in an “opt – in” Ch 14: see
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162of Europe and the international community respectively does not bode well for Australia, or the
international community for that matter, attempting to entice it to change its position.
In any event, even if the UK could be persuaded, then the form of such recognition would be
problematic. Article 7 of the Rome Convention is one model, as is its successor
363 but both are as yet,
an unknown quantity – there are no reported cases on it, according to European commentators – and it
has been the subject of signiﬁcant and principled attacks from commentators
364 as containing too
much discretion with a consequent lack of certainty in outcome. The US model
365 would be a better
choice. Further in ratifying any convention that recognises foreign mandatory laws, Australia would
have to realise that it is a two-way street – that it too would ﬁnd itself having to, on occasion, apply
the law of a country with a close connection to the dispute, although not the contractual forum. This
was indeed the proposal of the ALRC in its Choice of Law report, which was by no means universally
well-received and looks to be never taken up.
Convention upholding party autonomy in (nearly) all cases
If broad agreement to recognise foreign mandatory law cannot be struck, then it is possible that
international agreement can be forged by recognising party autonomy as overriding foreign mandatory
law. This is the effect of a newly-minted Convention that has just been opened for signature: the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (2005 Convention).
366 Unlike Brussels I and
its successor Brussels Regulation, the 2005 Convention is international in reach. It arose from the
ashes of an earlier more ambitious and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to standardise Common Law
and Civil Law approaches to jurisdiction.
367 While dramatically oversimplifying the provisions, in
essence the 2005 Convention relevantly provides that the court nominated by the parties to an
international
368 agreement will have jurisdiction unless the agreement is null and void under the law
of the designated State. Article 6 provides that any other court must decline to hear the case
369 unless
the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court, or giving effect to the
agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of
the State of the Court seised.
The inspiration for this Convention was the model operating in international arbitration, the New
York Convention,
370 where a court will stay proceedings brought in breach of an agreement to submit
disputes to arbitration.
371 The 2005 Convention is modelled also on the Brussels Convention,
372
although there are several important differences. One is that it speciﬁcally states it will neither require
http://www.daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V08/507/44/PDF/V0850744.pdf?OpenElement viewed 12 May 2008. As
Ch 14 waters down the enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction clauses, England at least will most likely refuse to opt in (Art 76).
Similar criticisms bedevilled the Hamburg Rules.
363Rome Regulation - see text accompanying n 175 also see generally Dickenson A, n 140.
364Dickenson, n 376; Tillman C, “The Relationship between Party Autonomy and the Mandatory Rules in the Rome
Convention” (2002) J Bus L 45.
365Outlined in brief in Pt 1 of this paper.
366For a more detailed explanation of the Convention see Thiele C, “The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements:
Was It Worth the Effort?” in Gottschalk, Michaels, Ruhl and Hein (eds) Conﬂict of Laws in a Globalised World (2007) at 63.
367Garnett R, “The Internationalisation of Australian Jurisdiction and Judgments Law” (2004) 25 ABR 205 at 206.
368A “case is ‘international’ unless the parties are resident in the same Contracting State and the relationship of the parties and
all other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the location of the chosen court, are connected only with that State.” –
Art 1.2. The 2005 Convention only applies to civil or commercial matters.
369See Garnett R, “The Internationalisation of Australian Jurisdiction and Judgments Law” (2004) 25 ABR 205 where the
author reviews the 2004 draft of the Convention; also Winship P and Teitz L, “Developments in Private International Law:
Facilitating Cross–border Transactions and Dispute Resolution” (2006) 40 The International Lawyer 505.
370The United Nations Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards entered into in New York 1958 as discussed
at “Litigation Despite Agreement to Arbitrate” in Pt I and “International Convention Upholding Party Autonomy – What Effect
Domestic Mandatory Law? The Exceptional Case of Arbitration Clauses” in Pt II of this paper.
371Garnett R, “The Internationalisation of Australian Jurisdiction and Judgments Law” (2004) 25 ABR 205 at n 7.
372Discussed at “If Contract is Silent as to Law and Jurisdiction – Default Position” and “Concept of Party Economy” in Pt I of
this paper.
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163nor preclude the issue of interim measures, which means anti-suit injunctions are still available.
373 The
second is that there is no paramountcy of the ﬁrst seized court
374 – the trigger for a court staying one’s
own proceedings is the existence of a clause favouring another jurisdiction, not that it is the second
court in which proceedings have been commenced. This neatly leapfrogs over the issue that has on
occasion tied up the European courts regarding Brussels Convention, where the ﬁrst seised court takes
its time in assessing its own jurisdiction, to the frustration of the court that appears to have exclusive
jurisdiction under the parties’ contract.
375
It has been said that the “deﬁned rules of allocation of cases between States” contained within the
Brussels Convention, without any discretion to override inappropriate cases, has as its price a “certain
rigidity, which can lead to unwelcome and unjust results, but has to be accepted when it occurs.”
376
This would likewise afflict the 2005 Convention, but the trade-off is contractual certainty.
While it is clear that no one Convention is going to be perfectly attuned to all the needs of the
international business community, the 2005 Convention, although not perfect,
377 may be an answer, or
at least the beginnings of an answer. It has a broad deﬁnition of international agreement, which means
all but totally domestic agreements would be effective. Therefore, if a contract was between two
Australian companies who chose England as the exclusive jurisdiction for their dispute, then the 2005
Convention would not operate to require the court to stay proceedings in breach of that clause; in that
instance the mandatory provisions of the TPA could not be avoided. It will not apply where natural
persons are contracting as “consumers”.
378
It is too early to say if this Convention will obtain broad acceptance in the international
community, or what the Australian or English attitudes towards it are likely to be. The 2005
Convention has at least one important supporter in Australia – the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of New South Wales.
379 The 2005 Convention is perhaps of less relevance to maritime lawyers
because it excludes from its operation matters concerning carriage of passengers and goods, marine
pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general average and “emergency” towage and
salvage.
380 If it does come into force
381 and is ratiﬁed by Australia, it may be nonetheless important in
maritime cases that might fall through the cracks of this deﬁnition – such as time and demise charter
373Yackee JW, “A Matter of Good Form: the (Downsized) Hague Judgments Convention and Conditions of Formal Validity for
the Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements” (2003) 53 Duke LJ 1179.
374Which is the case in the Brussels Convention – see Art 21.
375See Blobel F and Spath P, n 89 at 531-532.
376Males S, n 60, at 551.
377For criticism of the 2005 Convention, see Svantesson DJ, An Update on the Proposed Hague Convention on Exclusive
Choice of Court Agreements found at http://www.epublications.bond.edu.au/law_pubs/60 accessed September 2007; Yackee JW,
“A Matter of Good Form: the (downsized) Hague Judgments Convention and Conditions of Formal Validity for the
Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements” (2003) 53 Duke LJ 1179.
378In a narrower sense than the Trade Practices Act. The deﬁnition of a consumer contract in the 2005 Convention is where “a
natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) is a party”.
379Spigelman J, n 24, at 326.
380Art 2.
381At time of writing, the Convention has only one signatory, being Mexico. It requires two signatories to come into effect, but
clearly it would require adoption by most countries in order to be of the level of signiﬁcance of the New York Convention.
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164disputes,
382 and contracts for “ordinary” towage.
383 As Garnett observes,
384 if Australia signs the 2005
Convention, it will have to take care to align its laws accordingly.
385 As regards mandatory laws and
maritime law in Australia, this would mean:
• Addressing which mandatory laws, if any, will be exempt from the operation of the Convention in
Australia. As Australia has excised COGSA from the operation of IAA in Australia, the
Parliament will need to decide which Australian laws are not going to be susceptible to a stay
under the 2005 Convention. Given the exceptions to its operation outlined above, COGSA should
be expressed as falling outside the 2005 Convention. Similarly, the ICA should be exempted.
386
Should the parliament wish the TPA to be an exception to the operation of the 2005 Convention,
it ought to do so expressly, in the adopting statute.
387 As Allsop J opined in relation to the TPA
and the IAA, there is a choice between public policy statutes here – will the legislature choose the
2005 Convention to be dominant, leading to the transfer of proceedings overseas regardless of
TPA allegations? Given the all pervading presence of TPA allegations in commercial litigation in
Australia, a decision to exempt the TPA from the operation of the 2005 Convention would be a
serious blow to the effectiveness of the 2005 Convention in Australia.
• Addressing in the enacting statute whether the Australian Courts will retain a power to impose
appropriate conditions on the stay. This power was not express in the New York Convention but
was inserted by Australian Parliament. There is at least one judicial comment inclining to the
view that a statute requiring a stay without including a power to impose conditions would
constitute an impermissible interference with the judicial process.
388
• The need for clariﬁcation of the exceptions to Art 6 and the triggering or otherwise of those
exceptions by the TPA and other “mandatory rules” of Australia. Will an agreement to litigate in
a forum that will not apply the TPA, (or indeed ICA or COGSA), be “manifestly contrary” to
public policy? This is likely to be played out in subsequent case law rather than an enabling
statute,
389 but it is submitted that those exceptions should apply only to matters of international
public policy, and not be broadly interpreted as including matters of domestic public policy.
If the TPA were subject to this Convention, it would narrow the number of instances where the
Australian courts would permit litigation in Australia in breach of contract. In effect, it would bring at
least some matters into line with the English position, and the position in arbitration law worldwide,
that party autonomy is of prime importance. However, for maritime lawyers, the exceptions to the
2005 Convention will be as important as its inclusions. As COGSA falls outside of it, parasitic TPA
claims will still receive the protection of the Australian courts.
390 Further, the fact it does not restrict
anti-suit injunctions means that no matter what restrictions the Australian legislature imposes to
protect its own law, if the UK signs the 2005 Convention, there will be no change in the practices of
their courts in issuing anti-suit injunctions. Those courts will apply their own law, not the Australian
382Commonly not regarded as contracts for carriage of goods but contracts for the hire of a vessel.
383If it did apply, it would mean that towage contracts in standard form that contracted for English jurisdiction would have to
be upheld, and the effect of not only s 52 of the Trade Practices Act but also s 74 would be avoided. See Lewins, What’s the
TPA got to do with it… Although in the context of a towage contract, where there are other close connections with a forum other
than the contracted forum, and where the English court permitted the case to proceed in the other forum despite an exclusive
jurisdiction clause, see the case of Bouygues Offshore SA v Caspian Shipping Co [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 461.
384Garnett R, “The Internationalisation of Australian Jurisdiction and Judgments Law” (2004) 25 ABR 205 at 208; see also
Garnett R, n 31.
385See also Spigelman J, n 24, at 325-326.
386That would be consistent with the High Court decision in Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR
418. If the ICA were not excluded from the 2005 Convention, it would represent a major shift in the current law.
387Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192; (2006) 238 ALR 457 per Allsop J at [240].
388Hi-Fert Pty Ltd v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc (1998) 90 FCR 1; 159 ALR 142 at 145 per Beaumont J.
389Although perhaps an Explanatory Memorandum could deal with this aspect.
390Of course the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act itself may well be replaced with the next sea carriage convention although that
would still appear to be some way off.
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165law, and therefore any excision to protect the rights of Australian litigants under COGSA, ICA or TPA
would not be relevant to the grant of an anti-suit injunction in the same way that they are of no
relevance at present.
The 2005 Convention may ease some of the discordance but not by recognition of foreign
mandatory laws, but rather through adopting the arbitration model denying their relevance –
effectively falling into line with the English position. Even that Convention is not necessarily assured
of success.
Judicial co-operation and conditional orders?
As Lord Denning once said:
In the interests of comity, one [court] must give way. I wish we could sit down together to discuss it.
391
This rather soulful aside might hold the key to another method of resolving the problem of courts
with overlapping jurisdiction: judicial cooperation. In his article on the subject,
392 Westbrook contends
that traditional conﬂict rules are increasingly unsatisfying, and mechanisms such as anti-suit
injunctions are highly intrusive and offensive to the other court. Perhaps one solution to parallel
litigation is for the courts themselves to “negotiate” with the other court. What is intended is not that
the judges necessarily speak directly to one another (although one would be forgiven for thinking that
might not be a bad idea). As Westbrook suggests, there are a range of ways in which one court could
enlighten the other about its law, the litigation thus far in its country, or even come to a joint judgment
on the merits. As Spigelman CJ notes, the possibilities are still evolving, but are to be encouraged as
a method of resolving jurisdictional disputes on a case-by-case basis. The idea that both courts might
work together with the parties to ﬁnd a solution to the jurisdictional dispute is deserving of further
thought, although one more akin to court mandated mediation rather than adjudication. In any event,
direct contact between the courts is some way off, if it is achievable at all.
One speciﬁc manifestation of this approach is, according to Westbrook, that one court makes a
court order “conditional” on parties behaving a certain way in the other court. This method of
compromise of systems seems to be occurring in a phlegmatic manner. It may be, for instance, that a
local court will agree to a conditional stay. Such orders are already made in circumstances where the
stay is conditional on the prompt progression of the other proceedings and where the stay is only
rendered permanent when compliance is assured.
393 However, it is rather a different proposition to
suggest that the condition might be that the parties allow the litigation of the TPA aspects of the
dispute in the foreign court – this is a variation of what occurred in the Pan case, where one side
conceded that the TPA issues could be raised before the arbitrator. This is where the difference
between arbitration – as a private procedure where the scope of the arbitrators mandate is agreed by
the parties, and court proceedings, where a court is exercising its own jurisdiction, looms large. It
seems unlikely that, an English court would be prepared to accept an Australian court’s entitlement to,
in effect, dictate what is to be raised in their court – at least without both parties’ consent to that
course.
394
However, if the courts could bring themselves to such a concession, the resolution of the problem
might be achieved. There is some precedent in its favour. For instance, in the seminal House of Lords
case of Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425, the House of Lords found the necessary
involvement of litigation in New York involving third parties to the contract, and the consequent
multiplication of proceedings, a sufficiently strong reason not to grant a stay based on a breach of an
exclusive jurisdiction clause. In discussing the weighing of one party’s interest to proceed in the
chosen forum, versus the advantages to the other party of proceeding in a foreign forum, the court
noted that the problem can often be overcome by appropriate undertakings given by the defendant, or
391Smith Kline & French Laboratories v Bloch [1983] 1 WLR 730 at 735 as quoted in Westbrook JL, “International Judicial
Negotiation” (2003) 38 Tex ILJ 567.
392Westbrook JL, n 392.
393Westbrook JL, n 392, at 577-578.
394Or perhaps some sort of bilateral agreement between governments.
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166by granting an injunction or stay upon appropriate terms.
395 In this case, the defendant seeking
discharge of an injunction enforcing the exclusive jurisdiction clause gave an undertaking that it
would not enforce against the plaintiff any multiple or punitive damages awards that may be given by
the US courts.
396 Lord Hobhouse explicitly noted that the undertaking “altered the position” as it had
appeared to the lower courts, and was one to be given weight in exercising its discretion.
397
Similarly, in the case of Bouygues Offshore SA v Caspian Shipping Co [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 461
an undertaking made by the applicant for a stay that it would only exercise the right of damages
against a fund already raised in London seemed to be one of the factors that persuaded the court to
issue the stay despite the exclusive jurisdiction clause favouring London. In Baghlaf v Al Zafer
Factory Co v Pakistan National Shipping Co
398 a stay of English proceedings brought within time but
in breach of the foreign exclusive jurisdiction clause was granted on condition that the shipowners
waived the right to rely on the time bar which had since expired, because the plaintiff had acted
reasonably in suing in England where it could recover a reasonable package limitation while in the
contracted country, Pakistan, it would be limited to a fraction of the claim.
399
The US experience is an enlightening one for Australia, as it too wishes to preserve the
advantages that its traders enjoy under local law. A study has shown that when a US court dismisses
local proceedings in giving force to the contractual exclusive jurisdiction clause favouring another
country, it often leads to the case settling, thus thwarting adjudication of the case on its merits.
400 US
commentators have also urged their courts to use conditional dismissals rather than outright dismissals
of local proceedings in favour of contractually selected courts or arbitration,
401 pointing out that “a
more generous use of the conditional dismissal device not only may avert the need to resolve these
difficult choice of law issues but may facilitate a determination on the merits of the dispute”.
402
It remains to be seen just how the use of conditional stays can work, and whether it can extend to
an order conditioning the stay on the basis that one party be allowed to raise an entirely new, and
foreign, cause of action in the contracted forum, and whether the court will look for such a concession
to be offered by one party rather than imposed by the court.
As stated, while it is unclear whether an English court will allow the imposition of a mandatory
statute of Australia just because an Australian court has asked politely; it may, however, be willing to
do so if the parties concede the point.
403 While this would be, one might think, initially deeply
unattractive to the party pressing for proceedings to be brought in England, strategically it might have
some merit. First, it cuts a swathe through the potential jurisdictional battle: saving both time and
money and ensuring that the entire dispute is dealt with in one forum – and the chosen forum.
395Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425 at 431. Some of the Law Lords also acknowledged the possibility that the
plaintiff could recover damages being the additional costs for breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clause: see p 439 (per
Lord Hobhouse), p 433 (per Lord Scott).
396See Lord Bingham, giving the leading judgment, at p 437.
397At p 439. Lord Scott said he would have come to the conclusion that there were strong reasons against a stay without the
proffered undertaking, but that the “undertaking offered by Armco conﬁrms it”.
398Baghlaf v Al Zafer Factory Co v Pakistan National Shipping Co [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 229, as cited in Gaskell 20.220. (book
– deﬁned on ﬁrst page)
399This case is contrary to the earlier cases where the courts would not consider the expiration of the time bar as a factor against
a stay: see above at n 76, also discussion at Gaskell at 20.20.213–20.220.
400Force R and Davies M, n 17, at 50–55.
401As is often the case in forum non conveniens cases where there is no exclusive jurisdiction clause: see Davies M, “Forum
Selection Clauses” (2003) Tul Mar LJ at 381.
402Force R and Davies M, n 17 at 55.
403If the parties were willing to do so, there would have been no dispute as to jurisdiction in the ﬁrst place – however, in the race
to secure best position, the parties may not have raised or negotiated this point.
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167Secondly, the fact that the TPA issue is aired does not mean it is going to be decisive.
404 The party
wanting to rely on it would still have to establish, for instance, its applicability to the circumstances,
which previous cases have shown, in a TPA context is not a foregone conclusion; what is more, that
party still faces an uphill battle to convince a court unfamiliar with the TPA of its effect and
application. Nevertheless, the party wanting to rely on the TPA would at least be able to raise and
argue the issue; although the treatment in the foreign jurisdiction might not be directly in alignment
with the way an Australian court would have dealt with it, it is better than nothing and a whole lot
cheaper besides. On the downside, however, the same sorts of issues arise here as are highlighted in
relation to such a course of action in arbitrations
405 – what exactly is open to the courts, and how will
they proceed? While the problem of multiple fora may be resolved, it would replace that battle with
relatively uncharted questions relating to the power to order conditional stays and their effect on
foreign proceedings. Given the fact that these types of claims are not regularly before the courts at the
highest levels, the rules of engagement for conditional stays, and their effect on the contractual forum,
may take some time, and expensive litigation, to play out. Nevertheless, this approach has the beneﬁts
of ﬂexibility and tailored solutions delivered at the precise point where they are needed, not to
mention a synchronicity with the case management principles in operation in courts in recent times.
Given that such an idea is in its infancy, perhaps then it is better to consider the recommendation
of Dickenson
406 and Whincop and Keyes
407 – that countries should look to reduce the effect of their
mandatory laws, rather than increase them. This option, which is considered next, has the advantage of
being one, at least, that Australia can bring about unilaterally.
Amendment of TPA
The TPA as a mandatory statute in the context of international contracts has been the subject of a lot
of litigation over the years. One has to wonder, pragmatically, whether the public policy objective of
the TPA is worth this price – at least insofar as international commercial litigation is concerned. In
addition, one also might ponder whether this was the desired effect of s 52 of the TPA in particular,
given that there is no applicable provision outlining its effect on exclusive jurisdiction or choice of law
clauses. There may be an argument that s 52 is an example of a “localising” statutory provision, with
its operation predicated on conduct within Australia or by Australian companies, such the parliament
had no intent for it to be a mandatory rule overriding parties’ choice as to foreign law or
jurisdiction.
408 Indeed, the fact that there is an express provision for another division (including s 74)
but not capturing s 52, would seem to support that.
409
It has been suggested that, from a conﬂict of laws perspective, courts should not be eager to
bestow mandatory status on a statute unless the statute says as much in clear words.
410 However, over
the last 30 years, the Australian judiciary has interpreted the Act broadly in keeping with its apparent
404Although the agreement to allow Trade Practices Act issues to be raised may be taken to be an agreement to change the
applicable law of the contract (or that, at least, the Trade Practices Act is applicable): see Nygh, n 343, at 120. Lawyers acting
for such a party would need to tread carefully and with eyes wide open in case their client was taken to concede that the Trade
Practices Act was triggered, for instance.
405See “International Convention Upholding Party Autonomy – What Effect Domestic Mmandatory Law? The Exceptional Case
of Arbitration Clauses.” in Pt II of this paper.
406See Dickenson A, n 140, at 84.
407Whincop and Keyes at 61 and 65.
408See Whincop and Keyes at 65-67. Also see Mann, “Statutes and the Conﬂict of Laws” (1972–1973) 46 British Year Book of
International Law 117. Tetley calls such laws “obligatory forum statutes”, being a statute that the forum court is obliged to
apply, but which has no place in any system of international law. Tetley W, International Conﬂict of Laws: Common Civil and
Maritime BLAIS (1994) at 103.
409Although one could also argue that, as s 52 deals with conduct that may or may not be contractual, a provision such as s 67
would not be a good ﬁt with s 52.
410Whincop and Keyes, p 65.
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168policy. It would certainly seem too late for any narrowing of that interpretation by judicial means.
411
Therefore it is submitted that clariﬁcation as to the application of the TPA should occur as a matter of
statutory amendment.
One possible reform would be to “beef up” the TPA by extending the operation of s 67 to s 52
and surrounding provisions.
412 However, as was shown in Akai, this does not improve the chances of
it being recognised by an English court. Alternatively, it could be added to s 2C of the IAA so the TPA
has a similar status as COGSA for international arbitrations. However, this would see Australia drop
further from international uniformity in the one situation where this appears to have been achieved –
arbitration under the New York Convention. It would be preferable for the IAA to remain as it is, with
the court making use of its entitlement to impose conditions to ensure the TPA is heard. Further, the
differences in treatment of TPA allegations in the context of enforcement of arbitration clauses
compared to exclusive jurisdiction clauses is difficult to justify, in particular because there is no
explicit applicable provision in the TPA which indicates how s 52 is to be treated in a conﬂict
situation.
413
Therefore, the most effective means of achieving the desired end would be to reduce the scope of
the TPA in relation to commercial contracts with an international perspective. There are a number of
ways that gateways out of the TPA could be crafted. It could be done by keeping the TPA mandatory
for domestic contracts but allowing contracting out of TPA in circumstances where there is an
international commercial contract – namely where both parties are commercial entities, at least one
party is based outside Australia, performance occurs outside Australia (at least in part) and some of the
connecting factors are outside Australia. An additional factor for contracting out might be the
consideration for the transaction – for international transactions over a certain amount, the TPA will
not apply.
414 Alternatively, reforms could allow contracting out of s 52 by certain industries such as
the carriage of goods by sea (whether the contract is contained in a charterparty or sea carriage
document) and international trade – which would, in a sense, be an extension of the effect of s 74(3).
Consider the advantages of such an amendment. If these types of transactions fell outside the TPA
it would have a double beneﬁt. First, it would add to certainty in enforcing jurisdictional clauses, and
lead to a lessening of jurisdictional clashes, which are expensive and lead to delays in resolving
disputes. (Those plaintiffs whose claims fall under COGSA would nonetheless maintain their right to
bring an action in Australia.
415) Further, as it currently stands, the overseas party holds all the cards.
For instance, if the overseas company in fact wanted to rely on the TPA against the Australian party,
it could institute proceedings in Australia and the courts would permit it to continue here in breach of
a contractual provision to sue elsewhere, possibly even obtaining an anti-anti-suit injunction in
Australia. An Australian party might have earlier obtained an anti-suit from the English courts to
prevent the overseas party from continuing here. But if the judgment is to be enforced in Australia
against the Australian party, there would be no “downside” for the overseas party in continuing in
Australia, because there is no way for the English courts to take advantage of the enforcement process
to display its displeasure. However, where the Australian party wishes to rely on the TPA against the
overseas party, the same situation will not work in reverse. There, the overseas party would be entitled
411However, Whincop and Keyes argue that courts should not read any attempt to overrule party autonomy extensively, but
rather, narrowly, because the best and most certain results are obtained if the parties’ wishes are respected: p 63. While the courts
cannot refuse to enforce such legislation, it should not widen its scope by eliminating choices of law that Parliament has not
eliminated: p 65.
412At least insofar as a breach of s 52 is said to have occurred in a contractual context.
413As stated at the outset, the conﬂict provisions in the Trade Practices Act do not apply to Pt V Div 1 of the Trade Practices
Act, which includes s 52.
414A similar provision exists in s 187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of the Conﬂict of Laws (US): see n 171 and discussion
at “Mandatory Rules of Third ‘Closely Connected’ Country (Other Than the Forum or Chosen Law)” in Pt I of this paper.
415Although such a right would be open to challenge from an English court where that court is chosen by the parties in their
contract, at least by virtue of enacting an international convention to which England and Australia are each a party, the attitude
to the Australian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act has yet to be played out in the English Courts.
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169to an anti-suit injunction and, if England is the place where its assets are, then enforcement of any
Australian judgment in England would be subject to challenge.
Secondly, the quarantining of TPA from international transactions would make the Australian
forum a more attractive one for litigation and as a nominated seat of arbitration.
416 Frankly, the TPA
might be giving Australia a bad name in this regard.
417 If this issue were resolved, Australia could
legitimately promote itself as a provider of ﬁrst class legal services at a reasonable price, with a legal
system highly supportive of international trade: in short, a worthy neutral venue for litigation and
arbitration.
On the other hand, admittedly such an exception opens up a can of worms. Any such reform
would need to take place after extensive review of the business, economic and legal imperatives for
change. If the reform was to be limited only to international trade and maritime contracts, the review
would have to consider whether and why those ﬁelds should be allowed an exception, and not other
forms of international commerce.
418 Perhaps a special case can be made for maritime law; but it
would be preferable to have a wider exception for international commerce generally. Perhaps it is
simply the case that Australian businesses taking their place on the world stage should be allowed to
stand up for themselves, and importantly, agree to abide by agreements made as to forum and law.
In considering reform such as that proposed, the realities of the current situation need to be borne
in mind. An exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of England brings a strong likelihood of the grant
of an anti-suit injunction in England restraining an Australian party from commencing or continuing
proceedings in Australia.
419 As we have seen, the likely conclusion of the English courts will be that
English law applies, and that the mandatory domestic law of Australia has no part to play. That being
the case, it is as if, de facto, parties to an international transaction may contract out of the provisions
of the TPA. Perhaps it is time to bring the statute into line with this reality so as to minimise cost and
uncertainty for those parties.
Depending on the form that the amendments might take, those parties who freely negotiate their
contracts could still bargain for Australian law.
420 Those parties who ﬁnd themselves subject to
so-called “boilerplate” provisions will not have that luxury. However, those types of provisions are
most likely to be found in sea carriage documents caught by COGSA so as to give them some
semblance of entitlement – recognised in Australia at least – to continue proceedings in Australia.
421
In any event there is something to be said for the view that those parties still have it within their power
416While it is true that Australia could be nominated as the contractual forum and the law of, say England apply to the
contract/arbitration, in reality it is more sensible to have the nominated place enforce its local law.
417Another way to improve Australia’s prospects as a country offering arbitration services is to include in the Trade Practices
Act a provision similar to that in s 27(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK) which recognises that if the law of
England is applicable only by choice of the parties, not because the English law is the proper law of the contract, then the Act
will not apply. Dicey and Morris term this a “self denying statute” and the Law Commission speciﬁcally included the provision
so as not to discourage business from selecting England as a neutral venue for their disputes: see 14th ed at 1-062.
418Although there is a precedent for this: Section 74 provides part of the argument – carriage is already exempt from this
section. In addition, in what seems a purely political idiosyncrasy, engineers and architects are exempt from s 74. The
amendment of s 74 to exclude those professions was made by the Senate on 2 May 1986 at the insistence of the minority party
holding balance of power in the Senate: See Speech by Lionel Bowen to the Senate on 2 May 1986: http://
parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=84058&table=HANSARDR viewed 11 November 2007.
419Unless the Australian party can bring an anti-anti-suit injunction ﬁrst. This is discussed further under the next heading.
420For instance, if theAct permits contracting out in certain circumstances rather than excising certain types of transactions from
the operation of s 52.
421At least in the context of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, in most cases, the basis of the claim is likely to be the same in
England and Australia because of the common root of the Hague Visby Rules. It seems that carriers are accepting of litigation
concerning cargo claims delivered in Australia being litigated in Australia – undoubtedly, it has been a common feature of cargo
claims for a long time – but also perhaps because the efficient litigation process, cheaper legal costs and close parallels between
English and Australian law. However, one possible hiccup would be where the Australian modiﬁcations are directly in issue, at
which point it may be worth a carrier’s while attempting to have the matter heard in England, and relying on The Hollandia for
the application of the “pure” Hague Visby Rules by the English court. However, in this regard, see n 156.
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170to negotiate with the seller of the goods to ensure the carriage contract contains the terms it prefers,
422
even though that may be commercially unrealistic.
For now, the solution lies in the hands of the parties
Unless and until any of the above changes can be wrought, the parties are left with a difficult situation
when one wishes to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction clause and the other wishes to assert that an
Australian court should adjudicate because the TPA applies. The following should be borne in mind
by Australian parties involved in international transactions:
– First, pay attention to the terms of the contract being negotiated. To preserve an entitlement to
rely on TPA, ideally a contract should stipulate for Australian law. A premium may have to be
paid. For consignees in CIF sales, then it is possible
423 to stipulate in the contract of sale that the
contract of carriage must have an exclusive jurisdiction clause to your liking. Again, expect to
pay a premium for the privilege. If it is not possible to negotiate, then the lawyers will simply
have to work with what they have got.
– Secondly, when a dispute happens, move quickly to assess and act. Where there is an arbitration
clause, the law is clearer (and therefore so too are your options). But it is also clear that it might
still be worth commencing proceedings even if the obvious result is to obtain a stay against you
in favour of arbitration – because, based on previous cases, you might be able to get an order
that the arbitral panel considers TPA law. The other party may even agree to such an order,
seeing it as a trade off for the stay in Australia.
424 Indeed, the parties may be able to agree to the
inclusion of the TPA in the reference to arbitration from the outset, avoiding the need for court
proceedings at all.
– Similar advice can be given where the clause is an exclusive jurisdiction clause. It may be worth
an attempt to negotiate with the other side about the raising of TPA matters. This may involve
some idealistic concession for the party seeking to uphold the contractual provisions. But the
concession could be framed on the basis that the triggering of the TPA is still in issue, although
the applicability of it is accepted. It may well be unrealistic to think parties might do this, but if
it means that at least the forum of the dispute will not itself be disputed, it might be worth the
concession: particularly if it seems that the TPA is unlikely to add much to the matrix of liability
in any event. On that basis, any proceedings in breach of the contract might be able to be stayed
on condition that the TPA issues can be raised, and the court that is the chosen forum may be
able to endorse this in the manner suggested by Westbrook.
It has to be conceded that both of these suggestions do sacriﬁce total primacy of contractual
terms, but upon the altar of pragmatic resolution of the whole of the dispute in one forum, and in the
spirit of the recent cases in Australia and England in the context of conditional stays.
If negotiations are not fruitful then unfortunately, the stand off between the courts means that the
parties have little choice but to engage in the pre-litigation stoush. The difficulty is that there is little
time for the lawyers to consider whether the TPA cause of action adds anything to the claims already
possibly under the contract. With sufficient time to assess, it might be that the lawyers conclude there
is no substantial advantage to pleading a TPA claim. However, the very nature of the pre-litigation
battle, and the importance of commencing proceedings and obtaining initial orders, the opportunity to
assess this might not occur until after the parties have run up the very real expense of court orders. A
party that has fought hard to maintain its right to bring a TPA claim is going to be reluctant to give
that claim away at a later point; but keeping the TPA claim on foot will add to the expense of the
litigation. Perhaps again, there is a practical solution – that all parties agree to a moratorium period
while options are canvassed.
Where the parties are unable to achieve any sort of agreement, then, while we are awaiting more
considered reform or guidance from the Australian legislature, the rule of thumb for measuring the
422Von Zeigler A, n 11, at 95. See also 112-117 for a spirited defence of the carrier’s entitlement to insert and rely upon
exclusive jurisdiction clauses in its contracts of carriage.
423Although perhaps unlikely.
424See Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 425.
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171outcome of these disputes will be no more elegant or principled than a scramble for an anti-suit (or
anti-anti-suit injunction) on a “ﬁrst snout in the trough” basis.
The uncertainty thus induced, taken with the perceived prize of the party’s perceived jurisdiction, stokes up
the enthusiasm for expensive and prolonged jurisdictional arguments.
425
This is the least attractive option but also the status quo, unless and until there is some impetus for
change. Perhaps the rumblings of English courts willing to refuse to enforce judgments obtained in
breach of contract, or to seek indemnity costs for pursuing proceedings in breach of contract, will
render parties and their lawyers more circumspect and governments more willing to consider reform.
An indigestible stew, indeed.
425Steel, J, n 67, at 18.
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1725.2  Significant Developments  
5.2.1  Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly 
or Partly by Sea 
 
The article in 5.1 discusses the TPA as a ‘mandatory’ statute.  The article distinguishes the operation 
of mandatory statutes that are enacting international conventions dealing with carriage of goods 
regimes on the basis that they are ‘closed systems’ that reduce or extinguish party autonomy.
128 
Indeed, the clashes between jurisdictions that occur are usually because of the differing carriage 
regimes enacted in countries relevant to a particular carriage transaction.  An example mentioned in 
the article is that of the Hollandia.
129  
 
These clashes may well get worse before they get better, with the looming introduction of the Draft 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Draft 
Convention) introduced in Chapter 2 above.
130 The Draft Convention is to apply where any one of 
the following places is located in a country which has enacted it: the place of receipt, the port of 
loading, the place of delivery or the port of discharge.
131 A plaintiff may bring proceedings in one of 
a range of jurisdictions; the domicile of the carrier, the place of receipt or delivery agreed in the 
contract, the place of loading or of discharge of the goods, or a court which the parties have 
agreed.
132 Exclusive choice of court clauses will only be enforceable if within a volume contract
133 
                                                      
128 See article set out in 5.1, at text accompanying fn 242. 
129 [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 as discussed in article set out in 5.1, at text accompanying fn 155; and also fn 237. 
130 Above, in Chapter  2.2.2. 
131 Draft Convention Article 5. 
132 Ibid, Article 68. 
  173and only in certain circumstances.
134 Significantly, countries will only be bound by the jurisdiction 
and choice of court provisions in Chapter 14 of the Draft Convention if they declare that to be the 
case.
135  If many countries, or even just the more influential countries such as England, choose not 
to be bound by Chapter 14 on jurisdiction, then it would seem that the issues concerning selection of 
the forum by the plaintiff might be as fractured as ever.   
 
5.2.2  Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd [No 3]
136
This case was mentioned in the article at 5.1 above.
137 The defendant sought the discharge of ex 
parte injunctions preventing banks paying the defendant pursuant to performance guarantees issued 
by the plaintiff.
138  The judge undertook a full consideration of the matter, including the construction 
of the guarantees, in order to properly deal with the application.
139 He concluded that the plaintiff 
was in fact in breach of the relevant contract and that accordingly, the defendant was entitled to call 
upon the guarantees.  The judge did not conduct any further review of the authorities concerning 
TPA and arbitration.  A stay of the order discharging the injunctions has been granted pending the 
hearing of an application for leave to appeal.
140
                                                                                                                                                                 
133 Defined in Article 1(2) of the Draft Convention as ‘a contract of carriage that provides for the carriage of a specified 
quantity of goods in a series of shipments during an agreed period of time. The specification of the quantity may include a 
minimum, a maximum or a certain range’. This definition would encompass the so called contracts of affreightment 
commonly used in Australia to export commodities.  The Attorney General’s department is also concerned that a simple 
contract for shipment of two containers on two different ships could be interpreted as a ‘volume contract’: ‘Summary of 
draft Convention on contracts for the international carriage of goods wholly or partly by sea for Australian Industry’ 11 
March 2008 circulated to MLAANZ members on 12 March 2008.  A copy is held by the author. 
134 Article 69 of the Draft Convention.  There are also limits on its enforceability on third parties to the carriage contract: 
Article 69 (2). 
135 Ibid, Article 76. 
136 [2007] FCA 2082 ( unreported, Gilmour J  21 December 2007). 
137 See article set out in 5.1 above, n 120. 
138 Who had entered a conditional appearance; above n135 at [7]. 
139 Ibid, [20] 
140 Clough Engineering Ltd v Natural Gas Corporation Ltd [No 4] [2007] FCA 2110 (unreported, Gilmour J.) 
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Chapter Six:  
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  175This thesis set out to explore the uneasy relationship between Australian maritime law and the TPA. 
It sought to provide guidance to maritime lawyers in Australia and abroad as to the operation of the 
provisions of s52 and s74 of the TPA, their pitfalls and potential application in maritime and shipping 
matters.  
 
The thesis considered the potential applicability of the TPA in 3 main types of maritime contracts: 
carriage of goods, carriage of passengers, and towage contracts, as an example of contracts for 
maritime services. It then dealt with the reality which faces Australian maritime lawyers who seek to 
rely on the TPA on behalf of their clients: that the TPA, afforded great respect in Australia, has little 
influence when the contract between the parties confers exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts. 
As England remains the centre of preference for dispute resolution of matters maritime, this 
conclusion has more impact than one might otherwise think. 
 
It was not always clear that the TPA would apply to purely commercial, private contracts where there 
is no consumer in sight.
141  However, now there can be no doubt that the TPA does apply to 
maritime law in Australia, although its application creates discord with the accepted matrix of legal 
liabilities that constitutes the commonality of maritime law.  What is more, as shown by chapters 3 
and 4 in particular, recent amendments have created a hotch-potch of exceptions and caveats to the 
application of the TPA in any given instance.  The end result is that the law is neither clear nor 
certain.  There are uncertainties as to the extraterritorial reach of the TPA,
142 whether the limitation 
provisions in International Conventions apply to TPA claims,
143 whether State laws will be brought in 
                                                      
141 See the article reproduced at 5.1at fn 1 and the cases cited there. 
142 See Chapter 2 and 5. 
143  See Chapters 2 and 3. 
  176to overrule s74,
144 whether and to what extent a contractual indemnity might be valid,
145 to what 
extent cruise ship passengers are engaging in a ‘recreational activity,’
146 and whether an arbitrator 
based overseas will hear TPA issues,
147 to name but a few.  The TPA’s application, reach and 
integration with international conventions are all uncertain. What is worse, one cannot even comfort 
oneself with the thought that the TPA is continuing to perform its original function well because the 
amendments result in even less protection for those who were the original beneficiaries – the 
consumers.  
 
An uncertain legal environment is the enemy of commercial endeavour. The strength of demand for 
Australian commodities at present ensures that international commerce will be transacting here for 
the foreseeable future. However, as noted in Chapter 5, the deviation from commonality of laws that 
the TPA represents may well be harming the attempts to increase Australia’s profile as a centre for 
dispute resolution and arbitration in maritime matters.  One cannot imagine that a well advised 
overseas commercial entity would knowingly agree to an arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clause in 
favour of Australia at present if there was even a whiff of the possibility that the TPA might apply. It is 
true that arbitrations could be conducted in Australia pursuant to the laws of England (or some other 
place). However, one would imagine a businessperson would choose either England itself, or a place 
perceived to have laws more closely aligned with that international ‘commonality’ of laws. 
 
The current complexity of the TPA in maritime law must similarly be affecting Australian based plaintiffs.  
Plaintiffs are understandably eager to preserve their rights to allege helpful local causes of action 
                                                      
144 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
145 See Chapter 4. 
146 See Chapter 3. 
147 See Chapter 5.1.  
  177such as the TPA,
148 and if there is no dispute as to jurisdiction (as is discussed in Chapter 5) then 
the addition of the TPA claim may not add a great deal of expense to the litigation.  However, if the 
plaintiff is forced to engage in expensive and drastic strategies
149 in order to preserve its rights to 
pursue a TPA claim then it would be preferable for the application, reach and limits of the TPA to be 
more readily ascertainable.  At least then the plaintiff, and its legal advisers, would have some 
reasonable scope to decide whether it is worthwhile undertaking those drastic strategies.  The 
present situation seems to be, as we saw in chapter 5, that when there is a commercial maritime 
contract
150 it is likely that the applicability of the TPA will be decided not by a reasoned and logical 
application of facts to law, but rather by a scramble to the courthouse. That route is hardly likely to 
produce a principled outcome, nor at an economical price. 
 
Further, we have seen that the current arrangement could be said to favour foreign shipowners in 
some instances.
151  The Koumala case has shown that they are able to rely on the TPA themselves 
in their dealings with local service providers.  However, there is more than a little irony in the fact 
that, at least where COGSA does not apply and there is a contractual exclusive jurisdiction or 
arbitration clause, the shipowner has a good chance of avoiding any TPA liability by being the first to 
court to obtain an anti-suit injunction. The Draft Convention is likely to skew that outcome further with 
some important signatories refusing to countenance the suite of jurisdictional options it proposes for 
the Plaintiff, instead giving full force to exclusive jurisdiction provisions. 
 
                                                      
148 Mary Keyes says that ‘the use of TPA claims in foreign jurisdiction cases may be for strategic purposes’ – 
Jurisdiction in International Litigation (2005) at 154. Insofar as maritime cases are concerned, the author maintains that 
the TPA can be a meaningful cause of action for a plaintiff, quite apart from its consequences in any jurisdictional 
dispute. 
149 Such as anti –anti- suit injunctions. See for instance the lengthy Kiukiang Career litigation and the Pan case 
discussed in the article at 5.1, Part II. 
150 Not caught by COGSA. 
151 See Chapter 5.1, Part III.  
  178Ultimately, this thesis has argued that the ideal, but seemingly unattainable, solution would be an 
international convention on jurisdiction with broad acceptance.
152 Only time will tell us the fate of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005. In the meantime, further juridical 
development of the notion of co-operation and conditional orders may be of assistance in individual 
cases; but this has the disadvantage of being piecemeal – as a result, not contributing to certainty in 
this area. The options are canvassed in Chapter 5; but it has to be said that – aside from unilateral 
action by Australia to make the problem disappear
153 - no particular negotiated solution presents 
itself as workable at present. The remaining option, then, is for Australia to take unilateral action by 
amending the TPA.   
 
This thesis contends that the Australian policymakers, and eventually the Australian Parliament, 
ought to make a clear choice between preservation of the lofty ideals of the TPA, or comity in 
international maritime law. It may well be that the suggestions in chapter 5, to excise commercial 
maritime transactions from s52
154 (the excision option) gives the best outcome.  The certainty that 
would result would contribute to the enhanced attractiveness of Australia as a venue in which to 
litigate or arbitrate.
155  
 
In one area in which the writer is certain the TPA should continue to play a role is that of cruise ship 
passengers.  This is a manifestation of the original purpose of the TPA and should be maintained. 
Further, the recent changes barring a personal injury or death claim as a result of a breach of s52 
                                                      
152 Chapter 5.1. 
153 By excision of maritime law from the TPA. 
154 Although an argument could also be made for this excision only to affect s52 as maritime services claims might still 
be regarded as validly caught by s74. 
155 Indeed, one could claim a loose analogy with the exception of liner shipping from the competition provisions of the 
TPA. 
  179ought to be wound back to the 2004 position.  In that way the TPA can found a personal injury claim 
(consistent with its consumer protection mantle) but damages will be consistent with those awarded 
for a common law claim.
156
 
One could also make a sound argument for preserving the application of s74 to maritime services 
performed in Australia.  An exemption from s74 would seem to give those industries some sort of 
‘favoured status’ over non maritime industries operating in Australia.  It would be far neater for the 
requirement to remain, and the contracting parties to agree a limitation provision compliant with 
s68A. After all, other Australian industries have had to adapt to commercial life with s74.  However, 
the maritime services industries may argue that if they are to lose the protection of s52, they ought to 
lose the burden of s74.  These issues deserve some dialogue between industry and government. 
 
If the excision option is not taken up and the TPA is to continue to apply as it does at present, then a 
number of matters need to be made clearer.  The application, reach and limits of the TPA need to be 
clarified, and the festering issue of party autonomy clashing with the TPA also requires tending.  
 
Looming on the horizon is an opportunity for Australian policy makers to at least consider clarifying 
the place of the TPA in Australian maritime law.  The international community is currently finalising a 
new cargo regime, UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea.
157 The speed of adoption of Conventions is notoriously glacial - assuming 
                                                      
156 While the writer does not agree with the civil liability reforms, one can appreciate the importance of consistency in 
relation to damages available for different causes of action.  
157 See Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twenty-first session (Vienna, 14-25 January 2008) 
available on the web at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3Transport.html (accessed 1 April 
2008). 
 
  180that the Convention will receive sufficient acceptances to come into force at all.  But if the Convention 
does receive widespread acceptance, and Australia decides to commit to it, then it presents both a 
challenge and an opportunity as regards the TPA.  While considering carriage of goods by sea, and 
wider maritime law, in the Australian framework of legislation, Australia should also review the impact 
of the TPA in maritime law and give it a more thoughtful treatment. Should Australia choose to ratify 
and then enact enabling legislation, it should take that opportunity to consider whether the TPA 
should play a role in commercial maritime law at all.  If the answer is yes, then the interface between 
the TPA and the Convention could be made clearer.  For instance, the Convention could stipulate 
that the time and monetary limits within the Convention extend to any other causes of action against 
the carrier.  This alone should help minimise extraneous TPA allegations in carriage claims, because 
the TPA will not be a backdoor to receiving uncapped damages, or avoiding the time limits.  
 
In conclusion, it is important to note that the areas canvassed in this thesis – carriage of goods, 
carriage of passengers and contracts for maritime services – are merely some of the examples of 
maritime and trade law caught by the TPA web.  Some, such as pilots
158 and performance 
guarantees,
159 have been the subject of TPA case law already; and the field of unconscionability in 
international trade and transport remains relatively unexplored.
160 Clearly there are others who may 
be affected by the law as it currently stands. For instance, ship surveyors and classification societies 
could find s52 achieves for a non-contractual plaintiff what the law of negligence has not been able to 
deliver.  Port authorities and those providing navigational aids services such as VTS
161 might 
similarly find TPA allegations against them in the event of a casualty.  Likewise, TPA allegations 
                                                      
158 See Braverus case discussed at 2.2.2 and 4.3 above. 
159 Note Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd [1998] 3 VR 380 as cited in chapter 2.1 at fn 108. 
160 See Clough Engineering Ltd v Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd [2007] FCA 881 Gilmour J.(unreported) as 
discussed in chapter 5 above in Part II. 
161See Russell MacWilliam and Darryl Cooke, ‘VTS: lifting the fog of legal liability’ (2006) Lloyd's Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 362. 
  181might be aimed at a salvor for mismanaged salvage operations. Those topics will have to wait for 
another day.  
  182Appendix 1 - Errata 
Errors in published articles: 
‘Corporate Morality and Commercial Maritime Contracts: Considering the impact of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Australia) s52 on carriage of goods by sea’ (2004) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 197 – 218 
Page 199, should read ‘Section 52 prohibits a corporation from ‘engaging in conduct” that is 
misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive’. 
At p 217; ‘Indeed it could be said that Australian COGSA recognizes as much when it does not 
specifically make COGSA overrule s52, but only other parts of COGSA.’  Should read: ‘other parts of 
the TPA.’
Page 213 onwards; 4 (b) and (c) of the Article,162 need to be read subject to Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Chapter 5 discusses the fact that in most if not all cases, charterparties will include a stipulation that 
any disputes be resolved by arbitration or be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of a country other 
than Australia.  Chapter 5 discusses the ramifications of such a clause for an Australian litigant who 
wishes to rely on a TPA cause of action.  The Draft Convention is discussed again in this context. 
 
‘The Cruise Ship Industry – Liabilities to Passengers for Breach of s52 and s74 Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth)’ (2004) 18 MLAANZ Journal 30 – 54 
At text accompanying fn 165 the article discusses the limitation scheme applicable in New Zealand 
for claims against shipowners.
 163  It should have been pointed out that the New Zealand no – fault 
compensation scheme for personal injuries means that a passenger on a cruise line who sued in 
                                                      
162 From p213 onwards. 
163 At text accompanying fn 165. 
  183New Zealand would receive much less than might be the case in a country without such a scheme, 
such as Australia.  One assumes this was the motivation behind Mrs Dillon’s lawyers commencing 
proceedings in Australia rather than the location of the accident, New Zealand. 
 
At p 48, fn 127, it states that the 2002 Protocol ‘has 6 of the required 10 signatories’.  That is a 
misprint. As at 28 March 2008, it has only 4 of the required 10 signatories.
164  
 
 
                                                      
164See IMO website for status of conventions: <http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247>. 
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